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Executive summary 
Introduction 
Article 4.8 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) provides 
that ‘Parties shall give full consideration to … the impact of the implementation of response measures, 
especially on … (h) Countries whose economies are highly dependent on income generated from the 
production, processing and export, and/or on consumption of fossil fuels and associated energy-
intensive products’. Article 2.3 of the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC requires that developed country 
Parties (Annex I) ‘shall strive to implement policies and measures … in such a way to minimize … 
effects on international trade’ as well as minimizing the adverse effects on developing country Parties 
(Article 3.14). If Annex I Parties implement mitigation, they are assumed to buy less oil, coal or other 
fossil fuels. 
In this context, response measures are actions taken or initiated by developed countries (Annex 1) but 
with the impacts and ramifications flowing on to developing countries. The concern of developing 
countries, therefore, is in those impacts which to a greater or lesser extent depend on the degree of 
exposure of developing countries to trade (with or without the implementation of corresponding 
climate measures within the developing countries themselves). The South African economy derives 
much of its growth from production related to the energy-intensive sectors of its economy. In general, 
with the climate negotiations on the future of the climate regime post-2012, the implications for 
energy-intensive and trade-exposed sectors of the economy need to be clearly understood.  
This research confirms findings of previous studies (see Section 1.3), that the impacts of response 
measures may imply losses of exports in some sectors, but also possibly gains in other sectors. In this 
report the scenarios examined are broader than those examined under an earlier Fund of Research into 
Industrial Development, Growth and Equity (FRIDGE) study. In particular, this study highlights the 
impacts which response measures have on sectors other than the manufacturing sector, including 
mining, agriculture and tourism. The present report has provided a more specific identification of 
energy-intensive and trade-intensive sectors – and those that are both energy- and trade-intensive. We 
have also examined variations related to scenarios with and without emission trading among Annex I 
countries, and extended this to the consideration of a no-lose crediting approach for non-Annex I 
(NAI) countries.  
Identifying trade-exposed and energy-intensive sectors  
Analysis of trade-exposed sectors finds that industries that are most trade-intensive are not only 
mining and heavy industries but include other more diversified industries such as basic metals,  
chemicals, machinery and transport equipment. Descriptive analyses are conducted at the commodity 
level and at the industry level. At the commodity level there is some limited evidence that South 
Africa’s merchandise export trends are moving away from traditional export clusters in the resources 
towards higher-added-value clusters such as machinery, transport and other equipment. However, in 
terms of global trade it would appear that more conventional commodities trade (of minerals) has 
made something of a comeback on the back of rapid economic expansion in Asia. Thus, although at 
the industry level the overriding observation remains that resources and related activities such as basic 
metals and basic chemicals are the key driver of South African exports, diversification into value-
added activities such as machinery and transport equipment is noticeable. Agriculture’s exports, 
however, seem to have become more important, while those of processed food have lost ground. This 
is an interesting trend in that it suggests a reversing of the beneficiation process that may to a larger 
degree be taking place in the minerals resources complex.   
When an expanded view of ‘trade exposure’ is considered which includes not only direct but also 
indirect intermediate imports, analysis still identifies the list of ‘usual suspect’ sectors in terms of trade 
exposure, as shown in the table below. South Africa’s tertiary industries remain less exposed to trade. 
So, despite some tentative signs of diversification, resource-intensive sectors remain important to 
exports and are trade-exposed.  
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No. Trade-exposed Energy-intensive Energy-intensive and trade-exposed 
1. Mining, basic metals                                  
(ferrous and non-ferrous 
metals) 
Basic metals                                                  
(iron and steel and non-
ferrous metals) 
Basic iron and steel 
2. Machinery Non-metallic minerals Non-ferrous metals 
3. 
Chemicals 
Chemical and 
petrochemical products 
Chemicals and petrochemicals 
4. Oil Refining and related Mining and quarrying Mining and quarrying (incl. coal) 
5. High tech industries                                    
(professional and 
scientific equipment and 
TV electronics) 
 
Machineries and manufactures (incl. food 
products and transport vehicles and 
equipment) 
6.  Transport services including air transport 
 
The analysis of energy-intensive industry sectors reviews available data, particularly energy balances, 
in order to identify those sectors with high energy-to-output ratios (with energy use per unit of 
economic output as our metric of energy intensity). Energy-intensity is used as a proxy for emissions-
intensity, since this analysis does not consider changes in fuel mix. Applying this analysis to industry 
sectors shows a clear set of the ‘top four’ as shown in the table above. 
The more energy-intensive sectors that stand out include basic metals (iron and steel as well as non-
ferrous metals), non-metallic minerals, chemical and petrochemical products, and mining and 
quarrying. Together these comprise the ‘top four’ energy-intensive industrial sectors. This could be 
due to issues in the underlying data, or a real effect. A possible explanation could include a move to 
more tertiary sectors and a service economy. The other possibility would be that some energy 
efficiency measures are having an impact. Further analysis and longer, more consistent time-series 
would be needed to identify any such trend definitively. Combining the two underlying analyses, we 
identify as energy-intensive and trade-exposed (EITE) sectors as below. 
Modelling the impacts of response measures for different scenarios  
Having identified EITE sectors, we model the impact of response measures on South Africa under 
different scenarios. The scenarios considered include two reduction scenarios for Annex I – 25% 
(Scenario 1) and 40% (Scenario 2) below 1990 levels by 2020. Each of these two Annex I mitigation 
scenarios considers three different variants, distinguished by their assumptions about emissions 
trading (ET): (a) no emissions trading; (b) trade only among Annex I countries; and (c) access to 
carbon markets for NAI countries on a no-lose crediting basis. The ‘No emissions trade’ scenario is 
not considered likely, given existing and planned trading schemes, but provides a benchmark against 
which marginal abatement costs of other variants can be assessed. ‘Annex I emissions trade’ keeps the 
situation as with the Kyoto Protocol, with trading limited to developed countries but not extended to 
developing countries. The third variant considers a situation (as currently under negotiation for the 
period after 2012) in which NAI countries could trade on a ‘no-lose crediting’ basis.  
The overall results of modelling the impacts of response measures suggest that, nationally, losses due 
to exports (coal and other) are offset by gains in exports of EITE sectors. However, this occurs only in 
a situation with emissions trading extended beyond Annex I, on the basis of no-lose crediting for NAI. 
In the case of the ‘No ET’ scenario and the ‘Annex I ET’ scenario, South Africa can expect real 
production losses, essentially because global competition for export of energy-intensive goods to 
Annex I countries intensifies on the back of falling fossil fuel prices (due to falling world demand) 
which may end up allowing some NAI regions such as China to gain from the competition, but 
resulting in losses for others such as South Africa. The overall losses, however, can be turned into 
potential gains if NAI regions are allowed to participate in a global ET scheme on a ‘no-lose’ basis.  
In terms of potential gains from emissions crediting, South Africa might earn $285 billion in 2010 (for 
the 25% no-lose NAI mitigation scenario which rises to $470 million for the 40% scenario), $121 
million in 2015 ($187m) and $64 million in 2020 ($68m). These potential earnings should be 
understood in the context of massive gains from emissions trade by Annex I countries: for example, 
the US would save $4288 million in 2020 in the 40% scenario.  
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A summary of the analysis can be described briefly in terms of winners and losers as follows:  
Losers: 
• ‘Coal mining’ irrespective of emissions trading regimes, due to reduced worldwide demand in all 
scenarios relative to Business as usual (BaU) (around -1.5 to -2% per annum in ‘no ET’ and 
‘Annex I ET’ Scenarios and around -2.5 to -3% in ‘Annex I ET with NAI no-lose crediting 
scenario). More specifically the figures above show (as well as those in Table 3.10 later) that 
across all three scenarios assessed (No ET, Annex I ET and Annex I ET and no-lose crediting) the 
coal sector stands to lose in terms of exports. In the last scenario, however, with no-lose crediting, 
the magnitude of this negative impact on the coal sector is significantly smaller, dropping from 
5.4% in ‘no ET’ to 0.3% in ‘no-lose crediting’.  
• Other EITE sectors benefit from no-lose grading, but show some losses otherwise. These sectors 
are ferrous metals; agriculture, food and tobacco; chemical, rubber and plastic; motor vehicle and 
equipment; non-ferrous metals; other manufacture; international tourism. This is due to a 
combination of reduced demand (income effect) in Annex I countries and strong competition from 
other NAI countries in the supply of these goods to Annex I countries. ‘Air transport’ escapes 
from losses because of the benefit of reduced fuel costs due to reduced world demand for fuels 
(relative to BaU scenario). ‘Iron and steel’ and ‘Other mining’ avoid reduction due to ‘leakage 
effects’ to South Africa despite competition from other NAI countries.  
Winners: 
• ‘Iron and steel’, ‘Other mining’ and ‘Air transport’ in ‘No ET’ and ‘Annex I ET’ scenarios. The 
positive impact on ‘Air transport’ in South Africa is primarily due to reduced fuel costs due to 
reduced world demand for fuels (relative to BaU). The positive impacts on ‘Iron and steel’ and 
‘Other mining’ in South Africa are partly due to potential ‘leakage effects’. 
• Most EITE sectors can turn losses into gains with ‘No-lose trading’ or even just ‘Annex I trading’ 
– except ‘Coal mining’, ‘Iron and steel’, and ‘Other mining’. The potential losses outweighed by 
the positive income effect from improved efficiency in this ET regime, particularly if the sectors 
have access to the carbon markets directly. 
• ‘International tourism’ – as with most sectors – shows positive impacts when there is ‘Annex I ET 
with NAI no-lose crediting’, but reports losses when there is no NAI no-lose crediting. This is (at 
least in part) due to the way this sector is created in this analysis.
1
 Firstly, ‘International tourism’ 
shows negative impacts in ‘No ET’ and ‘Annex I ET’ scenarios because of the negative impacts 
on the ‘Trade and other transport (except air transport)’ and ‘Other market services’ sectors 
despite positive impacts on the air transport sector. Only in the ‘Annex I with NAI no-lose 
crediting’ scenario that this is turned around. 
Robustness of the results and sensitivity analysis 
Scenario 1 results show that there is an important shift in the pattern of economic activity and trade in 
the South African economy, and in particular on the EITE sectors, when the emissions trade 
arrangement is changed from ‘No ET’ or ‘Annex I ET’ to one with a ‘no-lose credit’ arrangement that 
allows NAI countries to earn credit for their efforts to reduce rather than to increase their own 
emissions in response to Annex I regions implementing climate policy measures. The reason is that 
the world as a whole can benefit from increased efficiency of climate policy and  lower relative costs, 
and these benefits can flow on to all countries, including South Africa. Efficiency gains do not, 
however, address issues of equitable distribution of gains from trade across countries. The benefits of 
increased climate policy efficiency can be said to come from three sources: 
                                                        
1  In this study we assume the expenditure level of ‘International tourism’ takes up a fixed proportion of the total 
expenditure level in sectors such as ‘Other market services’, ‘Recreational and other services’, ‘Trade and 
transport’ (see Table 3.2). This means when the total expenditure in these sectors changes (as a result of the 
climate response measures) we implicitly assume that the expenditure level by international tourists in these 
sectors also changes by the same proportion. This implies either that the expenditure level per tourist remains the 
same but the total number of tourists change or the number of tourists remains the same but the expenditure level 
per tourist has changed. Future studies may want to determine either or both of these two factors (in some 
exogenous simulations) to determine more accurately the changes in the proportion of international tourism 
expenditure level in these sectors over different periods rather than assuming them to remain unchanged, as is 
done in this study. 
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i) Output or production expansion effect, which sees the world economic output (and hence world 
demand for exports and imports) increased, even if the same climate policy target (for the world 
as a whole) is maintained. 
ii) Production efficiency effect, which sees a switch from energy-inefficient (and emissions-
inefficient) production activities to energy-efficient activities. This allows NAI countries to reduce 
their emissions (at least in relative terms), rather than increasing them, and this can bring benefits 
to both NAI regions and Annex I regions. Emissions can be reduced in the regions where it is 
most cost-effective to do so, meaning more mitigation takes place overall. Increased global 
mitigation has benefits for all countries in avoiding greater climate impacts, to which poor 
countries and communities are particularly vulnerable. This is the ‘gains from (emission) trade’ 
effect even if ‘trade’ here is still limited because it is confined only to a form of ‘no-lose credit’ 
given to NAI efforts at reducing emissions rather than by an explicit allocation of emissions 
permits. 
iii) Consumption efficiency effect, which sees a switch of consumption activities from energy and 
emission intensive commodities/activities to less energy-intensive ones, even if the same level of 
welfare is maintained. 
Depending on how these three effects interact, the impacts on South African energy-intensive and 
trade-exposed sectors will differ, as analysed under Scenario 1. Overall, the results of Scenario 2 help 
to reinforce the results of Scenario 1. They show that even with significant changes in the climate 
policy target (from 25% reduction to 40% reduction below 1990 emissions level for Annex I regions) 
the patterns of the impacts on South Africa do not change in any significant way, even though the 
magnitudes of the impacts will change (as expected). There is, however, a significant shift in the 
patterns of impacts when there is a change in emissions trading regime from ‘Annex I ET’ to ‘Annex I 
ET with NAI no-lose crediting’ remains with Scenario 2 as in Scenario 1. 
Recommendations  
The findings suggest that policy-makers might wish to consider the following: 
• Negative impacts on the coal exports sector need to be considered for further studies. 
• The mixed impacts on a range of sectors, including iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, chemicals, 
machinery and transport equipment, due to the differences inherent in different ET regimes, need 
to be considered for climate change considerations and negotiations, as well as for domestic 
industry policies. More specifically: 
o In terms of international climate policy negotiations. In particular, the potential gains (for 
South Africa as well as other developing countries) from an ET regime which allows for 
crediting for developing countries on a ‘no-lose’ basis. These potential gains are reflected in 
the results of this study and implies this is a promising policy approach. This approach can, 
therefore, be supported at the international negotiation level; but at the same time, further 
research needs to be conducted at the South African level to help identify more specifically 
the gains for South Africa and policies needed to facilitate these gains.  
 Research is needed to understand how this ET approach would work in practice in South 
Africa and to what extent it would help reinforce, or is in conflict with, domestic policies 
aimed at energy savings in South Africa, to move towards a low-carbon economy. 
 The impacts of industrial energy efficiency policies in South Africa and impacts of 
international ET regimes on South African sectors have domestic budgetary 
implications, such as profitability and employment, as well as environmental 
implications such as lower greenhouse gas emissions and future sustainable development 
of the country (Howells & Laitner, 2005). The key question is how to reconcile or 
combine these two consequences. 
o In terms of domestic climate policy on mitigation, the identified EITE sectors would either 
require a structured regulatory approach (e.g. benchmarks for emissions intensity in relation 
to their greater exposure), or incentives. Incentives could be domestically defined, e.g. 
through incentives to improve energy efficiency (and thus reduce intensity) or incentives in 
industrial policy for trade-exposed sectors. 
• The impacts on agriculture and tourism deserve particular attention. Specific areas of focus for 
further work are suggested in section 5. 
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In general, previous studies have found the sectoral impacts of response measures to be negative. This 
report shows, however, that not all impacts will be negative, and in fact some sectors will experience a 
positive gain from the implementation of response measures to climate change by Annex I countries. 
South African policy-makers must thus be aware of not only the sectoral gains and losses but more 
importantly the magnitude of these losses, and the degree to which they can be balanced by gains. 
Ultimately, trade and climate policy-makers need to be prepared to deal with the energy-intensive and 
trade-exposed sectors identified in this report. 
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1. Response measures to climate change 
1.1 Context 
Article 4.8 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) provides 
that ‘Parties shall give full consideration to … the impact of the implementation of response 
measures, especially on … (h) Countries whose economies are highly dependent on income 
generated from the production, processing and export, and/or on consumption of fossil fuels and 
associated energy-intensive products’. Article 2.3 of the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC requires 
that developed country Parties (Annex I) ‘shall strive to implement policies and measures…in such a 
way to minimize…effects on international trade’ as well as minimizing the adverse effects on 
developing country Parties (Article 3.14). If Annex I Parties implement mitigation, they are assumed 
to buy less oil, coal or other fossil fuels. More recently, there has been debate whether a broader set 
of issues should be included here, for instance the issue of carbon footprint which implies products 
produced from developing countries and bought by developed countries, involve many intermediate 
production processes which may impact upon (as well as be impacted upon by) climate measures 
and therefore should be taken into account. Also, there is the issue of international tourism
2
 which 
affects production and consumption activities of both developed and developing countries jointly.  
1.2 Problem statement and relevance 
In this context response measures are actions taken or initiated by developed countries (Annex 1) but 
with the impacts and ramifications flowing on to developing countries. The concern of developing 
countries therefore is in those impacts which to a greater or lesser extent depend on the degree of 
exposures of developing countries to trade (with or without the implementation of corresponding 
climate measures within the developing countries themselves). For example, South Africa or China 
may or may not want to impose a carbon tax or emissions reduction targets on their own industries, 
In such a situation, if Annex I countries decide to reduce their CO2 emissions, some of the energy 
and emissions intensive activities in Annex I countries may be partially shifted to developing 
countries (due to a phenomenon known as ‘leakage’).
3
 This phenomenon will work to the advantage 
of developing countries. However, a different phenomenon may also be adversely impacting 
developing countries. For example, South Africa exports coal to Annex I countries and therefore, 
due to climate response measures in Annex I countries, their demand for coal will be reduced. In this 
example, impacts on South Africa would be negative, unless this trade can be to a large extent be 
directed towards other non-Annex I countries. The analysis of the response measure impacts on 
South Africa must therefore distinguish between energy and emission-intensive industries (which 
can benefit if carbon constraints are imposed in Annex I countries), and the coal export sector which 
will be adversely affected. Also, some sectors such as agriculture, forestry and fishery, which may 
not be energy and emissions-intensive in its own production
4
 but with a dependence on transport as a 
means to trade and transport is emission intensive sector, the sector can also be said to be impacted 
upon by climate response measures. 
Negotiations are currently underway under the UNFCCC. There is thus a need to give effect to 
consolidated action to stem the tide of climate change, including as mandated by Ministers in the 
                                                        
2 One of the challenges faced when trying to model the impact of climate change responses specifically on 
tourism was the lack of model inputs. As a consequence, this is not dealt with at this stage. 
3  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report confirmed with ‘high 
agreement and medium evidence that there may be effects from Annex I countries’ action on the global 
economy and global emissions although the scale of carbon leakage remains uncertain’ (IPCC 2007: 37). This 
phenomenon may to some extent be averted by other measures such as border tax adjustment (import tax or 
export subsidy based on differences in energy intensities between home and foreign countries and taking into 
account the presence or absence of carbon taxes). Also, in reality leakage may not be significant due to other 
constraints in developing countries such as production capacity, and product quality differentials etc. 
4  Agriculture is not emissions intensive in terms of CO2 emissions but can be if negative impacts on carbon 
sequestion due to land clearing is included and also Agriculture can be emissions intensive in terms of CH4 and 
N2O emissions (the latter due to the use of fertilizers). Agriculture, forestry and fishery therefore would be an 
important sector to consider (on its own right rather than as a sector relying on transport) if the issue of land use 
and emissions of CH4 and N2O are included. 
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Bali Action Plan and negotiations for further commitments for Annex I parties under the Kyoto 
Protocol. Addressing the risk of such adverse impacts for developing countries is an important factor 
in ensuring a successful outcome to the negotiations.  
This project involves an economy-wide descriptive analysis and scenario modelling exercise to 
ascertain the possible effect of response measures to climate change on South African trade in the 
global arena. The focus of analyses is on identifying the energy-intensive and trade-exposed sectors 
of the South African economy, and determining how they would respond to the implementation of 
response measures. 
1.3 Previous studies 
One previous study has examined these issues. Overall, the Fund of Research into Industrial 
Development, Growth and Equity (FRIDGE) study found that the ‘net effect of Policies And 
Measures (PAM’s) are projected to have a marginally positive overall impact on the South African 
economy’ (Consult 101, EC & IDC 2001). In other words, the impacts of response measures on 
South Africa are probably relatively small, and, if anything, marginally positive. Van Seventer et al 
(2001) similarly analyze the impact of implementing the Kyoto Protocol on the South African coal 
market and economy and find that, depending on the choice of climate change policy regime, South 
Africa can expect to experience negative or positive impacts on coal exports depending on the 
stringency of emission-reduction targets imposed on developed countries and South Africa 
respectively.  
1.4 Purpose of this study 
The South African economy derives much of its growth from production related to the energy-
intensive sectors of its economy. As a non-Annex-I country, South Africa has no binding 
commitment to reduce its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by a quantifiable amount, but this may 
change in the future. The country’s dependence on coal-intensive energy generation does make it a 
comparatively large producer of GHG emissions globally (Winkler & Zipplies, 2009a). In this report 
the scenarios to be examined are broader than those examined under the FRIDGE study as it will 
highlight the impacts which response measures have on sectors other than the manufacturing sector, 
including mining, agriculture and tourism. At the outset an overview of the current energy-intensive 
and trade-exposed sectors of the economy are identified in Section 2. This identification is then used 
to establish the impact of implementing response measures to climate change on South African 
trade. This is done through an economic simulation analysis in Section 3. Ultimately, the purpose of 
this analysis is to examine the impacts of climate change response measures on trade-offs that also 
involve South Africa’s trade relations. In Section 5 this report provides recommendations that would 
offer information on response measures in the lead-up to the UNFCCC negotiations in Copenhagen, 
Denmark in December 2009. In the longer-term, the connections with trade and industrial policy 
need to be taken into account in developing national climate policy, as South Africa proceeds to 
define a sustainable development path that would make a transition to a low carbon economy and 
society. 
The effect of response measures to climate change on South Africa’s economy and trade  
ENERGY RESEARCH CENTRE 
3
2. Identifying the trade-exposed and energy-intensive 
sectors of the economy  
2.1 Export and trade-intensive sectors of the economy  
2.1.1 Introduction5 
An important concern in the policy discussions around the impact of climate change on the South 
African economy is the degree to which response measures to climate change may impact on its 
trade with the rest of the world. The focus in this section is an analysis of the trade exposure of 
South African industry. For completeness, the impacts of such measures on imports are also assessed 
to understand the implications these have on overall trade of industries in South Africa. 
A useful first step in a structured approach to energy intensive and trade exposed sectors under a 
carbon price may be to identify the industries concerned. This section identifies trade-intensive 
sectors, then energy-intensive ones separately, before combining the findings to identify EITE 
industries. 
Before turning to the first analytical steps, some background of where South Africa comes from in 
this regard is briefly outlined. Minerals extractions and processing industries make a decisive 
contribution to South Africa’s exports; historically, and at present, coal, gold and platinum comprise 
South Africa’s top three exports by value; with iron ores and concentrates, these four categories 
comprised 32% of South Africa’s exports in 2008 (DTI, 2005). 
Not only are exports an important contributor to GDP in South Africa, the economy has become 
more open since the first democratic elections in 1994. An active policy of trade liberalisation 
resulted in a considerable reduction of the import tariffs during the 1990s. Competition from imports 
has seen many local producers struggle with employment losses often the consequence. But 
intermediate imports have become more affordable and final imports cheaper. Import competition 
has seen the general price level being reduced, while some argue that competitiveness has improved. 
However, there is no denying that exports increased considerably during the 1990s, whether this was 
associated with trade policy measures or with re-entering the global trade scene – or more likely due 
to a combination of the two. The net effect of trade liberalisation on employment has been debated 
intensely (for an overview see Edwards et al, 2009). In this section we consider industry level 
exports and more broadly, trade exposure as a way of describing the risk of negative impact on 
South Africa’s trade position of responses to climate change, as developed countries undertake 
mitigation. 
2.1.2 Macroeconomic context 
By way of context we briefly sketch the macroeconomic picture of the last 10 years or so. Until a 
year ago, South Africa’s economic growth had been well above its long-term average (of just over 
3% since 1946), for almost 10 years. From a basis of low growth in the late 1990s to medium growth 
in the early years of the next decade, growth in real GDP (measured at basic prices in terms of 
annual percentage change) climbed to over 4% and remained there for the period June 2004 to June 
2008. However, the global financial crisis has caused GDP growth to retreat to almost negative 
territory since March 2009, as can be seen in Figure 1 below. Here, it can also be seen that while 
growth in final consumption expenditure was elevated to very high levels of more than 6% over the 
same period; it started dropping off from the end of 2007, much earlier than GDP. 
Relatively high GDP growth was maintained for longer, mainly due to growth in gross capital 
formation, associated with infrastructure spending. Export growth has been erratic over the last 10 
years with some negative patches along the way. However, the recent decline is more marked, well 
below the period average, and coincides with the global financial crisis. These trends have brought 
about a marked shift in the contributions of main macroeconomic variables, as can be seen in Table 
2.1. Final consumption has made way for investment (gross capital formation reflects investment), 
the latter rising from the 15% share that it had occupied for the previous two decades or so. Exports 
                                                        
5  In this report the terms ‘trade-intensive’ and ‘trade-exposed’ are used interchangeably. 
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have maintained a share of just over 25% of GDP, slipping only slightly. With higher growth, 
imports tend to rise, as can be seen in the last column. 
Table 2.1: Expenditure shares in GDP, constant 2000 prices 
Source: South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin and own calculations 
  
Final 
consumption 
expenditure: 
households 
Final consumption 
expenditure: 
general 
government 
Gross capital 
formation: gross 
fixed capital 
formation 
Exports of 
goods and 
services 
Imports of 
goods and 
services 
Ave last 4 quarters to Jun09 67.9% 19.6% 22.7% 26.3% 34.1% 
Ave Sep04-Jun09 quarter 66.9% 19.2% 19.5% 26.5% 32.3% 
Ave Sep99-Jun04 quarter 63.3% 18.5% 15.5% 27.0% 25.1% 
Note: Row totals do not add to 100% since imports are reported here as a positive share while in the national accounts 
they would have to be subtracted from exports in order to arrive at net exports. Also, we have ignored inventory changes 
and residuals here. 
 
 
 
 a) Expenditure on gross domestic product b) Final consumption expenditure: Households 
 
c) Gross capital formation: Gross fixed capital formation                    d) Exports of goods and services 
  
Note: All figures reflect constant 2000 prices, annual percentage change 
Figure 2.1: Main macro economic variables, annual percentage change 
Source: South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin (2009) 
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2.1.3 Trade-intensive commodities and industries 
Although exports have maintained a fairly constant share of GDP over the last five years they may 
still differ widely across commodities and industries. With that in mind, we proceed by examining 
what the picture is at the commodity level followed by the industry level. We employ the United 
Nations Commodity Trade Statistics database (UNComtrade)
6
 at the two digit level of commodity 
disaggregation (according to the Harmonised System or HS classification) as well as the Quantec 
Standardised Industry Database
7
 which identifies 46 industries at varying levels of two to three digits 
South Africa Standardised Industry Classification (Statistics South Africa, 1993).  
2.1.3.1 Commodities 
With a global trade database such as UNComtrade we can examine South Africa’s export 
performance in a global context. However, this can only be achieved with a classification that is 
common across countries. This forces us to examine commodities rather than industries (but we will 
return to them later). The next table shows the twenty-five (out of 100) most important two digit 
commodity clusters in South Africa’s export basket over the last five years. They represent more 
than 90% of South Africa’s total commodity exports. 
Table 2.2: Merchandise trade for South Africa in global context 
Source: UNComTrade global trade database (http://comtrade.un.org/) 
 
 
Note: since the data is reported in US$ and subsequently converted back to local currency with the average exchange 
rate for the year 2008, total commodity exports does not match official national accounts data as it excludes services 
trade. 
                                                        
6  See the website at http://comtrade.un.org/. 
7  See the website at http://www.quantec.co.za/data/easydata-rsa-standardised-industry. 
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Heading the list in terms of share in South Africa’s export basket is the export of gold and diamonds 
(HS71), followed by iron and steel (HS72), coal (HS27), motor vehicles (HS87) and machinery 
(HS84), iron ores, aluminium, fruits, electrical equipment and inorganic chemicals make up the rest 
of the top ten. Although measured in nominal terms, average annual growth over the last five years 
has been higher than 10% for all but one of these clusters, namely HS08 edible fruits, nuts, peel of 
citrus fruit and melons. This may seem high, but in the case of the top three clusters, global trade has 
actually increased at an even faster rate (in the range of 18%) and at a rate that is faster than 
merchandise trade’s global average of 12.1%. This means that South Africa is losing share in 
markets that are growing in importance, hence the ‘Underperformer’ comment in the last column. In 
the case of the first two clusters [Gold and diamonds (HS71), followed by Iron and steel (HS72)] 
their share in South Africa’s export basket (18.8% and 12% respectively) is much higher than the 
share of these clusters in global trade (2.1% and 3% respectively, see column 5). Thus, South Africa 
appears to have a revealed comparative advantage (RCA>1, see column 6)
8
 in two 
‘underperforming’ clusters. Overall, this means that while these commodities clusters are a key to 
South Africa, in the global context, the country’s share in these vital global markets is declining.  
In the case of HS87 Motor vehicles and HS84 Machinery, the picture is different, in that South 
Africa is outperforming the rest of the world in clusters that seem to have been declining in 
importance (in that their global growth has been lower than average). The star performer in South 
Africa’s export basket is HS26 Ores where global trade has increased more than average and South 
African producers have managed to grow even faster. Hence, their share in this expanding global 
market has increased. Similarly, other ‘champions’ are articles of HS73 Iron & steel products and 
HS74 Copper and articles thereof. 
Interestingly, agriculture and related clusters do not feature much in this line-up. Although HS08 
Fruits are located in the top ten, HS22 Beverages and HS20 Vegetables are not only much lower 
down the share ranking in row 13 and 25, their exports over the last five years have been 
characterised by ‘retreating from declining markets’ in that these two clusters lost share in a global 
market that increased by less than average. This is in and of itself, is not a bad strategy. Global 
decline can also be noted for the HS08 Fruits cluster (row 8), but here South African exporters fare 
better, perhaps not a good strategy unless one is focusing on specific niche markets with growth 
potential. 
Chemicals and related clusters (rows 11, 14, 17 and 24) on the whole have performed with mixed 
results over the past five years with the common thread that none of them are star performers with 
hardly a noteworthy RCA. On the other hand, while paper products are performing relatively well, 
the global market is not. Similarly, the global markets for wood and wood pulp products are 
underperforming but at least South African exporters are not expanding here, although there appears 
to be a comparative advantage in wood pulp. 
To summarize this overview of South Africa’s merchandise export trends, it would appear that there 
is some limited evidence of moving away from traditional export clusters in the resources towards 
higher-added-value clusters such as machinery, transport and other equipment. Growth in exports of 
these higher value clusters has increased at a higher rate than at the global level and market shares 
have increased. However, at a global level these clusters have grown at lower than global average 
rates. Global merchandise growth seems to have tilted in recent times somewhat back in the 
direction of trade in the more traditional resources and it would appear that South Africa has not 
benefitted as much as other countries, such as perhaps Australia.  
2.1.3.2 Industries 
Since the focus of this report is on how industries would react to the implementation of climate 
change response measures, we now consider exports at the industry level. The aim is to examine 
whether exports have become more or less important in terms of the industry’s overall production. 
                                                        
8  RCA of a commodity or cluster of commodities is the ratio of the share of these commodities in South Africa’s 
export basket and the share of these commodities in world trade (excluding South Africa’s trade, although that 
wouldn’t make much difference. For example, if the share of cluster 71 (essentially gold and diamonds) in 
South Africa’s trade is 17% and 2.2% in world trade respectively, the RCA is 17%/2.2% =8.8. Thus, cluster 71 
is 8.8 times more important to South Africa’s exports than to the rest of the world and it can therefore be said 
that South Africa has a RCA in this cluster. This RCA can be the result of natural endowments or policy 
intervention (motor vehicles), the method, at least in this simple form, cannot make the distinction. 
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We employ South African-based industry level export data from the Quantec Standardised Industry 
Database (SASID) in order to examine export intensive industries. Results are shown in Table 3. We 
calculate averages for four five-year periods in order to examine broad structural changes over the 
last twenty years.  
It can be seen that the general story of Table 2.2 is mirrored and extended when we express exports 
as a proportion of total output (all measured in constant 2000 prices) of the identified industries. We 
also add the long-term annual average growth rate (calculated as an ordinary least squares time 
trend) for the full period 1989-2008. As before, we find resource-based industries at the top of the 
rankings, as most of their output is exported. Apart from gold mining, which has experienced 
negative export growth; this is the case for coal, other mining, metals, machinery and basic 
chemicals. Motor vehicles and related has experienced a spectacular increase in the export intensity 
as well as TV and related communications equipment and agriculture. The share of output of the 
latter that is exported rose from an average of only 6% in the early part of the 1990s to almost 18% 
in the last five years. A similar increase was recorded for catering and accommodation services, 
which constitutes the bulk of the tourism sector. On the other hand significant declines in export 
intensity have been recorded for textiles and clothing, wood products, paper and related products as 
well as food and beverage producers.  
Thus, while there is some cursory evidence that exports have moved into non-traditional value 
adding activities such as machinery, transport equipment and electronics, there has been a move out 
of others such as textiles, clothing and food. However, the bias in export-intensive industries remains 
towards resource based activities in mining and related activities while agriculture has also joined 
these ranks. Services related to tourism, such as in the catering and accommodation sectors, have 
become more export intensive as well.  
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Table 2.3: Export Intensities ranked according to 2008 ratio of exports to gross output  
(2000 constant prices) 
Source: Quantec Standardised Industry Database and own calculation 
 
 
 
We can also express the industries’ exports as a share of total exports (of all industries). In that way 
we get a feel for which the most important industry contributors to South Africa’s exports are. In a 
sense, it will be a repeat of column 3 of Table 2.2 but now expressed in terms of total exports (of 
goods and services) as opposed to merchandise exports as is the case in that table. The results are 
shown in Table 2.4. 
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Table 2.4: Export shares ranked according to the last period 2008 (2000 constant prices) 
Source: Quantec Standardised Industry Database and own calculations 
 
 
 
Other mining, including platinum and iron and other ores, is in this line-up the most important 
industry in terms of share in total exports. The share has increased somewhat over the full period, 
but the highest increase in share of exports is reserved for the motor vehicle industry, from only 3% 
in the mid 1990s to more than 10% in the last five-year period. On the other hand, gold and related 
mining has declined in a dramatic way over the full period, from 23% in the early 1990s to just over 
5% in the last five years. Basic metals (hereafter referring to iron and steel and non-ferrous metals) 
have managed to maintain their combined share at around 12% and the same applies to coal mining, 
which managed to maintain a share of just under 5% which makes coal exports one of the top 10 
exporting industries in this line-up of 46. Agriculture has also managed to improve its share in South 
Africa’s export basket from less than 2% in the early 1990s to double that over the most recent five-
year period. However, the share of food production in the basket has been halved from more than 
3% to 1.5%. Remarkable is the high importance of transport and storage and trade. Note also how 
the share of catering and accommodation increases from less than 1% to 1.5%. 
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On the other hand textiles and clothing have seen their share in South Africa’s export basket being 
reduced over the last 20 years, combined from 2.2% to less than half a percent. Basic chemicals are 
an important contributor to the export basket as well, with a share of about 4%, which has come 
down somewhat from the 5% that was recorded in the mid 1990s. Some other relatively big movers 
in terms of the share of the relevant industry’s production, such as leather, electronic equipment and 
accommodation (see Table 4) actually turn out to be small players in the greater scheme contribution 
to the total export basket. 
However, the overriding observation remains that resources and related activities like basic metals 
and basic chemicals are the key driver of South African exports with some diversification elsewhere 
into added value activities such as machinery and transport equipment. Although there are signs of 
further diversification they are limited to industries with very low shares including catering and 
accommodation. Agriculture is an exception in that its share is now up to 4% of South Africa’s 
export basket, but this has been offset to some degree by a decline in the exports of food products. 
This is an interesting trend in that it suggests a reversing of the beneficiation process that may to 
some degree be taking place in the minerals resources complex. 
2.1.3.3 Trade is exports plus imports 
Trade involves exports as well as imports and an often used measure of exposure to trade is the ratio 
of the sum of exports and imports to what is produced locally. Imports could also refer to 
intermediate imports by those industries, i.e., imports of production inputs. Here, the focus is more 
on the degree to which an industry relies on imported (or traded) inputs. 
Trade intensive industries have been defined as those in which exports and imports combined are 
more than 40% of their domestic output (Wainwright, 2002: 2). Other references use 60% as the 
threshold. We keep an open mind and present results for 46 industries over the last two decades in 
four five-year periods as shown in Table 2.5. It can be seen that the industries that are most trade 
intensive are not only mining and heavy industries, but include also TV, radio and communications 
equipment producers. As expected, services industries feature low, while light manufacturing 
industries such as food, beverages, textiles, clothing (referring hereafter to ‘wearing apparel’), paper, 
machinery and electrical machinery as well as plastic products and agriculture can be seen to be 
exposed to trade for less than 30% of their domestic production. 
As before, we examine change in trade exposure over the twenty year period by estimating log linear 
time trends by means of simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analyses. The results are 
shown in the last column of Table 5. Most industries have seen an increase in their exposure to trade. 
In particular, other and coal mining, machinery, electronics and motor vehicles as well as agriculture 
have seen large increases. Notable exceptions are basic metals and basic chemicals as well as textiles 
and paper. However, the basic metals and chemicals remain industries with very high trade exposure 
in spite of a decline. 
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Table 2.5: Trade Intensities based on exports and direct intermediate imports  
(2000 constant prices) 
Source: Quantec Standardised Industry Database and own calculations 
 
 
2.1.3.4 Industry level trade exposure: direct and indirect import measure 
The analysis including imports so far is based on direct intermediate imports by the relevant 
industries. It may also be interesting to examine what the value of intermediate imports is that is 
embodied directly and indirectly in the final demand for goods and services of each of the industries. 
Given the production structure of the South African economy as captured by an input-output table, it 
is then possible to determine the value of direct and indirect intermediate imports that are required to 
satisfy the actually observed final demand for goods and services of an industry.
9
 In this way it may 
                                                        
9 Thus, the given value of total intermediate imports as calculated in Table 2.5, could be redistributed across 
industries according to the intermediate import to output ratios and the Leontief Inverse (their product being the 
intermediate import multipliers) and the associated Final demand of these industries. Leontief Inverse Matrices are 
derived from Industry by Industry Input-Output tables (in constant 2000 prices) that form the basis for the Quantec 
Industry Data Series. While Input-Output tables are not available for every single year, they have been interpolated 
based on national accounts data, industry value added data, industry trade and industry reduction data amongst 
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be possible that direct and indirect intermediate imports are for some industries lower than their 
direct intermediate imports. This is likely because intermediate imports of some industries are used 
towards the final demand of other industries. Ultimately this, it may be argued, should be attributed 
to these other industries' ‘trade exposure’ and not to those to which it had initially been credited to. 
In a sense, we are interested here in the vertical integration of production and how intermediate 
imports are used downstream. The trade exposure based on exports and direct and indirect 
intermediate imports are shown for the same industries in Table 2.6. 
It can be seen that most industries with high direct trade intensities (see Table 2.5 above) also record 
high total (i.e. direct and indirect) trade intensities. The reason is that the export component of the 
industry trade intensity measure is as intense as before and very much so in case of the resources-
related industries. There are, however, a couple of notable changes in the rankings over the last 5 
year period of observation. Basic metals and basic chemicals are more trade-intensive when indirect 
intermediates are taken into account, as well as leather, furniture and specialised equipment. The 
latter three are, however relatively small industries. Textiles, clothing, footwear, as well as paper and 
related products are more trade-intensive, but coal and other mining, machinery and TV, radio and 
communications equipment are considerably less trade-intensive industries, as are, most importantly, 
the motor vehicle and related industries. 
The main message from the indirect intermediate imports calculations shown in Table 2.6 is that 
important industries such as coal mining as well as motor vehicles’ trade intensity is now lower than 
the threshold of 40% while machinery and equipment producers have become more trade intensive.  
Rankings based on direct or total (i.e. direct and indirect) trade intensities still report the usual 
suspects as the industries that are exposed to trade more than average. They include mining, basic 
metals, machinery, chemicals, oil refining and related, as well as more high tech industries such as 
professional and scientific equipment and TV and electronics. Tertiary industries are less exposed 
even when taken indirect intermediate imports into account.  
Note that the exposure to trade based on the indirect import measure is less volatile than when 
imports are measured directly. None of the rates of change in this trade exposure measure are larger 
than 10%. Interestingly, some of the signs in the rate of change have reversed. For example, basic 
metals and basic chemicals see their exposure increase somewhat, while they reported significant 
declines when the measure was just based on direct imports only. This means that these industries 
have, through their backward linkages, become more exposed to trade, in particular through their 
imports. The opposite is, to some degree, the case for machinery and electronics equipment as well 
as paper. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
others that are available at an annual basis. No data was available for 2008 and the 2007 Leontief Inverse was used 
instead. 
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Table 2.6: Trade Intensities based on exports and direct & indirect intermediate imports  
(2000 constant prices) 
Source: Quantec Standardised Industry Database and own calculations 
 
 
2.1.4 Summary 
Although exports have maintained a fairly constant share of GDP over the last five years, they may 
still differ widely across commodities and industries. With that in mind, we examined what the 
export picture is at the commodity level as well as the industry level. At the commodity level we 
showed that there is some limited evidence that South Africa’s merchandise export trends are 
moving away from traditional export clusters in the resources towards higher added value clusters 
such as machinery, transport and other equipment. Growth in exports of these higher value clusters 
has increased at a higher rate than at the global level and market shares have increased. However, at 
a global level these clusters have grown at lower than global average rates. Ironically, global 
merchandise growth seems to have tilted in recent times somewhat back in the direction of trade in 
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the more traditional commodities and it would appear that South Africa has not benefited as much as 
other countries such as perhaps Australia.  
At the industry level we first examined South Africa’s exports in terms of the relevant industry’s 
output followed by industry exports in terms of the total export basket of South Africa. Either way, 
the overriding observation remains that resources and related activities such as basic metals and 
basic chemicals are the key driver of South African exports with some diversification into added 
value activities such as machinery and transport equipment. Although there are signs of further 
diversification elsewhere they are limited to industries with very low shares, including catering and 
accommodation. Agriculture is an exception in that its share is now up to 4% of South Africa’s 
export basket, but this has been offset to some degree by a decline in the exports of food products.  
Trade involves exports as well as imports and an often-used measure of exposure to trade is the ratio 
of the sum of exports and imports to what is produced locally. Imports and their prices can be 
important for exports and here we refer to imports as intermediate imports by those industries that 
can be identified in the data, i.e., imports of production inputs. It was shown that the industries that 
are most trade-intensive are not only mining and heavy industries, but now also include other more 
diversified industries. The main message from the analysis with intermediate imports is that the trade 
intensity of important industries such as coal mining and motor vehicles is now much lower in the 
industry ranking while machinery and equipment producers have become more exposed.  
One step further and based on direct and indirect intermediate imports (using input-output tables) we 
can get an impression of ‘trade exposure’ induced by the vertical integration of production and how 
intermediate imports are used downstream. However, the results still presents the usual suspects as 
those industries that are exposed to trade more than average. They include mining, basic metals, 
machinery, chemicals, oil refining and related activities but now also include more high tech 
industries such as professional and scientific equipment and TV and electronics. Tertiary industries 
are less exposed even when taken indirect intermediate imports into account.  
Basic metals and basic chemicals see their exposure increase somewhat while they reported 
significant declines when the measure was just based on direct imports only. This means that these 
industries have, through their backward linkages, become more exposed to trade, in particular 
through their imports. The opposite is, to some degree, the case of machinery and electronics 
equipment as well as paper. What the energy intensity of these and other industries is will be 
discussed in the next section. 
2.2 Energy-intensive sectors of the economy  
2.2.1 Introduction 
The focus of this section is to employ recent practice in identifying energy-intensive sectors in an 
economy. One such measure is that of energy demand per unit of economic output (Neuhoff, 2009). 
This research highlights sectors that warrant special attention in terms of a sectoral approach to 
climate change mitigation.  
For South Africa, Winkler and Marquard (2009b) propose a number of short-term and long-term 
means of moving the South African economy towards a low-carbon path. In the short term, 
enhanced energy efficiency can provide energy savings and revenue which can be redistributed 
towards consumers and companies. In the long term, a move away from the minerals-energy 
complex towards a low-carbon economy would involve amongst other things, a shift in the fuel mix. 
Overall, the starting point to selecting economic tools and policy programmes to mitigate climate 
change is the identification of the energy-intensive sectors of the economy. 
It is useful to mention here that energy-intensity and emissions-intensity are related but distinctly 
different. In particular, it is possible to imagine situations in which energy-intensity (measured as 
energy demand per unit of economic output) remains unchanged, while emissions intensity 
(measured as emissions per output) changes; for example, by changing the fuel mix. In the 
immediate term, it is not expected that South Africa will undergo a great shift in the fuel mix and so 
in this report energy-intensity can still act as a reasonable first approximation of emissions intensity.  
In South Africa the industrial sector is the largest user of energy in final energy demand (Winkler et 
al, 2006). This section of the report aims to highlight the most energy-intensive industrial sectors of 
the economy as it is pivotal in addressing some of the concerns associated with the Bali Action Plan 
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(BAP) as stipulated in para 1.b (vi). In particular, at the climate negotiations in August 2009 (so-
called ‘Bonn3’), South Africa made an intervention on behalf of the Africa group on the issue of 
economic diversification in the Bali Action Plan, para 1.b(vi). South Africa highlighted ‘the broad 
nature of this particular issue, and that all of it touches Africa from loss of livelihood due to the 
practice of ‘food miles’ in Annex 1 countries, through to the loss of export markets, through for 
example, the threat to a country like Kenya of not being able to sell cut flowers into international 
markets.’ The statement further emphasised the priority that needs to be given to economic 
diversification applied to adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change, which is a distinct issue 
from impacts of mitigation measures on developing countries.  
2.2.2 Overview of energy in South Africa and recent trends 
Primary energy supply in South Africa is predominantly made up of coal, which is abundantly 
available. Other primary supply sources include crude oil which is largely imported, natural gas, 
nuclear (facilitated by the abundance of uranium reserves), hydro and renewables (comprising 
biomass and replenish-able natural processes) (DME, 2006). Table 2.7 indicates that three main 
primary energy supply sources for the period 2001 and 2006 were coal, crude oil and renewables. 
Table 2.7: Total primary energy supply (%) 
Source: Own calculations based on DME, Aggregate Energy Balances, 2001 – 2006 
Energy supply source 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Average 
Coal 77.2 63.9 72.7 68.2 71.9 67.2 70.2 
Crude oil less petroleum 11.4 22.0 13.7 19.4 14.3 20.2 16.8 
Gas 2.1 1.8 1.1 1.6 3.0 2.9 2.1 
Nuclear 2.9 2.8 3.1 2.8 2.4 2.0 2.7 
Hydro 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 
Renewables 6.0 9.2 9.5 8.2 8.4 7.7 8.2 
Total (Terajoules) 3 972 681 4 637 437 4 507 518 5 240 908 5 078 962 5 536 070 28 973 576 
 
Energy demand in South Africa is dominated by the industrial, residential and transport sectors, as 
shown in Table 2.8 below. Most significantly this demand is attributed to the industrial sector, which 
together with mining consumed an average of 42% of energy over the period of 2001 to 2006 (as 
shown in Figure 2.2). The notable fact that energy supply and demand do not equate is attributable to 
losses in transformation whereby some energy is lost as it is being converted. 
Table 2.8: Sectoral energy demand (%) 
Source: Own calculations based on DME, Aggregate Energy Balances, 2001 – 2006 
Sector 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Industry (excl. mining) 36 35 34 36 33 32 
Commerce 6 6 7 8 8 9 
Residential 18 18 18 18 18 19 
Mining and quarrying 8 8 7 7 8 7 
Transport (inc. aviation) 27 27 26 26 26 27 
Agriculture 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Non-specified (other) 1 1 3 3 4 3 
Non-energy use 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Total (Terajoules) 2 328 443 2 367 889 2 480 589 2 717 860 2 701 220 2 716 381 
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Figure 2.2: Energy demand per sector in 2006 
Source: Own calculations based on DME, Aggregate Energy Balances, 2006  
2.2.3 How do we identify an energy-intensive sector of the economy? 
2.2.3.1 Background to energy demand and GDP data and trends 
The focus of this section of the report is on trends in energy intensity in industry, for which trends 
over in the period 2001–2006 are examined. The time-frame is determined by data availability, with 
energy data sourced from the then Department of Minerals and Energy (DME), annual aggregate 
energy balances and GDP figures from Statistics South Africa’s Third Quarter GDP data release. 
The energy balances are only available at a disaggregated sectoral scale up to the end of 2006. This 
provides a six-year longitudinal view of industry dynamics in terms of energy demand. Measuring 
the energy intensity of a sector can be achieved in a number of ways including as energy demand per 
value added, gross value output, and mass of product basis (Hughes et al, 2002:1). Much of the 
literature identifies an energy-intensive sector as one for which there are ‘high energy to output 
ratios’ (Mongia et al, 2001). The DME measured the national energy intensity of the economy 
during the period from 1993 to 2000 as, total energy demand (in petajoules) divided by GDP (in 
billions of rands) (DME 2003).  
Industry in South Africa has shifted from being mining-intensive to energy-intensive manufacturing 
processes (Hughes et al, 2002). This trend is shown in Table 2.9, where the manufacturing sector 
contributed on average 0.6% to the total real annual economic growth rate over the period of 1998 to 
2007. The FRIDGE study similarly identifies South Africa as deriving its wealth from energy-related 
activities (Consult 101 et al, 2001: xvi). This characteristic of the economy is described by Fine and 
Rustomjee (1996) as the minerals-energy complex. Given that industry comprises the largest users of 
energy in South Africa we continue reporting on industry which is a sub-set of the entire economy, is 
assessed in terms of trends in energy-intensity between 2001 and 2006.  
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Table 2.9: Contributions to the total real annual economic growth rate (percentage points) 
Source: SSA (2008: Table B) 
Industry Relative size 
2007 
(percent)
1
 
Real annual percentage change for 2005 (compared with 2004), 
2006 (compared with 2005) and 2007 (compared with 2006) 
Contributions to the total real annual economic growth rate 
(percentage points) 
2
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  2004 2005  2006  2007  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  2004 2005  2006  2007  
Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing 
2.3  -5.3  6.2  4.7  -3.3  6.5  1.4  5.4  -7.2  2.9  -0.2  0.2  0.1  -0.1  0.2  0.0  0.1  -0.2  0.1  
Mining and quarrying 5.8  -0.1  -1.4  -1.1  -0.1  1.0  1.3  2.2  -0.3  0.0  0.0  -0.1  -0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  
Manufacturing 16.3  -0.2  0.6  8.1  3.2  2.8  4.7  4.6  4.9  4.5  0.0  0.1  1.3  0.5  0.5  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.7  
Electricity, gas and water 2.1  -6.3  -0.5  3.1  -3.7  3.5  3.0  1.7  2.8  3.0  -0.2  0.0  0.1  -0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  
Construction 3.0  -5.9  -1.4  5.6  4.9  5.8  11.1  12.4  13.5  17.1  -0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.6  
Wholesale and retail trade; 
hotels and restaurants 
14.1  1.3  7.6  8.1  1.9  2.3  5.9  7.3  7.2  5.2  0.2  0.9  1.0  0.3  0.1  0.8  1.0  1.0  0.7  
Transport, storage and 
communication 
9.9  5.5  5.2  8.3  5.9  9.0  4.7  5.3  6.6  5.6  0.4  0.4  0.7  0.5  0.9  0.5  0.5  0.7  0.6  
Finance, real estate and 
business services 
19.4  2.3  5.1  3.2  8.2  6.3  7.9  5.2  7.2  6.8  0.4  0.9  0.5  1.4  1.1  1.5  1.0  1.4  1.3  
General government services 12.6  -0.7  -0.9  -0.9  -0.9  0.7  2.6  3.1  3.1  3.7  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  0.1  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.5  
Personal services 5.4  8.9  7.7  9.1  1.5  2.5  2.0  4.4  5.8  4.0  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.2  
Total value added 91.0  0.7  2.7  4.4  2.9  3.8  4.8  5.0  5.2  5.1  0.6  2.4  4.0  2.5  3.2  4.4  4.6  4.7  4.7  
Taxes less subsidies on 
products 
8.9  -1.2  -0.6  1.5  1.4  2.7  5.3  4.7  6.1  4.7  -0.1  -0.1  0.1  0.1  0.4  0.5  0.4  0.6  0.4  
GDP at market prices 100.0  0.5  2.4  4.2  2.7  3.7  4.9  5.0  5.3  5.1  0.5  2.4  4.2  2.7  3.7  4.9  5.0  5.3  5.1  
1. The relative size of each industry for the year 2007 is the share of its real value added of the GDP for the year 2006. Similarly, the relative size of taxes less subsidies on products is the share of its value of 
the GDP for the year 2006. 
2. The contribution is calculated by multiplying the percentage change of each industry (and taxes less subsidies on products) with its share of GDP in the previous year (i.e. its relative size). 
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2.2.3.2 Measuring energy-intensity across a sub-sector of the economy 
In this report, energy intensity is measured as energy demand (in terajoules) per unit of GDP (in 
millions of 2000 constant rands). As such, the data used to derive a measure of energy intensity are 
energy demand per sector and GDP (total output) per sector. Energy intensity is then calculated as 
energy demand per sector, divided by economic output of that sector.  
Table 2.10 and Figure 2.3 show the trends in energy demand per sector between 2001 and 2006. 
Most notable is that the top six energy consuming industrial sectors include iron and steel, chemical 
and petrochemical products, mining and quarrying, non-ferrous metals and non-metallic minerals. In 
the case of these first three sectors we see a close alignment with the findings of Hughes et al 
(2002).
10
 
Table 2.10: Energy demand per industrial sub-sector in Terajoules, (%) 
Source: Own calculations based on DME, Aggregate Energy Balances, 2001 – 2006 
Industrial sub-sector 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Average 
 Iron and steel 277 078  280 727  292 005  313 771  305 487  293 426  293 749  
  (27.1) (27.4) (28.2) (26.7) (27.6) (27.4) (27.4) 
 Non-specified (industry) 193 139  239 165  232 777  350 907  280 190  282 522  263 117  
  (18.9) (23.4) (22.5) (29.9) (25.3) (26.3) (24.4) 
 Mining and quarrying 183 744  183 795  180 699  190 274  204 592  201 982  190 848  
  (18.0) (18.0) (17.5) (16.2) (18.5) (18.8) (17.8) 
 Chemical & petrochemical 235 000  184 584  178 524  154 006  141 809  147 625  173 591  
  (23.0) (18.0) (17.2) (13.1) (12.8) (13.8) (16.3) 
 Non-ferrous metals 56 974  58 043  58 530  64 630  67 104  67 106  62 065  
  (5.6) (5.7) (5.7) (5.5) (6.1) (6.3) (5.8) 
 Non-metallic minerals 43 406  43 944  59 019  67 349  74 818  44 867  55 567  
  (4.2) (4.3) (5.7) (5.7) (6.7) (4.2) (5.2) 
 Construction 15 044  15 816  16 939  15 982  16 535  15 665  15 997  
  (1.5) (1.5) (1.6) (1.4) (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) 
 Paper pulp and print 8 835  8 837  7 777  7 697  8 635  9 441  8 537  
  (0.9) (0.9) (0.8) (0.7) (0.8) (0.9) (0.8) 
 Food and tobacco 3 724  3 785  3 688  3 516  3 783  4 135  3 772  
  (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.3) (0.3) (0.4) (0.4) 
 Textile and leather 1 774  1 901  1 880  1 890  1 868  1 868  1 864  
  (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) 
 Machinery 1 010  1 019  2 337  2 071  2 278  2 479  1 865  
  (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) 
 Wood and wood products 1 011  1 115  974  1 044  1 068  1 069  1 047  
  (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) 
 Transport equipment 682  717  343  304  332  329  451  
  (0.1) (0.1) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
Total 1 021 419 1 023 448 1 035 492 1 173 440 1 108 500 1 072 513 100 
                                                        
10  Figure A.1 in the Appendix highlights the trends of the other seven main industrial energy consuming sectors. 
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Figure 2.3: Trends in GDP across industrial sub-sectors, 2001 to 2006 
Source: Own calculations based on DME, Aggregate Energy Balances, 2001 – 2006
11
 
In terms of output in each of these industrial sectors Table 2.11 and Figure 2.4 indicate that, much as 
expected, the mining and quarrying sector as well as chemical and petrochemical products and iron 
and steel (inclusive of non-ferrous metals in SSA GDP figures) contribute significantly to GDP of 
the industrial sectors assessed. Close followers include the construction and food and tobacco 
industries. The construction industry showed a notable increase in GDP during the 2001 to 2006 
time period whereas the mining and quarrying sector appeared to decline in output between 2003 
and 2006.  
Table 2.11: Annual GDP per industrial sub-sector in constant 2000 prices - Rmillion, (%) 
Source: SSA, 2001 – 2006 
Industrial sub-sector 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Average 
 Non-metallic minerals 4 989  5 470  5 446  5 576  5 806  5 933 5 537  
  (1.8) (1.9) (1.9) (1.8) (1.8) (1.8) (1.8) 
 Iron & steel & Non-ferrous metals 30 875  34 777  34 456  36 086  37 832  38 667 35 449  
  (11.0) (12.0) (11.8) (11.9) (11.8) (11.6) (11.7) 
 Chemical and petrochemical 40 140  39 550  39 478  40 675  41 553  43 362 40 793  
  (14.3) (13.6) (13.5) (13.4) (13.0) (13.0) (13.5)  
 Mining and quarrying 63 325  63 927  66 502  67 363  68 818  68 591 66 421  
  (22.6) (22.0) (22.8) (22.1) (21.5) (20.5) (21.9) 
 Construction 22 154  23 441  25 053  27 830  31 268  35 494 27 540  
  (7.9) (8.1) (8.6) (9.1) (9.8) (10.6) (9.0)  
Wood & paper, publishing & printing 16 605  16 614  16 381  17 447  18 725  20 824 17 766  
  (5.9) (5.7) (5.6) (5.7) (5.9) (6.2) (5.8)  
 Machinery 5 133  5 079  5 084  5 104  5 636  6 246 5 380  
  (1.8) (1.7) (1.7) (1.7) (1.8) (1.9) (1.8) 
 Textile & leather 7 503  8 108  7 919  8 599  8 279  8 262 8 112  
  (2.7) (2.8) (2.7) (2.8) (2.6) (2.5) (2.7)  
 Food & tobacco 25 582  26 094  24 990  25 847  27 575  28 952 26 507  
  (9.1) (9.0) (8.6) (8.5) (8.6) (8.7) (8.7) 
 Transport equipment 16 134  15 925  15 271  16 337  17 469  18 406 16 590  
  (5.8) (5.5) (5.2) (5.4) (5.5) (5.5) (5.5)  
Total GDP across these industries 279 920  290 377  291 417  304 398  319 517  334 229 100  
                                                        
11  Non-specified industry comprises one of the six highest energy consuming sectors but is omitted from this 
discussion as it does not comprise a single sector to which later analyses can easily be compared. 
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Figure 2.4: Trends in GDP across industrial sub-sectors, 2001 to 2006
12
 
Source: Own calculations based on SSA, 2001 – 2006 
 
Next we combine the above.  Table 2.12 shows energy intensity by industry as energy use per unit 
of economic output.
13
 While there were movements in the trend of energy-intensity, in general, the 
data shows a decline which could be explained by variation in the data reported in the energy 
balances as most industries record positive growth. It is immediately clear that the most energy-
intensive sectors are non-metallic minerals, iron and steel, chemical and petrochemical products, 
mining and quarrying,
14
 and non-ferrous metal as ranked by average energy-intensity (most to least) 
for the period 2001 and 2006, portrayed in Figure 2.5. 
Table 2.12: Energy intensity (energy per economic unit of output) 
Energy demand (Terajoules)/GDP (constant 2000 prices - Rmillion) 
Source: Own calculations based on DME, Energy Balances data and SSA (2008) 
 
Industrial sub-sector 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Rank 
 Iron and steel and non-ferrous metals 10.8 9.7 10.2 10.5 9.8 9.3 1 
 Non-metallic minerals 8.7 8.0 10.8 12.1 12.9 7.6 2 
 Chemical and petrochemical 5.9 4.7 4.5 3.8 3.4 3.4 3 
 Mining and quarrying 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.8 3.0 2.9 4 
 Construction 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 5 
 Paper pulp and print and wood 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 6 
 Machinery 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 7 
 Textile and leather 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 8 
 Food and tobacco 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 9 
 Transport equipment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10 
                                                        
12  The trends in GDP across the other main industrial sub-sectors are shown in Figure A.2 in the Appendix. 
13  Ideally ‘sector-specific’ information should be used to assess the energy efficiency of sectors to ensure the 
drivers behind the changes we see, are explained. In this report we do not attempt to explain the drivers of 
changes in energy-intensity and thus this approach is not necessary.  
14  The gold mining sector is a particularly energy-intensive sector, as the deeper gold is needed to be mined the 
more energy is required to make this possible.  
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Figure 2.5: Average energy intensity between 2001 and 2006 across industrial sectors  
Source: Own calculations based on DME, Energy Balances data and SSA (2008) 
A comparison of Tables 2.11 and 2.12 would suggest that the industry sub-sectors of highest energy 
intensity did not appear to experience any dramatic changes in output over the 2001 to 2006 time 
period. However, it is clear that while for example, the decline in energy demand observed in Table 
2.10 for the chemical and petrochemical sector is associated with an increase in output for this 
sector. This suggests that the chemical and petrochemical sector may have ‘cleaned its act’ between 
2001 and 2006. 
2.2.4 Summary  
This section has assessed recent trends of energy demand and the energy intensity of the industrial 
sector in South Africa. In regard to the latter, only energy intensity in the industrial sector was 
examined as this sector comprises the largest users of energy in South Africa. The energy-intensity 
metric used to identify these sectors was that of energy demand (in terajoules) per unit of GDP (in 
millions of 2000 constant rands). A comparison across sectors showed that the top four sectors of 
‘high energy to output’ ratios’ were: 
1. iron and steel and non-ferrous metals. 
2. non-metallic minerals; 
3. chemicals and petrochemicals; 
4. mining and quarrying; and  
These top-four energy-intensive sectors stand-out from the remaining industrial sectors. An analysis 
of trends in energy-intensity over the period 2001 to 2006 suggests that there may be declining 
energy intensity. This could be due to issues in the underlying data, or a real effect. The possible 
explanations of this would include that of a move to more tertiary sectors and a service economy. 
The other possibility would be that some energy efficiency measures are having an impact. Further 
analysis and longer, more consistent time-series would be needed to confirm any such trend 
definitively. 
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2.3 Identifying the energy-intensive and trade-exposed 
sectors of the economy 
The preceding sections have assessed the South African economy to determine those industries 
which are most energy-intensive and trade-exposed. Section 2.1 indicated that there is some limited 
evidence of a shift to non-traditional trade. Basic metals still drive exports but with some 
diversification into chemicals, machinery and transport equipment and resource-intensive sectors 
remain important. Section 2.2 showed that the most energy-intensive sectors of the South African 
economy are non-metallic minerals, basic metals, chemical and petrochemical products, and mining 
and quarrying. A comparison of Tables 2.5 and 2.11 show that the most important trade-exposed 
sectors of the South African economy are gold and uranium ore mining, metals (ferrous and non 
ferrous), leather and leather products, other mining, basic chemicals, machineries and equipment, 
coal mining; while the most important energy-intensive sectors (most of which are also trade-
exposed) are non-metallic minerals, iron and steel, chemical and petrochemical, mining and 
quarrying, non-ferrous metals, machinery, textile and leather, food and tobacco, wood and wood 
products, and transport equipment.  
A combination of these two lists thus will indicate that those sectors that are trade-exposed (TE) or 
trade-intensive as well as being energy-intensive (EI) provide a list of energy-intensive and trade-
exposed (EITE) sectors.  The methodology used for this report has been to use expert judgement, in 
considering the rankings for EI and TE sectors. Table 2.13 below provided the basis for this 
comparison.  Future research could fully align sectors across the various datasets used for such 
purposes. The five top EITE sectors in South Africa are identified in this study as: 
1. basic iron and steel; 
2. non-ferrous metals; 
3. chemicals and petrochemical products; 
4. mining and quarrying (including coal); 
5. machineries and some other manufactures (such as food products, as well as transport 
vehicles and equipment. 
Unsurprisingly these are similar sectors to those identified in other countries facing the same policy 
dilemmas. Transport as a service sector is highly energy intensive. However, often transport (and 
trade) is considered only as a ‘margin’, i.e. as a means to facilitate production and exchange, hence it 
may not feature directly as a single ‘sector’. Air transport is also a component of international 
tourism which is an important trade-related or export sector (see Section 3 below). Hence the list of 
energy-intensive trade-intensive sectors may also include transport: 
6. transport services including air transport.  
In general, with the onset of new climate policies post-Copenhagen, it is the energy-intensive and 
trade-exposed sectors of the economy which could be most threatened in terms of international 
competitiveness. 
Table 2.13: Energy-intensive and trade-exposed sectors  
Trade-exposed Energy-intensive  Energy-intensive and trade-exposed 
Mining, Basic metals (ferrous 
and non-ferrous metals) 
Basic metals  (iron and steel 
and non-ferrous metals) 
Basic iron and steel 
Machinery Non-metallic minerals Non-ferrous metals 
Chemicals 
Chemical and petrochemical 
products 
Chemicals and petrochemicals 
Oil Refining and related Mining and quarrying Mining and quarrying (incl. coal) 
High tech industries (profes-
sional and scientific equip-
ment and TV electronics) 
 
Machineries and manufactures 
(incl. food products and transport 
vehicles and equipment) 
 Transport services including air transport 
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3. Implications for South African trade of different 
climate change policy scenarios  
3.1 Defining the scenarios 
To study the impacts of response measures to climate change on South African trade-related sectors, 
we conduct a number of policy simulations based on various scenarios. These scenarios are based on 
trade relations between South Africa and the rest of the world in which there will be carbon 
constraints on Annex I countries, but assuming there are no constraints on emissions for South 
Africa (nor for other non-Annex I (NAI) countries). The scenarios include: 
• Scenario 1: Reductions by Annex I countries of 25% below 1990 levels by 2020. There are three 
variations under this scenario: 
o 1A: No ET (‘No emissions trade’): assuming there are no emissions trading amongst 
Annex I countries (but emissions trading only within each Annex I country)
15
; this 
provides a benchmark to measure marginal abatement costs (MACs) of different Annex 
I countries and regions, 
o 1B: Annex I ET (‘Annex I emissions trade’): Annex I countries can trade in emissions 
reduction with each other,
 16
  but not with NAI countries, nor can Annex I countries buy 
emissions reduction credit from NAI countries. 
o 1C: Annex ET with NAI no-lose crediting (‘Annex I emissions trade with NAI 
emissions reduction no-lose crediting’): Annex I countries can trade emissions 
reductions with each other as well as buying emissions reduction credits from NAI 
countries to offset their non-reduction.
17
 
• Scenario 2: Reductions by Annex I countries of 40% below 1990 levels by 2020. The purpose of 
this scenario is to test the sensitivity and robustness of the results under Scenario 1. Hence the 
same three variations 2A, 2B, 2C will be repeated here. 
3.2 Methodology and data 
The scenario simulations are conducted using the GTAP-E comparative static general equilibrium 
model. This model has been adapted to produce results for several periods by means of a recursive 
dynamic method. By recursive dynamic method, we mean that the results of one period are used to 
update the database for the next period, and then a simulation for the next period is repeated under 
different circumstances which reflect changing conditions for the next period.
18
 The database used 
for the simulations are based on the GTAP version 7 database which has economic, energy, and 
emissions information for 113 countries/regions and relating to 57 different economic sectors. For 
the purpose of this study, the regions and sectors are aggregated into a 20 by 20 data set with 20 
aggregated regions and 20 aggregated sectors.
19
 Because the focus of the study is on the effect of 
response measures of Annex I countries to climate change on South African trade, especially in the 
                                                        
15  This can also be referred to as ‘domestic’ emissions trading. Without domestic emissions trading it would be 
much more expensive to arrive at a particular (domestic) emissions reduction target hence this situation is not 
considered. 
16  Quite clearly, this would include emissions trading within each Annex I country because it would not be 
meaningful to allow trade between Annex I countries while not allowing for the same trade within each 
country. 
17  Proposals for various sectoral approaches have been made in the negotiations, both under the AWG-KP and the 
AWG-LCA. The KP has considered sectoral crediting and sectoral trading (e.g. http://unfccc.int/resource/ 
docs/2009/awg9/eng/10a02.pdf), while in the LCA subgroup on paragraph 1 (b) (iv) of the Bali Action Plan has 
produced non-paper 43, ‘Cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-specific actions’, see http://unfccc.int/ 
meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/items/5012.php South Africa has indicated in the negotiations that, 
among the variety of sectoral approaches, it finds no-lose sectoral crediting baselines a conceptually interesting 
option to creatively extend carbon markets, but its political feasibility must be further explored. 
18  More details on this methodology are given in the Appendix. 
19  See Appendix 2. 
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energy-intensive production and consumption sectors, we aggregated the sectors in such a way that it 
can relate to the set of energy intensive and trade-exposed (EITE) sectors of South Africa’s economy 
that have been identified in Section 2 above. Table 3.1 provides information on the EITE sectors 
based on the GTAPv7 database. 
By way of introduction it is useful to consider the importance of exports and imports (for a particular 
sector) from the GTAP-E perspective so as to confirm the findings in the earlier section. We do this 
not only relative to the size of its own production (see Section 2.1) which is used to create column 5 
labelled ‘SASID rank’ reported in Table 3.1, but also relative to the total value of exports or imports 
of the whole economy (as indicated by columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.1 with the labels GTAP export 
and GTAP import ‘rank’). Next, column 5 of Table 3.1 shows the energy intensity of the sectors 
based on GTAP energy input data [in million tons of oil equivalent (toe)] and economic output value 
data (in 2004 $ million). This information is used to provide the GTAP energy intensity rank listed 
in column 7). From Table 3.1, the most important ‘trade-intensive’ sectors according to the GTAP 
export/import ranks and SASID rank are: ‘Agriculture, forestry, fishery, food beverages and tobacco 
products’, ‘Minerals not elsewhere classified (nec).’, ‘Chemical, rubber, and plastics’, ‘Iron and 
steel’, ‘Non ferrous metals’, ‘Motor vehicle, spare parts, and transport equipment’, ‘Other 
manufacturing’. The most energy-intensive sectors according to the GTAP rank are: ‘Minerals nec.’, 
‘Chemical, rubber, and plastics’, ‘Non-metal mineral nec’, ‘Iron and steel’, ‘Non-ferrous metals’, 
‘Air transport’, and ‘Trade and other transport’. The last two sectors can be referred to as 
consumption-oriented sectors, in contrast to the first five sectors which are primarily production-
related. There are thus overlaps between the two sets which produce the following set of ‘energy-
intensive trade-exposed’ (EITE) sectors: 
• ‘Minerals nec.’; 
• ‘Chemical, rubber, and plastics’; 
• ‘Iron and steel’, ‘Non ferrous metals’, ‘Ferrous metal products’; 
• ‘Trade and transport’. 
The rest are either trade-intensive or energy-intensive but not both. For example, ‘Coal mining’ and 
‘Agri., forest., fish., food bev. and tobacco’ are seen to be important trade-exposed sectors but not 
energy-intensive. ‘Motor vehicle, spare parts, transport equipment’, as well as ‘Other manufacturing’ 
(which includes other machineries) do not feature strongly in GTAP-E energy-intensive list. This is 
consistent with Table 2.11 and Figure 2.4 of Section 2, where machinery and manufacture cannot be 
counted as energy-intensive when compared against highly energy-intensive sectors such as iron and 
steel, but are energy-intensive in any case. Thus, in order for the list of GTAP sectors used for 
purpose of our simulation study, to be consistent with our earlier focus on EITE sectors it is 
‘expanded’ to include these sectors. Finally, ‘Air transport’ is highly energy-intensive (as expected 
and shown in GTAP list of EI sectors) and although it is not listed as a trade-exposed sector in 
Section 2, it is included in the list of EITE sectors because firstly, it is a component of the 
‘International tourism’ sector (discussed below) and also since air transport, like any other forms of 
transport, is a ‘margin’ which is used in most trade activities. 
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Table 3.1: Trade intensities of South African sectors in 2004 
Source: GTAP v7, Quantec 
     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No.  Description  TE EI EITE 
GTAP total 
imports at 
market prices 
(m 2004 $) 
GTAP total 
exports at 
world prices  
(m 2004 $) 
GTAP 
import 
rank 
GTAP 
export 
rank 
SASID 
trade-
exposure 
rank 
GTAP 
energy 
intensity 
(toe/ 
$mill) 
GTAP 
energy 
inten- 
sity 
rank 
1 Coal TE   3 801.4 3 101.4 8 8 9   
2 Oil    0.0 0.0 20 20 6   
3 Gas    0.2 0.2 19 19 7   
4 Refined products    1 485.5 1 243.2 11 12 10   
5 Electricity    273.3 273.3 18 18 18   
6 Agri. forest. fish. food bev. 
tobacco. 
TE  
 7 378.2 6 367.3 3 3 13 51 11 
7 Minerals nec  TE EI EITE 5 659.6 5 244.4 5 5 1 814 1 
8 Paper products, publishing    1 399.6 1231.2 12 13 11 58 10 
9 Chem., rubber, plastic 
products 
TE EI EITE 
5 294.3 4 865.7 6 7 8 205 6 
10 Non metal minerals nec  EI  622.6 544.1 17 17 14 654 2 
11 Iron and steel TE EI EITE 6 336.7 5 921.3 4 4 2 483 4 
12 Non ferrous metals TE EI EITE 9 583.3 9 486.3 2 1 3 211 5 
13 Ferrous metal products TE EI EITE 1 202.1 1 103.3 14 14 4 60 9 
14 Motor veh. & parts, trans. 
equip. 
TE 
 
EITE 
5 244.9 4 977.2 7 6 12 5 15 
15 Other manufacturing  TE  EITE 9 996.5 9 268.8 1 2 5 24 12 
16 Air transport   EI EITE 1 077.3 1 077.3 15 15 15 569 3 
17 Trade & trans.(excl. air trans.)  TE EI EITE 2 696.6 2 696.6 9 9 16 153 7 
18 Rec., cultural, sport., dom. 
svces  
   1 259.1 1 259.1 13 11 17 77 8 
19 Other market services    1 805.7 1805.7 10 10 20 23 13 
20 Government services    975.7 975.7 16 16 19 12 14 
 Total    66 092.5 61 442.0      
* Note: Energy-intensive sectors are shown in bold, trade-exposed sectors in italics. 
Figure 3.1 below reiterates some of the important trade-intensive sectors of the SA economy. In 
aggregating the SA sectors for the purpose of this study, there is one important ‘export’ sector which 
is not easily aggregated: international tourism. Based on the expenditure pattern of international 
tourists in SA (in the year 2005) taken from the Statistics South Africa Draft Tourism Satellite 
Accounts (SSA 2005) which is shown in Table 3.2, we can ‘reconstruct’ an ‘International tourism’ 
sector as reported in Figure 3.2. (Some shares may seem large but that is the result of very low 
export values in the relevant industries). Figure 3.3 below shows the most important regions with 
which SA has significant trade. 
Table 3.2: Components of ‘International tourism’ sector based on expenditures in 2005 
Model 
code 
Description Share of inbound visitors 
expenditure of sector’s exports 
P_C  Refined products 8% 
AFBT  Agriculture, forestry, fishing, food beverages and tobacco 10% 
CRP  Chemical, rubber, plastic products 0.2% 
OMF  Other manufacturing 23.6% 
ATP  Air transport 74.2% 
TTR  Trade and transport (excl. air transport) 85.2% 
ROS Recreational and other services 85.2% 
OSM  Other market services 91.4% 
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Figure 3.1: South African exports and imports – by sectors (GTAP v7 database, 2004) (% of total) 
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Figure 3.2: South African exports and imports by sectors including international tourism (2004) 
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Figure 3.3: South African exports and imports – by regions (GTAP v7 database, 2004) 
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3.3 Results and findings 
3.3.1 Reference or Business as usual Scenario 
Since we are conducting simulation experiments into the future, we need to create a baseline which 
requires some assumptions to be made. To predict the future levels of CO2 emissions for regions 
around the world, we need to specify assumptions about the basic drivers of these emissions. The 
two main drivers we can use in the GTAP-E model are population growth and GDP growth.
20
 The 
assumptions regarding GDP growth rates are based on the IPCC Special Report on emissions 
scenarios,
21
 and the assumptions regarding population growth rates are based the United States (US) 
Census Bureau projections.
22
 The assumptions are listed in Table 3.3 and illustrated graphically in 
Figures 3.4 and 3.5.  
 
Table 3.3: Assumed basic drivers of CO2 emissions 
  GDP growth (% p.ạ.) Population growth (% p.ạ) 
No.  Region 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 
1 South Africa 2.99 2.83 2.77 0.73 -0.34 0.10 
2 USA 2.20 2.11 2.05 1.00 0.99 0.97 
3 Germany 1.91 1.84 1.78 -0.03 -0.08 -0.13 
4 UK 1.91 1.84 1.78 0.28 0.29 0.29 
5 Netherlands 1.91 1.84 1.78 0.47 0.35 0.30 
6 France 1.91 1.84 1.78 0.60 0.47 0.37 
7 Italy 1.91 1.84 1.78 0.02 -0.14 -0.23 
8 Belgium 1.91 1.84 1.78 0.12 0.06 0.02 
9 W Europe 1.91 1.84 1.78 0.20 0.10 0.00 
10 EFTA 1.91 1.84 1.78 0.40 0.26 0.23 
11 Russia 3.63 3.44 3.37 -0.48 -0.49 -0.55 
12 Japan 1.91 1.84 1.78 -0.08 -0.33 -0.49 
13 Aus., NZ, Canada 2.20 2.11 2.05 1.00 0.93 0.85 
14 Rest Annex I 1.91 1.84 1.78 -0.33 -0.32 -0.38 
15 China & HK 6.00 5.80 5.00 0.62 0.68 0.53 
16 India 5.00 5.00 4.20 1.68 1.51 1.39 
17 Bra., Arg., Para. 2.99 2.83 2.77 1.32 1.14 0.99 
18 Africa 2.99 2.83 2.77 1.93 2.06 1.79 
19 Middle East 2.99 2.83 2.77 1.85 1.70 1.52 
20 Rest of world 3.70 3.52 3.43 1.75 1.64 1.55 
 
                                                        
20  Other drivers can also be used such as the level of resources (endowments) utilization, such as the rates of 
growth of labour, capital, land, and natural resources used. If these drivers are chosen then GDP growth will be 
endogenous. Conversely, if GDP growth rates are chosen as drivers (exogenous), then the rates of resource 
utilisation will be endogenous. 
21  http://www.grida.no/publications/other/ipcc_sr/?src=/climate/ipcc/emission/. 
22  http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/informationGateway.php.  
The effect of response measures to climate change on South Africa’s economy and trade  
ENERGY RESEARCH CENTRE 
 
28
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
S
o
u
th
 A
fr
ic
a
U
S
A
G
e
rm
a
n
y
U
K
N
e
th
e
rl
a
n
d
F
ra
n
c
e
It
a
ly
B
e
lg
iu
m
W
e
s
t.
E
u
ro
p
e
E
F
T
A
R
u
s
s
ia
J
a
p
a
n
A
u
s
.,
 N
Z
,
C
a
n
.
R
e
s
t 
A
n
n
e
x
I
C
h
in
a
 &
 H
K
In
d
ia
B
ra
.,
 A
rg
.,
P
a
ra
.
A
fr
ic
a
M
id
. 
E
a
s
t
R
e
s
t 
o
f
W
o
rl
d
%
 p
e
r 
a
n
n
u
m
2004 - 2010
2010 - 2015
2015 - 2020
 
Figure 3.4: Assumed per annum GDP growth rates over the study periods 
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Figure 3.5: Assumed per annum population growth rates over the study periods 
Based on these basic assumptions, we run the GTAP-E model to produce a reference or Business-as-
usual (BaU) scenario. The emissions levels for the BaU scenario are shown in Table 3.4. From this 
table, it can be seen that without the imposition of any climate policy around the world, global CO2 
emissions are expected to grow by 19.8%, 16.3% and 15.5% respectively for each period 2004-2010, 
2010-2015, and 2015-2020. These trends are reinforced graphically in Figure 3.6 below. The rates of 
growth of CO2 emissions for Annex I regions over these periods are lower than the global averages: 
at 13.8%, 11.0%, and 10.7% respectively. This implies that growth rates of CO2 emissions for NAI 
regions are larger than the world average. This reflects to a large extent the fact that NAI regions are 
generally less energy- and emissions-efficient than Annex I regions, even though to some extent, 
higher population growth and GDP growth (such as for the case of China and India) also plays a 
role. Figure 3.7 shows how regions fare in terms of their CO2 emissions. 
Table 3.4: CO2 Emission in the BaU scenario (million tons of carbon per annum) 
No.  Region 1990 2004 2010 2015 2020 
1 South Africa  98.16 115.9 132.3 150.7 
2 USA 1351.9 1655.33 1881.5 2086.0 2306.7 
3 Germany 276.1 216.57 242.3 265.1 289.4 
4 UK 159.3 162.17 181.3 198.2 216.3 
5 Netherlands 45.7 55.42 62.1 68.0 74.3 
6 France 100.0 102.43 115.1 126.4 138.4 
7 Italy 117.0 120.75 135.1 147.9 161.5 
8 Belgium 30.9 28.06 31.5 34.5 37.8 
9 W Europe 223.9 211.01 236.5 259.1 283.3 
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No.  Region 1990 2004 2010 2015 2020 
10 EFTA 22.2 29.95 33.6 36.8 40.3 
11 Russia 651.5 423.4 513.2 599.0 697.0 
12 Japan 320.0 298.81 335.0 367.2 401.4 
13 Aus., NZ, Canada 210.5 260.28 295.6 327.5 361.7 
14 Rest Annex I 445.5 358.4 400.0 436.9 476.0 
15 China & HK  1219.6 1658.5 2138.5 2672.3 
16 India  289.49 376.9 471.3 570.5 
17 Bra., Arg., Para.  122.95 144.9 165.3 188.1 
18 Africa  20.82 24.7 28.4 32.5 
19 Middle East  493.14 583.6 667.8 762.2 
20 Rest of world  923.08 1129.3 1329.1 1558.5 
Annex I Total 3954.6 3922.58 4,463 4,953 5,484 
% change from 1990 level (-0.81%) 12.8% 25.2% 38.7% 
% change over pvs period  13.8% 11.0% 10.7% 
NAI Total 3167.2 4033.9 4932.8 5934.8 
% change over pvs period  27.4% 22.3% 20.3% 
World Total 7089.8 8496.5 9885.5 11418.9 
% change over pvs period  19.8% 16.3% 15.5% 
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Figure 3.6: Average per annum rates of CO2 Emission rate in the Business-as-usual (BaU) scenario 
– by Regions 
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Figure 3.7: Average per annum rates of CO2 emission in the BaU scenario – by Annex I and NAI 
groupings 
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3.3.2 Scenario 1: Annex I CO2 reduction of 25% below 1990 levels by 2020 
For this scenario, we assume that Annex I regions will respond to the challenge of climate change by 
agreeing to cut back on their CO2 emissions levels to reach a level of 25% below the 1990 level 
emissions (of 3954.6 million tons of carbon (MtC))
23
 by 2020. To reach this level, we assume for 
simplicity that a constant rate of emissions reduction of 8.9% over each of the three periods 2004-
2010, 2010-2015, and 2015-2020 (see Table 3.5)
24
. To achieve the emissions reduction Annex I 
regions will have to impose a carbon tax or alternatively embark on some emissions trading 
scheme.
25
 We assume three situations: 
• Scenario 1A – No ET (‘No Emissions Trade’): when there is no emissions trade between Annex 
I countries; each regions will try to achieve individual target reduction of CO2 emissions without 
co-operation with other regions. To abstract from the issue of burden sharing we assume that 
each region will have to achieve the same target reduction (of -8.9% reduction over each of the 
three periods). The result of this simulation will then show up the differences in marginal 
abatement costs (MACs) of different Annex I countries. 
• Scenario 1B – Annex I ET (‘Annex I emissions trade’): when Annex I countries engage in 
emission trade with each other but not with NAI countries, the result will report a single average 
marginal abatement cost for all Annex I regions as a whole 
• Scenario 1C – Annex I ET with NAI no-lose crediting (‘Annex I emissions trade with NAI 
emissions reduction no-lose crediting’): to define an emissions reduction which can have ‘no-
lose credit’, the reference or BaU emission level of a NAI region is compared to the actual 
emission; if the actual level is lower, then a credit is given equal to the difference, but if it is 
higher, then no credit is given but no penalty is imposed either
26
. This scenario is similar to what 
has been proposed by Schmidt et al (2008). 
Emissions, marginal abatement costs and savings from emissions trade 
Results of Scenario 1 are given in Tables 3.5–3.15 and Figures 3.8-3.10. In Tables 3.5 and Figure 3.8 
the emissions levels for all regions for the three cases of Scenario 1 are shown. In the case of No ET, 
individual Annex I regions have to cut back their emissions by the same proportion of -8.9 % over 
each period.  
                                                        
23  These are total carbon dioxide emissions of Annex I Parties in 1990, for the purposes of Article 25 of the Kyoto 
Protocol (see: for example, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop3/07a01.pdf#page=31). 
24  This percentage is not per year, but for the period, derived as follows: a 8.9% reduction over 2004 results is a 
level of 0.91 in 2010; then 8.9% reduction over 0.91 gives a level of 0.83 in 2015, then 8.9% reduction over 
0.83 gives a level of 0.756 in 2020 (all compared to 2004 level). Since 2004 is already 0.81% reduced over 
1990, this gives a level of (0.756)*(1-0.0081) = 0.75 compared to 1990. Note that the period 2004-2010 is six 
rather than five years, therefore, -8.9% over this period is slightly less than -8.9% over the later periods 2010-
2015, 2015-2020; however, for simplicity we assume the same rate for all three periods 
25  From a theoretical (and modeling) viewpoint, there is no difference between a carbon tax system and an 
emissions trading (‘cap-and-trade’) system so long as the tax is consistent with the overall level of the 
emissions cap, and so long as the revenues from the tax (or emissions trading) are used for the same purposes. 
For example, if a cap and trade system is used, one must decide how to allocate the caps (by ‘grandfathering’ 
i.e. free allocation, or by auctioning). Grandfathering is equivalent to using the carbon tax revenue (if such a 
system is imposed) to subsidize firms for the increase in costs arising from the imposition of the climate policy. 
Auctioning, on the other hand, implies the government is collecting the revenue from climate policy for any 
purposes (including tax reform, for example). A carbon tax system implies setting the price of emissions 
(carbon tax) and letting polluters (consumers and firms) decide on quantities, whereas an emissions trading 
scheme will normally set the quantities and let the trading system work out the price. Although in theory there 
is no difference between the two systems, in practice, there may be important practical factors which determine 
if one system is preferred to the other (such as administrative cost, monitoring costs, etc). 
26  Defined this way, this Scenario looks like ‘half’ of a full ‘World emissions trading’ situation when NAI regions 
are given ‘quotas’ on emissions and both a credit is given if the quota is not exceeded but a penalty will also be 
imposed if it is. 
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Table 3.5: CO2 emissions for Scenario 1 (Gt C) 
  No ET Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI no-
lose crediting 
No.  Region 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 
1 South Africa 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.09 0.09 0.09 
2 USA 1.51 1.37 1.25 1.47 1.29 1.13 1.73 1.80 1.91 
3 Germany 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.23 0.24 0.25 
4 UK 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.18 
5 Netherlands 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 
6 France 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 
7 Italy 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.15 
8 Belgium 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 
9 W Europe 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.23 0.24 0.26 
10 EFTA 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 
11 Russia 0.39 0.35 0.32 0.37 0.34 0.31 0.46 0.49 0.54 
12 Japan 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.30 0.29 0.27 0.32 0.34 0.37 
13 Aus., NZ, Canada 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.27 0.29 0.30 
14 Rest Annex I 0.33 0.30 0.27 0.31 0.28 0.26 0.36 0.37 0.39 
15 China & HK 1.69 2.20 2.78 1.69 2.20 2.77 1.38 1.60 1.85 
16 India 0.38 0.48 0.58 0.38 0.48 0.58 0.33 0.38 0.44 
17 Bra., Arg., Para. 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.14 0.15 0.17 
18 Africa 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 
19 Middle East 0.61 0.71 0.84 0.60 0.71 0.84 0.55 0.60 0.65 
20 Rest of world 1.17 1.41 1.69 1.16 1.41 1.69 1.08 1.22 1.39 
Annex 1 Total 3.57 3.26 2.97 3.57 3.26 2.97 4.13 4.35 4.62 
% change over 1990 level -9.6% -17.7% -25.0% -9.6% -17.7% -25.0% 4.5% 9.9% 16.9% 
% change over pvs period -8.9% -8.9% -8.9% -8.9% -8.9% -8.9% 5.4% 5.2% 6.4% 
Non-Annex1 Total 4.14 5.15 6.28 4.14 5.15 6.28 3.58 4.05 4.62 
% change over pvs period 30.7% 24.4% 22.0% 30.6% 24.4% 22.0% 13.0% 13.3% 13.9% 
World total 7.71 8.41 9.25 7.71 8.40 9.25 7.71 8.40 9.25 
% change over pvs period 8.8% 9.0% 10.0% 8.7% 9.0% 10.0% 8.7% 9.0% 10.0% 
Leakage rate (from Annex I 
to NAI) (%) -11.9% -12.9% -13.8% -11.5% -12.6% -13.7% 138% 145% 153% 
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Figure 3.8: CO2 Emission in for the BaU case Scenarios 1 (A, B, C) in the year 2020 
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Differences in marginal abatement costs (MACs) of Annex I regions are shown in the first three 
columns of Table 3.6. They can range from a low of $142/tC for ‘Rest of Annex I’ to a high of 428 
US$/tC for France in 2010, and rising to $1928/tC in 2020. The reason for this is that  France relies 
most heavily on nuclear energy for its energy needs and hence it is most difficult to reduce CO2 
emissions for France, while other countries such as the US and UK, still relying on coal and hence it 
is much easier to cut back on emissions. Because of these differences in MACs, when Annex I 
regions are allowed to trade in emissions, countries such as USA, UK, Russia, Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada, and Rest of Annex I region, will cut back on their emissions, to sell the credits to 
those that cannot do so as well, such as France, Italy and Japan.  
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Figure 3.9: CO2 Emission in for Scenarios 1, cases A, B, C  
Table 3.6: MAC or CO2 Emission permit price (2004 $/tC) for Scenario 1 
  No ET Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI 
no-lose crediting 
No Region 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 
1 South Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 57 104 143 
2 USA 161 375 670 183 448 834 57 104 143 
3 Germany 204 501 931 183 448 834 57 104 143 
4 UK 174 465 917 183 448 834 57 104 143 
5 Netherlands 286 681 1232 183 448 834 57 104 143 
6 France 428 1054 1928 183 448 834 57 104 143 
7 Italy 332 836 1594 183 448 834 57 104 143 
8 Belgium 352 874 1633 183 448 834 57 104 143 
9 W Europe 315 796 1508 183 448 834 57 104 143 
10 EFTA 337 779 1405 183 448 834 57 104 143 
11 Russia 162 403 771 183 448 834 57 104 143 
12 Japan 337 857 1640 183 448 834 57 104 143 
13 Aus., NZ, Canada 170 416 765 183 448 834 57 104 143 
14 Rest Annex I 142 365 750 183 448 834 57 104 143 
15 China & HK 0 0 0 0 0 0 57 104 143 
16 India 0 0 0 0 0 0 57 104 143 
17 Bra., Arg., Para. 0 0 0 0 0 0 57 104 143 
18 Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 57 104 143 
19 Middle East 0 0 0 0 0 0 57 104 143 
20 Rest of world 0 0 0 0 0 0 57 104 143 
 
 
 
The effect of response measures to climate change on South Africa’s economy and trade  
ENERGY RESEARCH CENTRE 
 
33
The benefits of emissions trade are shown in Table 3.7. Countries which sell emissions cutback 
credits (cutbacks which are beyond their quotas) will gain by the revenue from sale. Countries which 
have to buy these credits will also save in abatement costs. Total savings for Annex I regions as a 
whole amount to some $4.5 billion per annum in 2010, rising to 7.4 $US billion in 2020. When 
Annex I regions are allowed to buy emissions reduction credits not only from each other, but also 
from NAI countries (Scenario 1C), the benefits are even greater. 9.6 US$ billion per annum in 2010 
but slowing down to just $7.1 billion in 2020.
27
 This is explained by the differences in MACs 
between NAI and Annex I regions which are greater than the differences among Annex I regions, 
hence the potential gains from emissions trade are also greater. 
Table 3.7: Values of emissions trade (2004 $ million) (annual average) for Scenario 1 
  Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI no-
lose crediting 
No.  Region 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 
1 South Africa 0.0 0.0 0.0 284.8 120.7 64.4 
2 USA 1 256 2 387 3 487 2 088 2 151 2 060 
3 Germany 101 107 82 290 290 271 
4 UK 44 119 197 187 200 192 
5 Netherlands 115 106 79 88 85 78 
6 France 362 436 456 183 177 160 
7 Italy 292 358 404 192 188 172 
8 Belgium 81 98 106 48 46 42 
9 W Europe 499 609 656 340 332 303 
10 EFTA 78 68 57 49 47 43 
11 Russia 367 181 5 669 728 734 
12 Japan 720 889 1012 484 470 428 
13 Aus., NZ, Canada 102 89 199 331 349 333 
14 Rest Annex I 479 133 642 355 398 388 
15 China & HK 0 0 0 2 621 1 733 1 123 
16 India 0 0 0 469 286 181 
17 Bra., Arg., Para. 0 0 0 74 53 37 
18 Africa 0 0 0 11 9 6 
19 Middle East 0 0 0 359 276 197 
20 Rest of world 0 0 0 510 415 304 
 Total 4 495 5 580 7 382 9 633 8 354 7116 
 
Leakage 
One potential negative aspect of the case of Annex I ET scenario but without participation from NAI 
countries even in the form of no-lose crediting is a phenomenon of so-called (emissions) ‘leakage’
28
. 
This is defined as the increase in NAI emissions divided by the reduction in emissions of Annex I 
regions and expressed as a percentage. Leakage occurs when emissions-intensive activities in Annex 
I regions are to some extent shifted towards NAI regions, hence the increase in emissions in NAI 
regions. In terms of reducing emissions world-wide, there is a smaller gain – emissions have 
‘leaked’ from one set of countries to others. From Table 3.5, it is seen that the leakage rates in the 
                                                        
27  Total cumulative savings for Scenario 1C are still greater than those of Scenario 1B, even though the annual 
savings may be smaller in 2020 due to the fact that most potential savings have already been pushed forwards to 
earlier years in the case of Scenario 1C. 
28  Leakage is difficult to measure because in reality this depends on a number of factors many factors and some of 
which may counteract each other. The empirical estimates of leakages using simulation models also tend to 
vary widely because it depends on the assumptions made about trade responses (Second Assessment Report, 
section 11.7.2, IPCC 1996). Nevertheless, it is a phenomenon worth considering at least for the purpose of 
considering the potential gains from a co-operative approach to climate policy. 
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case of No ET and Annex I ET are similar, around 12% in 2010 rising to 14% in 2020. One further 
advantage of the scenario (1C) in which when NAI regions are encouraged to participate in 
emissions cutback by allowing them to sell their voluntary cutback credits to Annex I regions is the 
fact that leakage rate will not only be stopped, but can become ‘positive’ in the sense that there is 
now a cutback in emissions in NAI regions as well as in Annex I regions. The ratio of emissions 
reduction in NAI as compared to Annex I emissions reduction is about 138% in 2010 increasing to 
153% in 2020 (last row of last three columns in Table 3.5). Because NAI emissions reductions are to 
compensate (exactly) for the reduced emissions cutbacks in Annex I regions the total world 
emissions therefore remain the same in both two situations (Scenario 1B and 1C) – see Table 3.5. 
Trade impacts, globally and on South Africa 
South Africa can potentially gain not only from emissions trade (see Scenario 1C result for South 
Africa in row 1 of Table 3.7), but also from trade in goods and services associated with this scenario. 
However, the gains from the traditional trade of goods and services can also be offset by potential 
losses. This depends on South Africa’s sectoral impacts of Annex I response measures to climate 
change and the impacts of different emissions trading arrangements. 
Table 3.8 shows the ‘relative’
29
 change in terms of trade (% change in price of Export – % change in 
price of import) as a result of the response measures. Terms of trade is an important factor to 
consider because it portrays the price advantage/disadvantage (if positive/negative) facing an 
exporter when the exporter is a ‘price taker’ i.e. a small player in the international market. This price 
advantage can be used to offset any changes in the volumes of exports relative to imports, or in the 
adverse movement of exchange rate.  
Table 3.8: Change in terms of trade – Scenario 1 relative to BaU (average % per annum) 
  No ET Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI 
no-lose crediting 
No Region 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 
1 South Africa 0.24 0.48 0.62 0.21 0.43 0.54 0.03 0.08 0.07 
2 USA 0.01 -0.07 -0.13 -0.08 -0.25 -0.41 0.07 0.07 0.06 
3 Germany 0.16 0.19 0.26 0.15 0.18 0.27 0.11 0.10 0.09 
4 UK -0.03 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.07 -0.04 0.00 0.02 0.03 
5 Netherlands 0.05 0.00 -0.09 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 
6 France 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.20 0.23 0.30 0.13 0.13 0.11 
7 Italy 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.18 0.21 0.30 0.13 0.12 0.10 
8 Belgium 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.04 
9 W Europe 0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.06 
10 EFTA -0.29 -0.19 0.00 -0.27 -0.18 -0.01 -0.15 -0.11 -0.07 
11 Russia -0.99 -1.13 -1.19 -1.00 -1.21 -1.29 -0.54 -0.46 -0.34 
12 Japan 0.16 -0.06 -0.26 0.34 0.33 0.44 0.31 0.29 0.24 
13 Aus., NZ, Canada -0.13 -0.12 -0.11 -0.15 -0.14 -0.14 -0.08 -0.03 -0.01 
14 Rest Annex I 0.03 -0.16 -0.74 -0.05 -0.32 -1.00 0.03 0.02 0.02 
15 China & HK 0.14 0.18 0.21 0.13 0.15 0.17 -0.05 -0.08 -0.09 
16 India 0.59 0.69 0.79 0.55 0.64 0.74 0.16 0.07 0.02 
17 Bra., Arg., Para. 0.31 0.51 0.77 0.28 0.45 0.70 0.06 0.05 0.04 
18 Africa -0.97 -0.78 -0.39 -0.95 -0.81 -0.43 -0.65 -0.55 -0.39 
19 Middle East -0.71 -0.52 -0.17 -0.70 -0.54 -0.21 -0.51 -0.45 -0.32 
20 Rest of world 0.02 0.11 0.22 0.01 0.09 0.20 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 
 
                                                        
29  By ‘relative’ is meant as compared to BaU scenario, i.e. after subtracting the percentage change in the terms of 
trade of the BaU scenario 
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From Table 3.8, it can be seen that South Africa clearly enjoys an improvement in terms of trade as a 
result of the response measures by Annex I countries. The reason is that while the world export price 
of coal will decrease (relative to the BaU Scenario) due to a decline demand following the 
imposition of climate policy, world export prices of energy-intensive industry outputs (such as 
chemicals rubber and plastics, iron and steel, non ferrous metals, minerals, and other manufactures) 
will tend to increase partly because of the higher energy input costs (see Table 3.9). Therefore, for 
those regions which rely mainly on the export of fossil fuels (such as Russia, Africa, Middle East), 
the terms of trade will decline, while those regions which export mainly energy-intensive goods such 
as metals, minerals, chemicals, and manufactures will experience improvements in terms of trade 
(USA, Germany, France, Italy, Brazil Argentina, Paraguay, China, India). South Africa’s exports of 
coal will mean some negative impact on its terms of trade but this is not enough to offset the positive 
impacts due to the export of energy-intensive goods, hence South Africa can also expect an 
improvement in its terms of trade (Table 3.9). 
Table 3.9: Change in price index of global merchandise exports from South Africa – Scenario 1 
relative to BaU (average % per annum) 
  No ET Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI 
no-lose crediting 
No  Sector 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 
1 Coal mining -1.58 0.37 1.05 -1.51 0.30 0.88 -2.37 -0.65 -0.16 
2 Oil extraction -0.83 -0.39 0.31 -0.84 -0.47 0.18 -0.80 -0.74 -0.54 
3 Gas extr., manufac. -0.25 0.77 1.13 -0.27 0.68 0.98 -1.43 -0.55 -0.26 
4 Petrol. & coal prod. -0.89 -0.37 0.22 -0.88 -0.45 0.09 -0.54 -0.30 -0.15 
5 Electricity 0.14 0.96 1.35 0.11 0.86 1.19 6.37 4.12 2.67 
6 Agri., food tobac. 0.63 0.99 1.28 0.57 0.89 1.14 0.04 0.03 0.04 
7 Other mining 0.38 0.79 1.07 0.33 0.69 0.92 0.97 0.84 0.65 
8 Paper & publishing 0.64 1.00 1.28 0.58 0.90 1.14 0.12 0.10 0.09 
9 Chem. rubber plas. 0.62 0.99 1.27 0.56 0.89 1.13 0.29 0.25 0.21 
10 Non metal minerals 0.63 1.04 1.34 0.57 0.94 1.19 0.63 0.53 0.41 
11 Iron & steel 0.59 1.01 1.30 0.53 0.90 1.16 0.66 0.55 0.43 
12 Non ferrous metals 0.75 1.14 1.42 0.68 1.03 1.27 0.26 0.20 0.16 
13 Ferrous metal prod. 0.64 1.02 1.30 0.58 0.92 1.16 0.32 0.27 0.21 
14 Motor veh. & equip. 0.58 0.88 1.10 0.54 0.82 1.01 0.13 0.12 0.10 
15 Other manufacture. 0.64 1.00 1.27 0.58 0.90 1.14 0.09 0.08 0.07 
16 Air transport  0.23 0.63 0.99 0.19 0.55 0.87 0.27 0.33 0.30 
17 Trade & oth. trans. 0.63 1.01 1.32 0.56 0.91 1.17 0.02 0.02 0.04 
18 Rec. cultural sport 0.66 1.02 1.31 0.59 0.92 1.17 0.12 0.08 0.07 
19 Oth. market srvces 0.76 1.13 1.42 0.70 1.02 1.27 -0.12 -0.12 -0.08 
20 Govt services 0.67 1.03 1.32 0.61 0.93 1.18 0.06 0.01 0.01 
 
The changes in terms of trade caused by the imposition of climate response measures may be 
considered as an important indication of the close interrelationship between climate and trade 
policies. One of the concerns in international climate policy is the issue of free riding and carbon 
leakage through trade. However, to combat this phenomenon trade measures (such as border tax 
adjustments based on energy intensity or non-tariff measures such as labelling) may come into 
conflict with other the international measures which seek to promote free trade. Therefore, the issue 
of close relationship between trade and environment therefore is an important issue to be considered. 
However, this can go beyond the scope of this study, therefore, in this study, we limit ourselves 
mainly to the study of the impacts of climate response measures on South Africa based on the 
assumption that other (exogenously defined) measures such as border tax adjustments, non-tariff and 
other technical regulations) are not in place. We leave the study of these additional measures and 
their impacts for future studies. 
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Despite the improvements in terms of trade (positive price effects) the quantity effects are however 
negative for most sectors in South Africa as can be seen from Tables 3.10 – 3.11. In Table 3.10, the 
quantities of exports for most sectors except electricity, iron and steel, air transport are seen to be 
negative (these trends are reflected graphically in Figure 3.10).  
Table 3.10: Impacts on volumes of exports from South Africa – Scenario 1 relative to BaU (average 
% per annum) 
  No ET Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI 
no-lose crediting 
No.  Sector 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 
1 Coal mining -5.4 -4.1 -3.1 -4.9 -3.6 -2.9 -0.3 -1.3 -1.1 
2 Oil extraction -4.3 -5.3 -5.8 -4.4 -5.5 -5.9 -1.4 -1.0 -0.7 
3 Gas extr., manufac. -9.3 -20.2 -19.3 -9.7 -20.2 -19.3 207.6 17.9 4.2 
4 Petrol. & coal prod. 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.1 -0.4 -0.9 -0.8 
5 Electricity 18.6 13.2 9.2 17.0 12.6 9.1 -15.0 -11.7 -7.9 
6 Agri., food tobac. -1.2 -1.9 -2.5 -1.1 -1.8 -2.4 0.5 0.4 0.3 
7 Other mining -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -1.5 -1.3 -1.0 
8 Paper & publishing -1.2 -2.1 -3.1 -1.2 -2.0 -3.0 0.5 0.5 0.4 
9 Chem. Rubber plas. -1.5 -2.2 -2.7 -1.4 -2.0 -2.5 -0.4 -0.1 0.0 
10 Non metal minerals -0.4 -0.9 -1.4 -0.6 -1.0 -1.4 -1.3 -0.8 -0.5 
11 Iron and steel 1.2 0.7 -0.1 1.0 0.6 -0.2 -1.3 -0.7 -0.4 
12 Non ferrous metals -1.1 -2.2 -3.4 -0.8 -1.8 -3.0 1.1 1.5 1.2 
13 Ferrous metal prod. -1.2 -2.1 -2.8 -1.1 -1.9 -2.6 -0.6 -0.3 -0.2 
14 Motor veh. & equip. -1.5 -2.4 -3.3 -1.3 -2.1 -2.8 0.4 0.5 0.3 
15 Other manufacture. -2.2 -3.5 -4.7 -1.9 -3.1 -4.2 0.6 0.5 0.2 
16 Air transport  2.9 3.0 2.3 2.6 2.8 2.4 0.2 0.0 -0.1 
17 Trade & oth. Trans. -1.2 -1.9 -2.7 -1.1 -1.8 -2.4 0.5 0.4 0.2 
18 Rec. Cultural sport -1.7 -2.8 -3.8 -1.5 -2.4 -3.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 
19 Oth. Market srvces -2.5 -3.7 -4.7 -2.2 -3.2 -4.3 1.1 1.0 0.7 
20 Govt services -1.7 -2.7 -3.5 -1.6 -2.6 -3.4 0.3 0.5 0.3 
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Figure 3.10: Scenario 1 – Specific export losses or gains in South African export sectors – 
Scenario 1 relative to BaU (total for each period in 2004 $ billion) 
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In Table 3.11, the picture for imports is almost the reverse, with most sectors increasing their 
imports except electricity, other mining, iron and steel, non ferrous metals and air transport. As a 
result the net impacts on the value of the trade balance for most sectors are negative except for a few 
like electricity, other mining, iron and steel, and air transport (Table 3.12). The total impact on South 
African trade balance is therefore also overwhelmingly negative for the case of ‘no ET’ and – 
slightly less, but still negative – for ‘Annex ET’. 
Table 3.11: Impacts on volumes of imports into South Africa – Scenario 1 relative to BaU (average 
% per annum) 
  No ET Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI 
no-lose crediting 
No.  Sector 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 
1 Coal mining 0.29 1.80 2.20 0.24 1.60 1.98 -7.37 -3.60 -1.95 
2 Oil extraction 0.83 0.65 0.46 0.73 0.60 0.44 -0.02 -0.32 -0.35 
3 Gas extr., manufac. 5.74 17.72 17.13 6.10 16.90 16.53 -8.60 -2.45 -0.89 
4 Petrol. & coal prod. 0.14 0.36 0.29 0.14 0.33 0.23 -0.16 -0.17 -0.20 
5 Electricity -4.73 -2.55 -0.94 -4.50 -2.43 -0.97 13.06 7.08 4.22 
6 Agri., Food Tobac. 0.50 0.75 0.95 0.49 0.72 0.91 -0.05 -0.12 -0.08 
7 Other Mining -0.17 -0.48 -0.79 -0.14 -0.42 -0.72 0.09 0.18 0.16 
8 Paper & Publishing 0.74 1.10 1.45 0.68 1.00 1.33 -0.06 -0.13 -0.09 
9 Chem. rubber plas. 0.48 0.64 0.75 0.46 0.61 0.69 0.18 0.08 0.04 
10 Non metal minerals 0.26 0.67 1.12 0.30 0.65 1.01 0.58 0.34 0.23 
11 Iron and steel -0.17 -0.09 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.04 0.52 0.38 0.25 
12 Non ferrous metals -0.62 -1.18 -1.77 -0.48 -0.99 -1.57 0.41 0.65 0.56 
13 Ferrous metal prod. 0.93 1.49 2.01 0.77 1.23 1.69 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 
14 Motor veh. & equip. 1.06 1.59 2.15 0.89 1.33 1.86 -0.37 -0.30 -0.20 
15 Other manufacture. 1.85 2.73 3.61 1.60 2.38 3.27 -0.65 -0.50 -0.29 
16 Air transport  -1.00 -1.10 -0.93 -0.89 -1.02 -0.89 -0.17 -0.11 -0.06 
17 Trade & Oth. Trans. 0.51 0.94 1.39 0.46 0.84 1.26 -0.26 -0.21 -0.11 
18 Rec. cultural sport 0.84 1.46 2.10 0.73 1.28 1.90 -0.05 -0.15 -0.10 
19 Oth. market srvces 1.47 2.27 3.17 1.27 1.99 2.88 -0.50 -0.46 -0.32 
20 Govt services 1.09 1.78 2.40 1.07 1.80 2.51 0.07 -0.16 -0.13 
Table 3.12: Contribution to trade balance in South Africa from various sectors – Scenario 1 relative 
to BaU (average per annum in 2004 $ Million) 
  No ET Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI 
no-lose crediting 
No.  Sector 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 
1 Coal mining -203 -113 -85 -189 -103 -83 -87 -69 -57 
2 Oil extraction 33 22 -13 36 31 0 61 85 86 
3 Gas extr., manufac. 0 0 -1 0 0 -1 1 1 1 
4 Petrol. & coal prod. 9 15 30 4 8 21 -12 -18 -18 
5 Electricity 66 109 160 61 100 146 -113 -119 -122 
6 Agri., Food Tobac. -70 -135 -213 -65 -126 -199 29 38 33 
7 Other Mining 18 40 66 14 31 47 -26 -32 -35 
8 Paper & Publishing -21 -45 -80 -20 -42 -76 6 11 11 
9 Chem. rubber plas. -103 -194 -295 -96 -179 -268 -33 -22 -19 
10 Non metal minerals -5 -14 -28 -6 -14 -27 -11 -10 -10 
11 Iron and steel 109 153 159 95 129 127 -42 -23 -14 
12 Non ferrous metals -29 -113 -257 -9 -82 -221 122 212 243 
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  No ET Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI 
no-lose crediting 
No.  Sector 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 
13 Ferrous metal prod. -21 -46 -78 -18 -40 -68 -6 -4 -4 
14 Motor veh. & equip. -190 -384 -638 -166 -336 -563 40 51 46 
15 Other manufacture. -543 -1098 -1859 -473 -958 -1648 141 153 115 
16 Air transport  34 57 69 31 52 67 3 2 1 
17 Trade & Oth. Trans. -40 -85 -147 -36 -77 -132 17 19 15 
18 Rec. cultural sport -18 -38 -63 -15 -33 -56 3 5 5 
19 Oth. market srvces -54 -102 -163 -47 -90 -146 22 27 26 
20 Govt services -20 -41 -68 -19 -39 -66 2 6 6 
 Total  -1048 -2016 -3503 -919 -1770 -3144 117 313 309 
 
Only in the case of ‘Annex I trading and NAI no-lose crediting’ that some positive change in the 
trade balance can be observed. The reason is that only with ‘Annex I trading and NAI no-lose 
crediting’ (Scenario 1C) that some turn around in the trade balance can be observed. This can be 
explained by the fact that only in Scenario 1C countries Annex I countries can enjoy some moderate 
increase in CO2 emissions by relying on NAI countries to do some of the work of reducing 
emissions for them (see Figures 3.8 and 3.9). This implies that the world as a whole is more 
‘efficient’ in reducing CO2 emissions if there is international co-operation as compared to the cases 
of less (Annex I ET) or no co-operation (no ET). The increase in efficiency is also the result of lower 
mitigation costs in NAI countries, as represented in the modelling in abatement cost curves and 
lower costs of labour and other factors of production. The positive impacts on export of energy-
intensive goods from South Africa can be partly attributed to the fact that with ‘Annex I trading and 
NAI no-lose crediting’, the switch of energy-intensive goods production activities from Annex I 
countries to NAI countries has decreased for a major NAI country such as China (see Figure 3.11) 
and therefore, allowing more room for export from South Africa. 
Although the switch in energy and emission-intensive production activities from Annex I to NAI 
countries is often seen as a negative phenomenon – the leakage effect discussed earlier; in the case 
of ‘Annex I trading and NAI no-lose crediting’ (i.e. with active participation from NAI regions even 
though without any binding constraints) the leakage phenomenon is not only stopped but turned 
around from a negative phenomenon to a positive one. Now, NAI regions can make a contribution 
towards climate change abatement. The benefit to a NAI country such as South Africa in this case is 
twofold: (i) an opportunity to earn revenue from emissions reduction efforts (see Table 3.7, where 
the value of emissions trade for South Africa is some $285 million in 2010, declining to $64 million 
in 2020); and (ii) increased export activities arising from the fact that with increased emissions and 
hence increased economic activities in Annex I regions, their demand for South African export 
goods will also increase through the income effect. 
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(S1): Scenario 1; (A) No ET; (B): Annex I ET; (C): Annex I ET with NAI no-lose crediting. 
Figure 3.11: Change in export for energy intensive sectors – relative to BaU (average % per annum) 
Specific losses or gains in some important South African export sectors 
Table 3.13A shows the specific losses or gains
30
 (relative to BaU scenario) by sectors for the South 
African economy including the special sector ‘International tourism’ which is defined here in terms 
of the expenditures of international tourists in the various sectors of the South African economy (see 
above).
31
 Figure 3.10 highlights the gains or losses for the export-oriented sectors. It can be seen that 
in the case of ‘No ET’ and ‘Annex I ET’, all sectors except ‘Iron and steel’, ‘Air transport’, and 
‘Other mining’ suffer losses, and these losses continue until the end of the period 2015-2020. Only 
in the case of ‘Annex I trading and NAI no-lose crediting’ (Scenario 1C) that the picture turns 
around. We now see the reverse situation where all sectors which previously suffered negative 
impacts under ‘No ET’ and ‘Annex I ET’ will now enjoy positive impacts. Conversely, ‘Other 
mining’ and ‘Iron and steel’ will experience a switch from positive impacts to negative impacts. 
                                                        
30  Gains and losses are defined in relation to the BaU Scenario, i.e., they measure the impacts due to the 
imposition of climate policies or response measures to climate change in Annex I regions. 
31  Note that since ‘International Tourism’ is defined in terms of the expenditures in various sectors, including 
international transport (ATP) (making up 74.2% of the export value of this sector), therefore, we cannot add the 
gains/losses of the international tourism sector to the rest of the economy to get the ‘total’ (in Table 3.13) as this 
will involve double counting.  
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Coal is the only sector which suffers from negative impacts under all three situations, and Air 
transport is the only sector which enjoys positive impact under all three situations. Note that 
‘International tourism’, even though including Air transport as one important component also 
includes other service sectors as its components and these sectors suffer from negative impacts under 
‘No ET’ and ‘Annex I ET’, hence as a whole ‘International tourism’ (as we defined it above) also 
suffers from (net) negative impacts under these situations, and only turns around to a positive impact 
when there is ‘Annex I trading with NAI no-lose crediting’ (Scenario 1C).
32
 
Table 3.13A: Specific export losses or gains in South African sectors – Scenario 1 relative to BaU 
(total for each period in 2004 $ billion) 
  No ET Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI 
no-lose crediting 
No.  Sector 
2004-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
2004-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
2004-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
1 Coal mining -1.23 -1.79 -2.20 -1.14 -1.65 -2.05 -0.55 -0.91 -1.20 
2 Oil extraction 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3 Gas extr., manufac. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
4 Petrol. & coal prod. 0.04 0.11 0.27 0.01 0.04 0.16 -0.09 -0.19 -0.30 
5 Electricity 0.31 0.83 1.63 0.28 0.75 1.48 -0.21 -0.30 -0.36 
6 Agri., Food Tobac. -0.21 -0.54 -1.07 -0.20 -0.51 -1.03 0.21 0.41 0.59 
7 Other Mining 0.12 0.33 0.67 0.10 0.26 0.50 -0.14 -0.28 -0.43 
8 Paper & Publishing -0.04 -0.12 -0.28 -0.04 -0.12 -0.29 0.05 0.11 0.18 
9 Chem. rubber plas. -0.25 -0.61 -1.12 -0.24 -0.58 -1.05 0.01 0.07 0.15 
10 Non metal minerals 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 
11 Iron and steel 0.68 1.49 2.37 0.60 1.29 2.00 -0.18 -0.24 -0.25 
12 Non ferrous metals -0.16 -0.73 -2.08 -0.03 -0.44 -1.59 0.88 2.08 3.47 
13 Ferrous metal prod. -0.04 -0.11 -0.23 -0.03 -0.09 -0.20 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
14 Motor veh. & equip. -0.27 -0.74 -1.49 -0.22 -0.62 -1.25 0.20 0.41 0.63 
15 Other manufacture. -0.88 -2.29 -4.39 -0.75 -1.97 -3.88 0.45 0.85 1.16 
16 Air transport  0.20 0.50 0.90 0.18 0.45 0.83 0.03 0.06 0.08 
17 Trade & Oth. Trans. -0.09 -0.24 -0.49 -0.08 -0.22 -0.45 0.09 0.16 0.22 
18 Rec. cultural sport -0.08 -0.21 -0.42 -0.06 -0.18 -0.37 0.03 0.05 0.08 
19 Oth. market srvces -0.18 -0.45 -0.85 -0.16 -0.39 -0.76 0.11 0.21 0.32 
20 Govt services -0.06 -0.16 -0.31 -0.06 -0.15 -0.30 0.03 0.06 0.09 
International tourism -0.38 -1.01 -2.01 -0.33 -0.87 -1.78 0.34 0.65 0.93 
Total -2.11 -4.71 -9.07 -1.84 -4.11 -8.24 0.88 2.52 4.41 
 
First, the positive impacts for ‘Air transport’ in South Africa can be explained partly by the fact that 
26.6% of Air transport services are used as inputs into ‘Other market services’, and this sector 
performs well in Scenarios 1A and 1B (but not Scenario 1C) – see Table 3.14B. This can be called 
the ‘income effect’. The other effect is ‘substitution’: with climate response measures imposed, 
world demand for fossil fuels (including petroleum products) decreases substantially and this 
depresses their supply prices (see Table 3.15). Since petroleum product is a major input into Air 
transport, this helps reduce the Air transport costs in South Africa and hence having a positive 
impact (substitution effect) on the level of demand and output of Air transport in South Africa (see 
second last row of Table 3.15). This is despite a world wide trend in reduced demand/supply 
(income effect) (see third last row of Table 3.15). Only in the last two periods of Scenario 1C that 
                                                        
32  Note that no specific link between global climate change (such as considered by Hamilton et al, 2005) and its 
mitigation responses is considered here. Thus, impacts on the tourism industry as considered in this section are 
solely derived from the economic impacts of response measures and not the global climate change impacts on 
the number and distribution of international tourists which is further considered in the next section. 
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the world wide trend (income effect) overwhelms the domestic (substitution effect) and therefore, 
the total demand/supply of Air transport in South Africa decreases (relative to BaU Scenario). 
Export of Air transport from South Africa, however, remains positive (relative to BaU) – see last 
row of Table 3.15, despite the slowdown in total output, which implies most of decline in demand 
are from domestic travellers rather than foreign travellers. 
Next, the positive impacts of Scenario 1C for most other South African sectors besides ‘Air 
transport’ (and except ‘Iron and steel’, ‘Other mining’, and ‘Coal’) can be explained by the fact that 
with ‘Annex I trading and NAI no-lose crediting’, an NAI country such as China will find it 
profitable to reduce some of its production activities (especially in energy-intensive sectors) to 
decrease emissions levels and then sell these credits to Annex I countries (see Figure 3.11). This is 
compared to the ‘No ET’ and ‘Annex I trading’ (scenarios 1A and 1B) where such an option is not 
available. This will then decrease the pressure of competition for exports to Annex I countries for 
South Africa and hence South Africa can enjoy some positive effects. This is particularly true for 
sectors such as ‘Other manufacturing’, ‘Motor vehicle, parts, and transport equipment’, ‘Chemical, 
rubber, and plastics’, ‘Fabricated metal products’, and ‘Agri., food, bev. & tobacco’ where Chinese 
exports are predominant (see Figure 3.12). In the case of ‘Iron and steel’, despite the reduction in 
Chinese export, this reduction is not as strong (as compared to the case of ‘Non-ferrous metals’ (see 
Figure 3.11). Furthermore, South Africa may also find it attractive to reduce its own emissions in 
‘Iron and steel’ production to sell emissions reduction credit to Annex I countries. Hence the net 
effect is negative for ‘Iron and steel’ export from South Africa. The case of ‘Other mining’ is partly 
explained by the fact that China is not reducing its export but in fact increasing it (see Figure 3. 11), 
However, since Chinese export in this sector is not dominant (see Figure 3.12), this negative impact 
on South African export of ‘Other mining’ is explained mainly by the fact that world demand for 
‘Other mining’ is declining (relative to BaU), in all Scenarios but especially in Scenario 1C (-0.01% 
-0.78%, -1.08% for the three periods in Scenario 1B, and -0.13% -0.96%, -1.30% for the three 
periods in Scenario 1C). 
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Figure 3.12: Total exports in 2004 to Annex I countries by South Africa and China by sectors  
($ billion) 
Climatic impacts on International tourism 
Based on a study by Hamilton et al (2006), we estimate the change in total number of international 
tourists into South Africa which is shown in Table 3.13B. This change in total number of 
international tourists will impact on the export revenue of the sectors which are assumed to make up 
the ‘International tourism’ sector as shown in Table 3.2. The magnitudes of these impacts are also 
shown in Table 3.13B. Based on these impacts, we re-run the BaU Scenario but with these impacts 
introduced as exogenous shocks to the model
33
.  
The results of the ‘new’ BaU Scenario (i.e. the BaU Scenario ‘with climate change’) when compared 
with the ‘old’ BaU Scenario (BaU without climate change) gives us the (negative) value of the 
impacts on international tourism to South Africa due to climate change. If climate response measures 
                                                        
33  The reason for introducing these shocks only to the BaU Scenario (but not to the Policy Scenarios 1 or 2 is that 
‘climate change’ is assumed to be occurring only if no climate response measures are introduced. 
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(in Scenario 1 or 2) can prevent ‘climate change’ completely
34
, then the magnitude of these 
(negative) impacts could be considered as the ‘extra value’ of climate measures to South Africa 
because they are the value of international tourism that would not be lost if climate change is 
completely prevented. These extra values are shown in Table 3.13C. When we add these extra values 
to Table 3.13A, we get the net gains/losses for Scenario 1. International tourism is now seen to have 
positive net gains rather than losses (except for period 2015-2020 for the ‘No ET’ Scenario – see 
second last row in Table 3.13C). The total net gains/losses for South Africa are also much improved 
if we assume climate response measures in Scenario 1 can prevent climate change from occurring. 
Table 3.13B: Changes in the number of international tourists into South Africa due to climate 
change and their impacts on expenditures in various sectors 
 Description 2004-2010 2010-2015 2015-2020 
 Net change in International Tourists into 
South Africa due to climate change (*) -6.21% -7.45% -8.68% 
 Impacts on sectoral expenditure:    
4 Petroleum & coal products. -0.50% -0.60% -0.69% 
6 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, food beverages 
and tobacco -0.62% -0.75% -0.87% 
9 Chemical, rubber, plastic products -0.01% -0.01% -0.02% 
15 Other manufacturing -1.46% -1.76% -2.05% 
16 Air transport -4.60% -5.53% -6.44% 
17 Trade and transport (excl. air transport) -5.29% -6.35% -7.40% 
18 Recreational and other services -5.29% -6.35% -7.40% 
19 Other market services -5.67% -6.81% -7.93% 
* Based on Hamilton et al (2006). 
 
Table 3.13C: The value of International tourism to South Africa sectors which will not be lost if 
climate change is prevented (total for each period in 2004 $ billion) 
  No ET Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI 
no-lose crediting 
No.  Sector 
2004-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
2004-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
2004-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
1 Coal mining 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 
2 Oil extraction 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3 Gas extr., manufac. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 Petrol. & coal prod. 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 
5 Electricity 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
6 Agri., Food Tobac. 0.07 0.16 0.27 0.07 0.16 0.27 0.07 0.16 0.27 
7 Other Mining 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
8 Paper & Publishing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
9 Chem. rubber plas. 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
10 Non metal minerals 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
11 Iron and steel 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
12 Non ferrous metals 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.07 
13 Ferrous metal prod. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
14 Motor veh. & equip. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
15 Other manufacture. 0.19 0.46 0.82 0.19 0.46 0.82 0.19 0.46 0.82 
                                                        
34    Since there is no way of ascertaining ‘how much’ of the ‘climate change’ (in Hamilton et al (2005) study) 
can be prevented by Scenario 1 or 2, we assume for simplicity that all of it (or at least as far as the impact on 
International tourism is concerned) is prevented. 
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  No ET Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI 
no-lose crediting 
No.  Sector 
2004-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
2004-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
2004-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
16 Air transport  0.07 0.16 0.28 0.07 0.16 0.28 0.07 0.16 0.28 
17 Trade & Oth. Trans. 0.20 0.47 0.81 0.20 0.47 0.81 0.20 0.47 0.81 
18 Rec. cultural sport 0.09 0.22 0.39 0.09 0.22 0.39 0.09 0.22 0.39 
19 Oth. market srvces 0.15 0.34 0.60 0.15 0.34 0.60 0.15 0.34 0.60 
20 Govt services 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 
International tourism 0.49 1.15 2.00 0.49 1.15 2.00 0.49 1.15 2.00 
Total 0.80 1.90 3.32 0.80 1.90 3.32 0.80 1.90 3.32 
Net gains/losses to 
International tourism 0.10 0.14 -0.01 0.15 0.28 0.22 0.82 1.80 2.93 
Net gains/losses to all 
sectors -1.31 -2.80 -5.75 -1.04 -2.21 -4.92 1.68 4.43 7.73 
 
Domestic microeconomic impacts on South Africa 
Table 3.14A looks at the domestic growth rates of sectors in the South African economy under the 
three Scenarios 1A, 1B, and 1C. With the (assumed) underlying GDP growth rates of 3.0%, 2.8%, 
and 2.8% respectively for the three periods ending from 2004 to 2020 (see Table 3.2, repeated in the 
first row of Table 3.14) we can see that the growth rates of sectoral outputs are also mostly around 
these ‘underlying’ figures. The services sectors such as ‘Air transport’, ‘Recreational, cultural, and 
sport’, ‘Other market services’, ‘Other government services’ are experiencing slightly higher growth 
rates than average, while export-oriented sectors such as ‘Coal mining’, ‘Agriculture, food, 
beverages and tobacco’, ‘Other mining’, ‘Paper and publishing’, ‘Chemical, rubber and plastics’, 
‘Non-ferrous metals’, ‘Other manufacturing’ are experiencing slower (or even negative in the case of 
‘Non-ferrous metals’) output growth.  
The rates of growth of employment for skilled and unskilled labour are also slightly higher than 
GDP growth rates, while that of capital is slightly lower. This reflects two conflicting trends. On the 
one hand, climate policy will impact on energy usage and hence encourage a substitution away from 
energy towards more capital (more energy-efficient technologies). This is called the energy-capital 
(or energy-efficiency) substitution effect. On the other hand, energy-intensive industries will also 
tend to be capital-intensive; hence a substitution away from energy-intensive industries towards less 
energy-intensive activities will also mean a substitution towards more labour and less capital. This is 
called the composition effect. If the composition effect is stronger than the energy-efficiency effect 
(such as the case for South Africa), then labour will be growing at a faster rate than capital. If the 
opposite is true (such as for the case of USA) then capital will be growing at a faster rate than 
labour.
35
 
                                                        
35  For the USA, capital is growing at about 0.5–1% higher than labour for the cases of ‘No ET’ and ‘Annex I ET’, 
but only 0.1- 0.2% higher for the case of ‘Annex I trading and NAI emissions crediting’.  
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Table 3.14A: Growth rates of GDP, population, primary factors and sectoral outputs in South Africa 
– Scenario 1 (average % per annum) 
  No ET Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI 
no-lose crediting 
No.  Factor/sector 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 
 GDP 2.99 2.83 2.77 2.99 2.83 2.77 2.99 2.83 2.77 
 Population 0.73 -0.34 0.10 0.73 -0.34 0.10 0.73 -0.34 0.10 
 Land 3.11 3.03 3.01 3.10 3.01 2.99 2.97 2.87 2.81 
 Unskilled labour 3.03 2.89 2.83 3.03 2.89 2.83 2.97 2.87 2.81 
 Skilled labour 3.05 2.92 2.88 3.04 2.91 2.87 2.96 2.86 2.81 
 Capital 2.84 2.65 2.55 2.86 2.67 2.57 3.17 3.03 2.93 
 Natural resources 3.18 3.04 3.02 3.16 3.03 3.00 3.05 2.89 2.82 
1 Coal mining 0.78 1.41 1.80 0.96 1.57 1.82 0.22 0.64 1.14 
2 Oil extraction 1.84 1.06 0.44 1.88 1.11 0.51 2.46 2.21 2.13 
3 Gas extr., manufac. 3.56 2.98 2.67 3.50 2.95 2.67 2.06 2.01 2.14 
4 Petrol. & coal prod. 3.72 3.32 3.11 3.63 3.26 3.09 2.88 2.36 2.31 
5 Electricity 3.98 3.53 3.29 3.92 3.48 3.26 -0.60 0.48 1.20 
6 Agri., Food Tobac. 2.13 1.65 1.60 2.14 1.67 1.62 2.57 2.13 2.13 
7 Other Mining 2.84 2.60 2.37 2.83 2.57 2.31 1.42 1.58 1.76 
8 Paper & Publishing 2.64 2.21 1.93 2.66 2.25 1.98 3.18 2.99 2.89 
9 Chem. rubber plas. 2.34 1.86 1.61 2.39 1.95 1.72 2.94 2.81 2.77 
10 Non metal minerals 3.06 2.83 2.71 3.01 2.80 2.72 2.71 2.68 2.69 
11 Iron and steel 3.48 2.95 2.46 3.42 2.91 2.46 2.36 2.46 2.57 
12 Non ferrous metals 2.24 1.01 -0.34 2.53 1.38 0.06 4.59 4.68 4.28 
13 Ferrous metal prod. 3.04 2.65 2.47 3.05 2.68 2.53 2.63 2.60 2.64 
14 Motor veh. & equip. 3.00 2.64 2.47 3.05 2.76 2.68 3.18 3.04 2.97 
15 Other manufacture. 2.53 2.01 1.77 2.59 2.12 1.90 3.00 2.73 2.66 
16 Air transport  4.15 4.10 3.76 4.01 4.02 3.77 2.90 2.64 2.57 
17 Trade & Oth. Trans. 2.60 2.22 2.04 2.63 2.27 2.11 2.90 2.70 2.65 
18 Rec. cultural sport 3.02 2.91 2.76 3.04 2.94 2.78 3.24 3.14 3.01 
19 Oth. market srvces 3.45 3.48 3.55 3.40 3.43 3.50 3.02 2.94 2.87 
20 Govt services 3.11 3.08 3.03 3.11 3.07 3.01 3.28 3.09 2.96 
 
To examine the impacts of response measures only on South Africa, the average rates of growth of 
the BaU scenario must be subtracted from the scenario growth rates. These are referred to as relative 
growth rates and are shown in Table 3.14B and Figure 3.13. It can be seen that impacts of climate 
response measures on South African sectoral output growth are consistent with the impacts on 
sectoral export performance discussed earlier. Most of these impacts are negative, and only in a few 
cases (‘Air transport’, and other services sectors) that the impacts are positive. When there is ‘Annex 
I ET with NAI no-lose crediting’, however, there is a significant reversal in the impacts for ‘Non 
ferrous metals’ as compared to the cases of ‘No ET’ and ‘Annex I ET’. This can be explained partly 
by the reversal in export performance of this sector as described earlier (see Figures 3.10 and 3.11). 
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Table 3.14B: Relative growth rates of GDP, population, primary factors and sectoral outputs in 
South Africa – Scenario 1 Relative to BaU (average % per annum). 
  No ET Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI 
no-lose crediting 
No.  Factor/Sector 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 
 GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Population 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Land 0.14 0.20 0.25 0.13 0.18 0.22 -0.01 0.04 0.04 
 Unskilled labour 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.05 -0.03 0.03 0.03 
 Skilled labour 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.11 -0.02 0.04 0.04 
 Capital -0.16 -0.20 -0.23 -0.14 -0.18 -0.21 0.17 0.18 0.15 
 Natural resources 0.19 0.21 0.25 0.18 0.19 0.23 0.07 0.05 0.05 
1 Coal mining -2.06 -1.27 -0.82 -1.88 -1.11 -0.81 -2.62 -2.05 -1.49 
2 Oil extraction -1.01 -1.67 -2.21 -0.97 -1.62 -2.14 -0.39 -0.51 -0.52 
3 Gas extr., manufac. 0.59 0.21 -0.06 0.52 0.18 -0.06 -0.92 -0.75 -0.59 
4 Petrol. & coal prod. 0.80 0.63 0.44 0.71 0.58 0.42 -0.04 -0.32 -0.35 
5 Electricity 0.99 0.71 0.53 0.93 0.66 0.50 -3.59 -2.33 -1.56 
6 Agri., food tobac. -0.24 -0.36 -0.46 -0.23 -0.34 -0.44 0.20 0.12 0.07 
7 Other mining -0.07 -0.28 -0.41 -0.08 -0.30 -0.47 -1.49 -1.29 -1.02 
8 Paper & publishing -0.40 -0.64 -0.87 -0.37 -0.60 -0.82 0.14 0.14 0.09 
9 Chem. rubber plas. -0.68 -0.97 -1.17 -0.63 -0.89 -1.06 -0.08 -0.02 -0.01 
10 Non metal minerals 0.04 -0.04 -0.10 -0.01 -0.07 -0.10 -0.31 -0.20 -0.12 
11 Iron and steel 0.47 0.13 -0.32 0.41 0.09 -0.32 -0.65 -0.35 -0.20 
12 Non ferrous metals -1.12 -2.18 -3.40 -0.83 -1.81 -3.00 1.23 1.49 1.23 
13 Ferrous metal prod. 0.03 -0.17 -0.32 0.03 -0.14 -0.25 -0.38 -0.22 -0.14 
14 Motor veh. & equip. -0.09 -0.29 -0.40 -0.04 -0.17 -0.18 0.08 0.12 0.10 
15 Other manufacture. -0.38 -0.66 -0.88 -0.32 -0.55 -0.76 0.09 0.06 0.00 
16 Air transport  1.29 1.41 1.10 1.15 1.32 1.12 0.04 -0.05 -0.08 
17 Trade & oth. trans. -0.29 -0.45 -0.61 -0.26 -0.40 -0.54 0.02 0.02 0.01 
18 Rec. cultural sport -0.18 -0.22 -0.26 -0.16 -0.19 -0.24 0.04 0.00 -0.01 
19 Oth. market srvces 0.36 0.50 0.66 0.31 0.44 0.61 -0.07 -0.05 -0.02 
20 Govt services 0.02 0.10 0.13 0.02 0.08 0.11 0.19 0.10 0.06 
 
Table 3.15: Change in the world supply price of energy commodities and impact on Air transport – 
Scenario 1 relative to BaU (average % per annum) 
  No ET Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI 
no-lose crediting 
No.  Commodity 
2004-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
2004-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
2004-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
1 Coal -2.12 -1.31 -1.86 -2.14 -2.08 -1.92 -2.64 -2.95 -2.77 
2 Crude oil -0.80 -1.24 -2.01 -0.74 -1.77 -1.99 -0.43 -1.22 -1.34 
3 Gas -3.04 -2.95 -2.78 -3.08 -3.33 -2.86 -1.66 -2.03 -1.79 
4 Petrol. & coal prod. -0.84 -1.33 -2.13 -0.75 -1.83 -2.11 -0.43 -1.22 -1.35 
5 Electricity -2.12 -1.31 -1.86 -2.14 -2.08 -1.92 -2.64 -2.95 -2.77 
World supply of Air transport -0.16 -0.27 -1.00 -0.14 -0.83 -0.99 -0.05 -0.67 -0.80 
SA supply of Air transport 1.29 1.41 1.10 1.15 1.32 1.12 0.04 -0.05 -0.08 
SA export of Air transport 0.20 0.50 0.90 0.18 0.45 0.83 0.03 0.06 0.08 
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Figure 3.13: Sectoral output growth in South Africa – Scenario 1 relative to BaU  
(average % per annum) 
Table 3.16A shows the (real)
36
 absolute changes in supply price indices of primary factors and 
sectoral outputs in South Africa. Table 3.16B shows the price changes relative to the BaU scenario. 
It can be seen from these tables that that the impacts on domestic prices of primary factors (except 
natural resources) and of all sectoral outputs (except fossil fuels) are positive, indicating the 
generally higher costs which flow on from the implementation of climate policies (and in the 
absence of any technological progress. 
                                                        
36  Since most computable general equilibrium models (including GTAP-E model) are of the Walrasian type and 
there are no monetary assets in the model, therefore, all prices are in ‘real’ terms and defined relative to a 
numeraire. In the case of our simulations, we have chosen to use the world average price index for primary 
factors as the numeraire, hence all prices are relative to this numeraire. 
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Table 3.16A: Change in supply price of primary factors and industry outputs in South Africa – 
Scenario 1 (average % per annum) 
  No ET Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI 
no-lose crediting 
No.  Factor/sector 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 
 Land -0.87 -1.13 -0.91 -0.90 -1.17 -0.97 -0.72 -1.21 -1.11 
 Unskilled labour 0.50 0.87 1.15 0.44 0.78 1.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 
 Skilled labour 0.69 1.16 1.45 0.62 1.05 1.29 0.12 0.09 0.04 
 Capital 0.88 1.27 1.57 0.80 1.14 1.40 -0.62 -0.52 -0.41 
 Natural resources -7.24 -3.79 -2.57 -6.92 -3.68 -2.79 -8.92 -5.95 -4.02 
1 Coal mining -1.89 0.08 0.78 -1.82 0.01 0.61 -2.68 -0.95 -0.44 
2 Oil extraction -1.12 -0.62 0.06 -1.13 -0.70 -0.08 -1.09 -0.98 -0.80 
3 Gas extr., manufac. -0.44 0.58 0.95 -0.45 0.49 0.81 -1.62 -0.74 -0.44 
4 Petrol. & coal prod. -1.16 -0.58 -0.01 -1.15 -0.65 -0.14 -0.80 -0.51 -0.38 
5 Electricity 0.01 0.85 1.23 -0.03 0.75 1.08 6.23 4.01 2.55 
6 Agri., food tobac. 0.52 0.90 1.18 0.46 0.80 1.04 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 
7 Other Mining 0.26 0.72 0.99 0.21 0.63 0.84 0.83 0.78 0.57 
8 Paper & publishing 0.57 0.95 1.22 0.51 0.85 1.08 0.03 0.04 0.02 
9 Chem. rubber plas. 0.54 0.93 1.20 0.48 0.84 1.07 0.20 0.19 0.14 
10 Non metal minerals 0.55 0.98 1.27 0.49 0.88 1.12 0.53 0.46 0.33 
11 Iron and steel 0.50 0.94 1.23 0.45 0.84 1.09 0.56 0.49 0.35 
12 Non ferrous metals 0.67 1.08 1.36 0.61 0.97 1.21 0.17 0.14 0.09 
13 Ferrous metal prod. 0.56 0.96 1.23 0.50 0.86 1.09 0.22 0.20 0.14 
14 Motor veh. & equip. 0.53 0.85 1.06 0.49 0.78 0.97 0.07 0.08 0.06 
15 Other manufacture. 0.56 0.94 1.21 0.50 0.84 1.07 0.00 0.02 0.00 
16 Air transport  0.12 0.55 0.89 0.08 0.47 0.77 0.15 0.24 0.20 
17 Trade & oth. trans. 0.54 0.95 1.25 0.48 0.84 1.10 -0.09 -0.04 -0.04 
18 Rec. cultural sport 0.59 0.98 1.25 0.53 0.88 1.11 0.04 0.04 0.01 
19 Oth. market srvces 0.70 1.08 1.36 0.63 0.98 1.21 -0.21 -0.17 -0.14 
20 Govt services 0.62 1.02 1.29 0.56 0.92 1.15 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
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Table 3.16B: Change in supply price of primary factors and industry outputs in South Africa – 
Scenario 1 relative to BaU (average % per annum) 
  No ET Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI 
no-lose crediting 
No.  Factor/sector 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 
 Land 0.10 0.18 0.24 0.08 0.14 0.17 0.25 0.10 0.04 
 Unskilled labour 0.60 0.96 1.23 0.54 0.86 1.10 0.11 0.07 0.06 
 Skilled labour 0.69 1.10 1.42 0.62 0.98 1.26 0.12 0.02 0.00 
 Capital 0.95 1.32 1.63 0.87 1.20 1.46 -0.54 -0.47 -0.34 
 Natural resources -6.30 -2.88 -1.70 -5.98 -2.77 -1.92 -7.97 -5.04 -3.15 
1 Coal mining -1.58 0.37 1.05 -1.51 0.30 0.88 -2.37 -0.66 -0.16 
2 Oil extraction -0.83 -0.39 0.31 -0.84 -0.47 0.18 -0.81 -0.75 -0.55 
3 Gas extr., manufac. -0.25 0.77 1.13 -0.27 0.68 0.98 -1.44 -0.55 -0.27 
4 Petrol. & coal prod. -0.89 -0.37 0.22 -0.88 -0.45 0.09 -0.54 -0.30 -0.15 
5 Electricity 0.14 0.96 1.35 0.11 0.86 1.19 6.36 4.12 2.67 
6 Agri., food tobac. 0.63 0.99 1.28 0.57 0.89 1.14 0.02 0.03 0.04 
7 Other mining 0.38 0.79 1.07 0.33 0.69 0.92 0.96 0.84 0.65 
8 Paper & publishing 0.64 1.00 1.28 0.58 0.90 1.14 0.11 0.10 0.09 
9 Chem. rubber plas. 0.62 0.99 1.27 0.56 0.89 1.13 0.28 0.25 0.20 
10 Non metal minerals 0.63 1.04 1.34 0.57 0.94 1.19 0.62 0.52 0.40 
11 Iron and steel 0.59 1.01 1.30 0.53 0.90 1.16 0.64 0.55 0.42 
12 Non ferrous metals 0.75 1.14 1.42 0.68 1.03 1.27 0.25 0.20 0.16 
13 Ferrous metal prod. 0.64 1.02 1.30 0.58 0.92 1.16 0.30 0.26 0.21 
14 Motor veh. & equip. 0.58 0.88 1.10 0.54 0.82 1.01 0.12 0.12 0.10 
15 Other manufacture. 0.64 1.00 1.27 0.58 0.90 1.14 0.08 0.07 0.07 
16 Air transport  0.23 0.63 0.99 0.19 0.55 0.87 0.26 0.32 0.30 
17 Trade & oth. trans. 0.63 1.01 1.32 0.56 0.91 1.17 0.00 0.02 0.04 
18 Rec. cultural sport 0.66 1.02 1.31 0.59 0.92 1.17 0.10 0.08 0.07 
19 Oth. market srvces 0.76 1.13 1.42 0.70 1.02 1.27 -0.14 -0.12 -0.08 
20 Govt services 0.67 1.03 1.32 0.61 0.93 1.18 0.04 0.01 0.01 
 
Table 3.17 shows the (absolute) percentage change in regional GDP price index. Since all prices are 
relative to the numeraire, which in our case is the average percentage change in factor prices of all 
regions, and since we assume that this numeraire remains unchanged throughout all simulations
37
, 
the change in regional GDP prices measures the movement in the general price level of each region 
relative to that of the world as a whole. Thus, if we compare the change in GDP price of the USA 
against that of South Africa, then we get a measure of the ‘relative inflation’ between these two 
regions. If we also assume that movement in the ‘real’ exchange rate is determined primarily by 
movements in relative purchasing power, then we get movements in real exchange rate from 
movements in this ‘relative inflation’ index.
38
    
                                                        
37  If we shock this numeraire, then this simply shifts all price levels in all regions by the same percentage, hence 
leaving all relative prices unchanged. 
38  Because of the system of single European currency for most European Union (EU) countries, the term ‘real 
exchange rate’ here should simply imply ‘real purchasing power’ from factor income, because it represents the 
relative movements in factor prices  
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Table 3.17: Change in GDP price index for all regions – Scenario 1 (average % per annum) 
  No ET Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI 
no-lose crediting 
No Region 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 
1 South Africa 0.59 1.04 1.34 0.53 0.93 1.19 0.00 0.03 0.01 
2 USA 0.29 0.38 0.44 0.16 0.13 0.06 0.21 0.22 0.19 
3 Germany 0.60 0.78 0.86 0.56 0.74 0.81 0.39 0.38 0.33 
4 UK 0.46 0.56 0.57 0.41 0.53 0.56 0.32 0.32 0.28 
5 Netherlands 0.37 0.40 0.33 0.45 0.54 0.50 0.37 0.36 0.32 
6 France 0.49 0.59 0.63 0.60 0.80 0.90 0.40 0.40 0.34 
7 Italy 0.56 0.71 0.78 0.58 0.79 0.92 0.40 0.39 0.34 
8 Belgium 0.74 0.87 0.87 0.72 0.91 0.95 0.51 0.52 0.46 
9 W Europe 0.49 0.60 0.59 0.51 0.66 0.70 0.35 0.34 0.29 
10 EFTA 0.25 0.52 0.74 0.25 0.50 0.68 0.17 0.20 0.19 
11 Russia -0.62 -0.52 -0.52 -0.65 -0.61 -0.69 -0.49 -0.42 -0.38 
12 Japan 0.46 0.45 0.38 0.65 0.85 1.09 0.51 0.51 0.46 
13 Aus., NZ, Canada 0.18 0.30 0.38 0.08 0.15 0.16 0.11 0.15 0.13 
14 Rest Annex I 0.49 0.37 -0.40 0.38 0.14 -0.83 0.33 0.31 0.27 
15 China & HK -0.08 0.15 0.44 -0.12 0.09 0.35 -0.51 -0.57 -0.49 
16 India 0.28 0.60 1.09 0.21 0.49 0.93 -0.34 -0.47 -0.37 
17 Bra., Arg., Para. 0.64 1.10 1.55 0.55 0.96 1.35 0.09 0.09 0.05 
18 Africa -0.54 -0.10 0.36 -0.58 -0.19 0.22 -0.53 -0.41 -0.34 
19 Middle East -0.31 0.07 0.42 -0.34 -0.01 0.30 -0.39 -0.32 -0.28 
20 Rest of world 0.21 0.52 0.75 0.16 0.44 0.64 -0.08 -0.07 -0.10 
 
Table 3.18A presents the absolute movements in real exchange rate between South Africa and other 
regions while Table 3.18B reports the movements relative to BaU scenario. Both shows that the real 
exchange rate between South Africa and other regions will depreciate for the cases of ‘No ET’ and 
‘Annex I ET’ (except for ‘Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay’, and also Belgium, but only for the first 
period 2004-2010). Only in the case of ‘Annex I trading and NAI no-lose crediting’ that the situation 
is reversed and South African Rand will appreciate against other currencies (except for the 
currencies of Russia, China & HK, India, Africa, and Middle East).  
The adverse movement in real exchange rate for South Africa can be partly attributed to adverse 
movements in factor prices in South Africa relative to other regions (Table 3.19a). This in turn can 
be partly attributed to strong demand for factors in South Africa relative to other regions (Tables 
3.20A-C) – with the exception of the demand for capital in other NAI regions which shows stronger 
movements than in South Africa (see Table 3.20A). This can also be the net result of two conflicting 
trends in South Africa as discussed above: energy-efficiency substitution (which encourages demand 
for capital) and shifts from energy-intensive to non energy intensive activities (which encourages 
demand for labour). The impact of response measures in South Africa seems to be a stronger 
(activity) compositional effect as compared to energy-capital substitution effect. Hence, employment 
is expected to increase in this scenario. 
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Table 3.18A: Differences in percentage change of GDP price index or movement in real exchange 
rate between South African Rand and other regions – Scenario 1 (average % per annum) 
  No ET Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI 
no-lose crediting 
No Region 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 
1 South Africa 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 USA -0.30 -0.66 -0.90 -0.37 -0.80 -1.13 0.21 0.18 0.18 
3 Germany 0.00 -0.27 -0.48 0.04 -0.19 -0.38 0.38 0.35 0.31 
4 UK -0.13 -0.48 -0.77 -0.11 -0.40 -0.63 0.31 0.29 0.27 
5 Netherlands -0.23 -0.64 -1.01 -0.08 -0.39 -0.69 0.36 0.33 0.31 
6 France -0.10 -0.45 -0.72 0.07 -0.14 -0.29 0.40 0.37 0.33 
7 Italy -0.03 -0.33 -0.57 0.05 -0.14 -0.27 0.39 0.36 0.33 
8 Belgium 0.14 -0.18 -0.47 0.19 -0.02 -0.24 0.51 0.49 0.45 
9 W Europe -0.10 -0.44 -0.75 -0.02 -0.27 -0.49 0.35 0.31 0.28 
10 EFTA -0.35 -0.52 -0.61 -0.28 -0.43 -0.51 0.16 0.17 0.17 
11 Russia -1.22 -1.56 -1.86 -1.17 -1.54 -1.88 -0.49 -0.45 -0.39 
12 Japan -0.13 -0.59 -0.97 0.12 -0.08 -0.10 0.51 0.48 0.44 
13 Aus., NZ, Canada -0.41 -0.74 -0.96 -0.44 -0.78 -1.03 0.11 0.12 0.12 
14 Rest Annex I -0.11 -0.67 -1.74 -0.15 -0.80 -2.02 0.33 0.28 0.26 
15 China & HK -0.67 -0.89 -0.90 -0.65 -0.84 -0.84 -0.51 -0.60 -0.50 
16 India -0.31 -0.44 -0.26 -0.32 -0.44 -0.26 -0.34 -0.50 -0.38 
17 Bra., Arg., Para. 0.04 0.06 0.21 0.02 0.03 0.16 0.08 0.06 0.04 
18 Africa -1.14 -1.14 -0.98 -1.11 -1.12 -0.97 -0.53 -0.44 -0.35 
19 Middle East -0.91 -0.98 -0.93 -0.87 -0.95 -0.89 -0.40 -0.35 -0.30 
20 Rest of world -0.39 -0.53 -0.59 -0.37 -0.50 -0.55 -0.08 -0.10 -0.12 
 
Table 3.18B: Differences in percentage change of GDP price index or movement in real exchange 
rate between South African rand and other regions – Scenario 1 relative to BaU (average % per 
annum) 
  No ET Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI 
no-lose crediting 
No  Region 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 
1 South Africa 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 USA -0.44 -0.78 -1.03 -0.50 -0.92 -1.26 0.07 0.07 0.05 
3 Germany -0.18 -0.43 -0.65 -0.15 -0.36 -0.55 0.20 0.19 0.14 
4 UK -0.31 -0.65 -0.95 -0.30 -0.57 -0.81 0.13 0.12 0.09 
5 Netherlands -0.43 -0.82 -1.20 -0.28 -0.57 -0.88 0.16 0.15 0.12 
6 France -0.27 -0.60 -0.88 -0.11 -0.29 -0.45 0.23 0.21 0.17 
7 Italy -0.21 -0.49 -0.74 -0.13 -0.30 -0.44 0.21 0.20 0.16 
8 Belgium -0.17 -0.48 -0.78 -0.12 -0.33 -0.54 0.20 0.18 0.14 
9 W Europe -0.28 -0.60 -0.91 -0.19 -0.42 -0.65 0.17 0.16 0.12 
10 EFTA -0.48 -0.64 -0.74 -0.41 -0.56 -0.64 0.03 0.05 0.05 
11 Russia -1.03 -1.39 -1.69 -0.99 -1.37 -1.71 -0.31 -0.28 -0.22 
12 Japan -0.38 -0.82 -1.20 -0.13 -0.31 -0.33 0.26 0.25 0.21 
13 Aus., NZ, Canada -0.52 -0.83 -1.06 -0.55 -0.87 -1.13 0.01 0.03 0.03 
14 Rest Annex I -0.31 -0.85 -1.93 -0.35 -0.98 -2.21 0.13 0.10 0.07 
15 China & HK -0.18 -0.37 -0.51 -0.16 -0.33 -0.45 -0.02 -0.09 -0.11 
16 India 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.05 -0.04 -0.07 
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  No ET 
Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI 
no-lose crediting 
No  Region 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 
17 Bra., Arg., Para. 0.07 0.09 0.23 0.05 0.06 0.19 0.10 0.09 0.07 
18 Africa -0.98 -1.01 -0.84 -0.95 -0.99 -0.83 -0.38 -0.31 -0.21 
19 Middle East -0.80 -0.89 -0.83 -0.77 -0.86 -0.80 -0.29 -0.27 -0.20 
20 Rest of world -0.26 -0.39 -0.46 -0.25 -0.37 -0.42 0.04 0.03 0.01 
 
Table 3.19A: Relative movement in factor prices (% change in other region – % change in South 
Africa – Scenario 1 (average % per annum) 
  No ET Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI 
no-lose crediting 
No  Region 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 
1 South Africa 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 USA -0.72 -1.19 -1.50 -0.83 -1.44 -1.88 0.45 0.37 0.31 
3 Germany -0.30 -0.69 -0.98 -0.23 -0.58 -0.84 0.73 0.62 0.52 
4 UK -0.37 -0.92 -1.36 -0.37 -0.80 -1.14 0.65 0.56 0.47 
5 Netherlands -0.87 -1.56 -2.13 -0.46 -1.02 -1.51 0.69 0.59 0.50 
6 France -0.53 -1.10 -1.47 -0.08 -0.41 -0.65 0.79 0.68 0.56 
7 Italy -0.50 -1.01 -1.40 -0.19 -0.52 -0.73 0.74 0.64 0.54 
8 Belgium -0.32 -0.85 -1.28 -0.04 -0.39 -0.70 0.86 0.77 0.67 
9 W Europe -0.59 -1.19 -1.67 -0.30 -0.71 -1.04 0.68 0.57 0.47 
10 EFTA -0.71 -0.97 -1.10 -0.50 -0.74 -0.87 0.49 0.43 0.36 
11 Russia -3.40 -5.07 -6.70 -3.59 -5.31 -6.91 -0.94 -0.97 -0.86 
12 Japan -0.53 -1.20 -1.73 -0.10 -0.41 -0.50 0.85 0.75 0.65 
13 Aus., NZ, Canada -0.89 -1.42 -1.75 -0.96 -1.51 -1.90 0.34 0.29 0.24 
14 Rest Annex I -1.17 -2.40 -4.47 -1.50 -2.80 -4.84 0.30 0.22 0.20 
15 China & HK -0.73 -0.95 -0.95 -0.70 -0.90 -0.89 -0.86 -1.00 -0.86 
16 India -0.27 -0.41 -0.22 -0.28 -0.41 -0.22 -0.38 -0.62 -0.51 
17 Bra., Arg., Para. 0.05 0.07 0.23 0.03 0.04 0.18 0.29 0.21 0.14 
18 Africa -1.23 -1.22 -1.05 -1.20 -1.21 -1.04 -0.40 -0.38 -0.34 
19 Middle East -0.96 -1.02 -0.97 -0.92 -0.99 -0.93 -0.48 -0.51 -0.46 
20 Rest of world -0.40 -0.54 -0.60 -0.38 -0.51 -0.55 0.03 -0.05 -0.10 
 
Table 3.19B: Relative movement in factor prices (% change in other region – % change in South 
Africa – Scenario 1 Relative to BaU (average % per annum) 
  No ET Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI 
no-lose crediting 
No  Region 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 
1 South Africa 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 USA -0.85 -1.31 -1.62 -0.96 -1.56 -2.00 0.32 0.25 0.19 
3 Germany -0.50 -0.87 -1.16 -0.43 -0.76 -1.02 0.53 0.44 0.34 
4 UK -0.58 -1.10 -1.55 -0.57 -0.98 -1.33 0.45 0.37 0.28 
5 Netherlands -1.10 -1.77 -2.35 -0.70 -1.24 -1.73 0.46 0.37 0.28 
6 France -0.72 -1.27 -1.65 -0.28 -0.58 -0.82 0.60 0.51 0.39 
7 Italy -0.69 -1.19 -1.58 -0.39 -0.69 -0.92 0.54 0.46 0.36 
8 Belgium -0.66 -1.18 -1.61 -0.37 -0.72 -1.04 0.53 0.44 0.33 
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  No ET Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI 
no-lose crediting 
No  Region 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 
9 W Europe -0.78 -1.36 -1.84 -0.49 -0.88 -1.22 0.49 0.40 0.30 
10 EFTA -0.84 -1.09 -1.23 -0.63 -0.87 -1.00 0.35 0.30 0.24 
11 Russia -3.21 -4.89 -6.52 -3.41 -5.13 -6.73 -0.75 -0.79 -0.68 
12 Japan -0.79 -1.43 -1.97 -0.36 -0.65 -0.74 0.59 0.52 0.41 
13 Aus., NZ, Canada -1.00 -1.51 -1.85 -1.06 -1.60 -1.99 0.23 0.20 0.15 
14 Rest Annex I -1.39 -2.60 -4.68 -1.72 -3.00 -5.05 0.08 0.02 -0.01 
15 China & HK -0.20 -0.39 -0.53 -0.18 -0.35 -0.47 -0.34 -0.45 -0.44 
16 India 0.16 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.09 0.11 0.05 -0.12 -0.17 
17 Bra., Arg., Para. 0.07 0.10 0.26 0.05 0.07 0.21 0.32 0.24 0.17 
18 Africa -1.06 -1.09 -0.90 -1.03 -1.07 -0.89 -0.24 -0.25 -0.19 
19 Middle East -0.85 -0.93 -0.87 -0.81 -0.90 -0.83 -0.37 -0.42 -0.36 
20 Rest of world -0.26 -0.39 -0.46 -0.24 -0.36 -0.41 0.17 0.09 0.04 
 
Table 3.20A: Relative movement in demand for capital (% change in other region – % change in 
South Africa – Scenario 1 (average % per annum) 
  No ET Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI 
no-lose crediting 
No  Region 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 
1 South Africa 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 USA -0.46 -0.22 -0.09 -0.43 -0.15 0.04 -0.92 -0.86 -0.84 
3 Germany -0.94 -0.73 -0.64 -0.96 -0.77 -0.69 -1.36 -1.28 -1.24 
4 UK -0.89 -0.60 -0.41 -0.87 -0.64 -0.51 -1.30 -1.23 -1.19 
5 Netherlands -0.57 -0.16 0.13 -0.83 -0.52 -0.28 -1.34 -1.27 -1.23 
6 France -0.76 -0.47 -0.32 -0.99 -0.82 -0.73 -1.34 -1.27 -1.22 
7 Italy -0.80 -0.53 -0.37 -0.95 -0.79 -0.70 -1.33 -1.26 -1.22 
8 Belgium -0.78 -0.49 -0.30 -0.94 -0.74 -0.61 -1.32 -1.25 -1.21 
9 W Europe -0.74 -0.41 -0.20 -0.90 -0.69 -0.57 -1.30 -1.23 -1.19 
10 EFTA -0.78 -0.61 -0.54 -0.89 -0.73 -0.66 -1.26 -1.20 -1.16 
11 Russia 1.49 2.47 3.81 1.57 2.67 4.07 0.69 0.71 0.74 
12 Japan -0.77 -0.48 -0.28 -0.91 -0.73 -0.65 -1.29 -1.22 -1.18 
13 Aus., NZ, Canada -0.42 -0.13 0.05 -0.40 -0.09 0.14 -0.92 -0.87 -0.84 
14 Rest Annex I -0.54 0.20 1.61 -0.33 0.52 1.99 -1.16 -1.08 -1.06 
15 China & HK 3.14 3.13 2.42 3.13 3.12 2.41 3.18 3.18 2.42 
16 India 2.01 2.19 1.46 2.00 2.18 1.45 2.00 2.18 1.44 
17 Bra., Arg., Para. 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.12 -0.13 -0.09 
18 Africa 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.10 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 
19 Middle East 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.02 
20 Rest of world 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.74 0.62 0.59 0.60 
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Table 3.20B: Relative movement in demand for skilled labour (% change in other region – % change 
in South Africa – Scenario 1 (average % per annum) 
  No ET Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI 
no-lose crediting 
No  Region 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 
1 South Africa 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 USA -0.80 -0.67 -0.62 -0.78 -0.62 -0.53 -0.75 -0.73 -0.74 
3 Germany -1.12 -1.01 -1.00 -1.12 -1.01 -1.00 -1.06 -1.03 -1.03 
4 UK -1.14 -1.00 -0.93 -1.12 -1.00 -0.96 -1.07 -1.04 -1.05 
5 Netherlands -0.97 -0.76 -0.64 -1.07 -0.92 -0.84 -1.07 -1.05 -1.05 
6 France -1.05 -0.91 -0.87 -1.11 -1.02 -1.01 -1.05 -1.02 -1.03 
7 Italy -1.07 -0.95 -0.92 -1.06 -0.95 -0.92 -0.99 -0.97 -0.98 
8 Belgium -1.07 -0.94 -0.89 -1.09 -0.99 -0.96 -1.02 -1.00 -1.00 
9 W Europe -1.07 -0.93 -0.88 -1.10 -1.01 -0.99 -1.04 -1.02 -1.02 
10 EFTA -1.09 -0.99 -0.97 -1.10 -1.01 -1.00 -1.03 -1.01 -1.01 
11 Russia 1.14 1.97 3.15 1.22 2.17 3.41 0.85 0.83 0.82 
12 Japan -1.09 -0.99 -0.95 -1.08 -0.99 -0.95 -1.01 -0.98 -0.99 
13 Aus., NZ, Canada -0.82 -0.68 -0.61 -0.81 -0.66 -0.57 -0.75 -0.74 -0.75 
14 Rest Annex I -1.12 -0.91 -0.61 -1.12 -0.83 -0.52 -1.04 -1.00 -1.00 
15 China & HK 2.96 2.93 2.22 2.96 2.93 2.22 2.88 2.84 2.14 
16 India 1.97 2.14 1.45 1.96 2.14 1.44 1.92 2.04 1.33 
17 Bra., Arg., Para. -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 
18 Africa -0.11 -0.06 -0.01 -0.11 -0.07 -0.02 -0.12 -0.16 -0.14 
19 Middle East -0.10 -0.07 -0.03 -0.11 -0.08 -0.04 -0.14 -0.16 -0.14 
20 Rest of world 0.68 0.66 0.63 0.68 0.66 0.64 0.70 0.63 0.60 
 
Table 3.20C: Relative movement in demand for unskilled labour (% change in other region 
 – % change in South Africa – Scenario 1 (average % per annum) 
  No ET Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI 
no-lose crediting 
No  Region 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 
1 South Africa 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 USA -0.81 -0.69 -0.64 -0.80 -0.65 -0.56 -0.77 -0.76 -0.76 
3 Germany -1.11 -1.00 -0.97 -1.11 -1.00 -0.98 -1.07 -1.05 -1.05 
4 UK -1.14 -1.00 -0.92 -1.12 -1.00 -0.95 -1.09 -1.07 -1.06 
5 Netherlands -0.97 -0.75 -0.62 -1.07 -0.91 -0.82 -1.09 -1.06 -1.06 
6 France -1.05 -0.91 -0.87 -1.11 -1.01 -0.99 -1.06 -1.04 -1.04 
7 Italy -1.06 -0.93 -0.88 -1.05 -0.94 -0.89 -1.00 -0.98 -0.99 
8 Belgium -1.07 -0.93 -0.87 -1.09 -0.99 -0.95 -1.04 -1.02 -1.02 
9 W Europe -1.08 -0.93 -0.86 -1.11 -1.01 -0.98 -1.06 -1.04 -1.04 
10 EFTA -1.09 -0.98 -0.96 -1.11 -1.02 -0.99 -1.06 -1.03 -1.04 
11 Russia 1.18 2.03 3.23 1.25 2.22 3.48 0.85 0.83 0.82 
12 Japan -1.11 -0.99 -0.94 -1.11 -1.02 -0.99 -1.05 -1.03 -1.03 
13 Aus., NZ, Canada -0.82 -0.69 -0.61 -0.81 -0.66 -0.57 -0.78 -0.76 -0.77 
14 Rest Annex I -1.12 -0.91 -0.60 -1.11 -0.83 -0.52 -1.06 -1.02 -1.01 
15 China & HK 3.04 2.98 2.23 3.04 2.98 2.24 3.02 2.99 2.26 
16 India 1.97 2.12 1.38 1.97 2.12 1.38 2.02 2.16 1.42 
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  No ET 
Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI 
no-lose crediting 
No  Region 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 
17 Bra., Arg., Para. -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
18 Africa -0.11 -0.07 0.00 -0.12 -0.08 -0.02 -0.13 -0.17 -0.15 
19 Middle East -0.10 -0.06 -0.01 -0.10 -0.07 -0.03 -0.14 -0.16 -0.14 
20 Rest of world 0.68 0.64 0.61 0.68 0.65 0.62 0.70 0.63 0.61 
 
3.3.3 Scenario 2: Annex I CO2 reduction of 40% below 1990 levels by 
2020 
So far, the analysis of Scenario 1 results showed that there is an important shift in the pattern of 
economic activity and trade in the South African economy and in particular on the energy intensive 
and trade intensive sectors, when the emissions trade arrangement is changed from ‘No ET’ or 
‘Annex I ET’ to one with ‘no-lose credit’ arrangement that allows NAI countries to earn credit for 
their efforts to reduce rather than to increase their own emissions in response to Annex I regions 
implementing climate policy measures. The reason is that the world as a whole can benefit from 
increased efficiency of climate policy, lower relative costs and these benefits can flow on to all 
countries, including South Africa. Efficiency gains do not, however, address issues of equitable 
distribution of gains from trade across countries. The benefits of increased climate policy efficiency 
can be said to come from three sources: 
iv) Output or production expansion effect, which sees the world economic output and hence world 
demand for exports and imports increased, even if the same climate policy target (for the world 
as a whole) is maintained. 
v) Production efficiency effect, which sees a switch from energy (and emissions) inefficient 
production activities to energy-efficient activities. This allows NAI countries to reduce their 
emissions (at least in relative terms), rather than increasing them, and this can bring benefits 
both to NAI regions as well as Annex I regions. Emissions can be reduced in the regions where 
it is most cost-effective to do so, meaning more mitigation takes place overall. Increased global 
mitigation has benefits for all countries in avoiding greater climate impacts, to which poor 
countries and communities are particularly vulnerable. This is the ‘gains from (emission) trade’ 
effect even if ‘trade’ here is still limited because it is confined only to a form of ‘no-lose credit’ 
given to NAI efforts at reducing emissions rather than by an explicit allocation of emissions 
permits. 
vi) Consumption efficiency effect, which sees a switch of consumption activities from energy and 
emission intensive commodities/activities to less energy-intensive ones, even if the same level 
of welfare is maintained. 
Depending on how these three effects interact, the impacts on South African energy-intensive and 
trade-intensive sectors will differ as analysed under Scenario 1. Overall, the results of Scenario 2 
help to reinforce the results of Scenario 1. They show that even with significant changes in the 
climate policy target (from 25% reduction to 40% reduction below 1990 emissions level for Annex I 
regions) the patterns of the impacts on South Africa do not change in any significant way even 
though the magnitudes of the impacts will change (as expected). There is however a significant shift 
in the patterns of impacts when there is a change in emissions trading regime from ‘Annex I ET’ to 
‘Annex I ET with NAI no-lose crediting’ remains with Scenario 2 as in Scenario 1. 
Emissions, leakage, marginal abatement costs, savings from emissions trade 
First, with respect to the issue of emissions and marginal abatement costs, and leakage rates, 
increasing the Annex I target emissions reduction from -25% below 1990 to -40% below 1990 
clearly will increase both the MACs and the leakage rates, as can be seen from Tables 3.21 and 3.22. 
However, the overall pattern of impacts remains the same. In particular, the ‘switching of regime’ 
from one of emissions leakage from Annex I to no-Annex I regions (when there is Annex I ET but 
without ‘NAI no-lose crediting’) to one with no leakage but with a positive contribution by NAI 
regions to the overall emissions reduction effort of the world as a whole (when there is Annex I ET 
but with ‘NAI no-lose crediting’) is maintained, if not reinforced.  
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The previous leakage rates of around 12% to 14% p.a. has now increased to 12% to 16% if there is 
no ‘NAI no-lose crediting’). With ‘NAI no-lose crediting’, leakage becomes ‘positive’ in the sense 
that there is now a positive contribution by NAI regions to the overall emissions reduction which is 
equal to 133% to 146% the size of Annex I reductions (instead of 138% to 153% in Scenario 1). 
Because the MACs are now much higher than before, and also the changes in emissions levels are 
also much greater, the potential savings in emissions abatement costs when there is Annex I ET 
(with or without ‘NAI no-lose crediting’) is also much higher (Table 3.23). Total savings is almost 
double or even triple in some cases (Annex I ET in the period ending 2020). The gains from 
emission no-lose crediting for SA is also higher: $469.8 million per annum instead of $284.8 million 
per annum in the period 2004-2010, even though the gains return to previous levels of around $67.7 
million in the period 2015-2020. 
Table 3.21: CO2 Emission for Scenario 2 (Gt C) 
  No ET Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI 
no-lose crediting 
No.  Region 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 
1 South Africa 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.08 0.08 0.08 
2 USA 1.40 1.18 1.00 1.34 1.08 0.87 1.68 1.72 1.81 
3 Germany 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.22 0.23 0.24 
4 UK 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.16 0.17 0.18 
5 Netherlands 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.07 
6 France 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.13 
7 Italy 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.14 
8 Belgium 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
9 W Europe 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.23 0.24 0.25 
10 EFTA 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 
11 Russia 0.36 0.30 0.26 0.34 0.28 0.18 0.44 0.46 0.51 
12 Japan 0.25 0.21 0.18 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.32 0.34 0.36 
13 Aus., NZ, Canada 0.22 0.19 0.16 0.22 0.18 0.15 0.26 0.27 0.29 
14 Rest Annex I 0.30 0.26 0.22 0.29 0.25 0.27 0.35 0.36 0.37 
15 China & HK 1.70 2.22 2.80 1.70 2.22 2.80 1.31 1.48 1.72 
16 India 0.38 0.48 0.58 0.38 0.48 0.58 0.32 0.36 0.41 
17 Bra., Arg., Para. 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.13 0.15 0.16 
18 Africa 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 
19 Middle East 0.61 0.73 0.85 0.61 0.73 0.91 0.53 0.57 0.63 
20 Rest of world 1.18 1.43 1.72 1.18 1.43 1.75 1.06 1.19 1.35 
Annex 1 Total 3.32 2.81 2.37 3.32 2.80 2.37 4.03 4.17 4.42 
% change over 1990 level -16.1 -29.0 -40.0 -16.1 -29.2 -40.1 1.9 5.4 11.7 
% change over pvs period -15.4 -15.4 -15.4 -15.4 -15.6 -15.4 2.7 3.4 6.0 
Non-Annex1 Total 4.17 5.22 6.33 4.17 5.22 6.43 3.46 3.85 4.38 
% change over pvs period 31.7 25.0 21.4 31.6 25.1 23.2 9.2 11.3 13.8 
World Total 7.49 8.02 8.71 7.49 8.02 8.80 7.49 8.02 8.80 
% change over pvs period 5.6 7.1 8.5 5.6 7.1 9.7 5.6 7.1 9.7 
leakage rate (from Annex I 
to NAI) (%) -12.1% -13.2% -12.8% -11.8% -13.2% -15.9% 133% 138% 146% 
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Table 3.22: Marginal abatement cost or CO2 emission permit price (2004 $/tC) for Scenario 2 
  No ET Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI 
no-lose crediting 
No  Region 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 
1 South Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 79 147 194 
2 USA 234 596 1154 273 740 1443 79 147 194 
3 Germany 309 843 1625 273 740 1443 79 147 194 
4 UK 273 824 1704 273 740 1443 79 147 194 
5 Netherlands 428 1122 2190 273 740 1443 79 147 194 
6 France 650 1749 3355 273 740 1443 79 147 194 
7 Italy 510 1437 2973 273 740 1443 79 147 194 
8 Belgium 534 1469 2930 273 740 1443 79 147 194 
9 W Europe 484 1363 2770 273 740 1443 79 147 194 
10 EFTA 499 1289 2516 273 740 1443 79 147 194 
11 Russia 226 621 1273 273 740 1443 79 147 194 
12 Japan 519 1478 3124 273 740 1443 79 147 194 
13 Aus., NZ, Canada 252 678 1338 273 740 1443 79 147 194 
14 Rest Annex I 219 667 1631 273 740 1443 79 147 194 
15 China & HK 0 0 0 0 0 0 79 147 194 
16 India 0 0 0 0 0 0 79 147 194 
17 Bra., Arg., Para. 0 0 0 0 0 0 79 147 194 
18 Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 79 147 194 
19 Middle East 0 0 0 0 0 0 79 147 194 
20 Rest of world 0 0 0 0 0 0 79 147 194 
 
Table 3.23: Values of emissions trade (2004 $ million) (annual average) for Scenario 2 
  Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI no-lose 
crediting 
No  Region 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 
1 South Africa 0.0 0.0 0.0 469.8 186.8 67.7 
2 USA 2610 5441 4288 3651 4049 3359 
3 Germany 204 245 430 523 564 452 
4 UK 10 358 607 342 395 324 
5 Netherlands 207 184 264 157 165 128 
6 France 669 849 1070 328 342 261 
7 Italy 751 229 38 346 366 283 
8 Belgium 150 192 293 85 90 69 
9 W Europe 935 1226 1572 611 643 498 
10 EFTA 139 123 50 88 91 70 
11 Russia 908 597 10056 1069 1265 1107 
12 Japan 1351 1818 2822 869 911 704 
13 Aus., NZ, Canada 180 259 389 586 664 544 
14 Rest Annex I 696 582 7588 657 792 662 
15 China & HK 0 0 0 4523 2864 1258 
16 India 0 0 0 804 480 206 
17 Bra., Arg., Para. 0 0 0 133 100 49 
18 Africa 0 0 0 21 17 8 
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  Annex 1 ET 
Annex I ET with NAI no-
lose crediting 
No  Region 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 
19 Middle East 0 0 0 654 524 255 
20 Rest of world 0 0 0 933 788 394 
 Total 8809 12105 29466 16852 15297 10698 
 
 
Specific losses or gains in some important South African export sectors 
Next, with respect to the issue of specific losses or gains by sectors for the South African economy 
Figure 3.14 (as compared to Figure 3.10) shows that although the magnitudes of the gains and losses 
are now much higher (especially for the cases of ‘No ET’ and ‘Annex I ET’, the patterns of the 
impacts remain the same, and also the switching of regime from one of mostly negative impacts 
when there is no ‘NAI no-lose crediting’ to one of mostly positive impacts when there is ‘NAI no-
lose crediting’. Interestingly, even if the magnitude of the overall losses in the cases of No ET and 
Annex I ET are now much higher ($20 billion per annum in the period ending 2020, instead of the 
previous $9 billion per annum), the magnitudes of the net gains for the case of ‘Annex I ET with no-
lose crediting’ remain essentially of the same order ($5.2 billion instead of $4.4 billion in the period 
ending 2020). This implies that with the case of ‘Annex I ET with no-lose crediting’, the results are 
much less sensitive to the emissions reduction target of Annex I regions as compared to the cases of 
‘No ET’ and ‘Annex I ET’. One of the reasons for this greater sensitivity in the cases of ‘No ET’ and 
‘Annex I ET’ as compared to the case of ‘Annex I ET with no-lose crediting’ is that in the former 
cases, with no (or little) co-operation between regions, there is a much smaller ‘base’ of emissions 
on which to work the reductions on, hence the results will be rather sensitive to the size of the target 
(relative to the base). This is in contrast to the latter case (Scenario ‘C’) when there is wider co-
operation and hence a much larger emissions base to work the reduction target on. As a result, the 
relative size of the target (compared to the base) will be much smaller (even though in absolute 
terms it is still of the same magnitude).
 39
 
 
                                                        
39  Note that the analysis in this section does not take into account the ‘extra value’ of climate change prevention 
on International tourism which was estimated for Scenario 1 in Section 3.3.2 but which can also be assumed to 
apply to Scenario 2. These ‘extra value’ can be added to the gains/losses discussed in this section to arrive at a 
‘net’ gains/losses if we assume that Scenario 2 can prevent climate change impacts (as assumed in the Hamilton 
et al. (2005) study)  on International tourism completely. 
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Figure 3.14: Scenario 2 – Specific export losses or gains in South African export sectors – 
Scenario 1 relative to BaU (total for each period in 2004 $ billion) 
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Figure 3.14: Scenario 2 – Specific export losses or gains in South African export sectors – 
Scenario 1 relative to BaU (total for each period in 2004 $ billion) 
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(S2): Scenario 2; (A) No ET; (B): Annex I ET; (C): Annex I ET with NAI no-lose crediting. 
Figure 3.15: Change in export for energy intensive sectors – relative to BaU (average % per annum) 
 
Domestic microeconomic impacts on South Africa 
Figure 3.16 looks at the domestic growth rates of sectors in the South African economy for Scenario 
2 (under the same underlying assumptions about GDP and population growth as in Scenario 1). 
Comparing Figure 3.16 with Figure 3.13, again, it can be seen that changing the severity of Annex I 
emissions reduction target from -25% to -40% below 1990 level does not significantly affect the 
patterns of results, even though the magnitudes can change. Only one sector shows high sensitivity 
to the emissions reduction target, and that is ‘Non-ferrous metal’. The negative impacts (in Scenario 
1) of –about -1 % to -3% p.a. (relative to BaU scenario) for the cases of ‘No ET’ and ‘Annex I ET’ 
has now increased to around -1% to -8% p.a. ) for the cases of ‘No ET’ and ‘Annex I ET’. 
Remarkably again, only in the case of ‘Annex I ET with NAI no-lose crediting’ that the magnitude 
of the gains for ‘Non-ferrous metals’ seems to have remained relatively unchanged: from 1.2% – 
1.5% (Scenario 1C) to just 1.5% – 2% (Scenario 2C). 
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Figure 3.16: Sectoral output growth in South Africa – Scenario 2 relative to BaU  
(average % per annum) 
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Conclusions  
Overall, the results of Scenario 2 help to establish an important observation, and that is, although the 
magnitudes of the impacts of response measures on South Africa may change with the magnitude of 
the emissions reduction target by Annex I regions (as expected), the patterns of the impacts seem 
robust and do not change significantly with changing emissions reduction target. There is however a 
significant shift in the patterns of impacts if there is a change in emissions trading regime from 
‘Annex I ET’ to ‘Annex I ET with NAI no-lose crediting’. 
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Throughout both Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 it has been observed that (i) ‘Coal mining’ always lose 
irrespective of ET regime, the losses
40
 are greater if there is greater co-operation in ET (Scenarios 
1B and 1C). This is to be expected because greater co-operation in ET implies greater and wider 
efforts at CO2 emissions reduction, hence the use of coal will fall world wide and exports of coal 
from South Africa will also fall, (ii) In addition to ‘Coal mining’, other sectors may also lose but 
unlike ‘Coal mining’, here the losses (or even gains) depends on whether there is ‘Annex I ET’ or 
‘Annex I ET with NAI no-lose crediting’. The reason for this can be given as follows: When Annex I 
regions impose emissions reduction targets but without participation of NAI regions, assuming the 
‘worst case’
41
 scenario when developing countries do not impose any climate response measures of 
their own but instead just ‘free ride’ on developed countries’ efforts, this will create a so-called 
‘leakage effects’ which shifts production of energy-intensive products such as Minerals and mining, 
Chemicals, Metal products (ferrous and non-ferrous), and Air transport (see Table 3.1) from 
developed countries to developing countries. This will create two different effects on South Africa. 
Firstly, the ‘net income effect’ which can stimulate (or decrease)
42
 production and exports of these 
energy-intensive and trade-exposed (EITE) products from South Africa to Annex I countries. The 
second (‘regional competition’ or ‘regional substitution’) effects will determine if a country such as 
South Africa can benefit more or less from a shift of production activities
43
 from Annex I to 
developing countries as compared to another developing country such as China. If the ‘net income 
effect’ is positive and dominates, then South Africa will benefit from ‘Annex I ET’ (or ‘No ET’). 
This is the cases of ‘Iron and steel’, ‘Air transport’, and ‘Other mining’. If the ‘net income effect’ is 
negative or if the ‘substitution/competition’ effect dominates, then South Africa can lose. This is the 
cases of all other EITE sectors except the three mentioned above.  
When there is participation of NAI countries in the overall emissions reduction efforts as in the case 
of ‘Annex I ET with NAI no-lose crediting’, there is an additional ‘income effect’ for the world as a 
whole because of the increased efficiency of climate response measures. This will add to the ‘net 
income effect’ considered above. We can call this the ‘world income effect’ (on South Africa) which 
represents the strength of the overall world demand for EITE products coming from South Africa as 
a result of the climate response measures with ‘Annex I ET and NAI no-lose crediting’. If this world 
income effect is stronger than regional competition effects, then South Africa can gain in exports. 
This is the cases of all EITE sectors except ‘Coal mining’, ‘Iron and steel’, and ‘Other mining’ (see 
Figures 3.10 and 3.14). 
 
                                                        
40  The ‘losses’ here are defined in terms of export losses relative to the BaU Scenario. This is also to be 
distinguished from domestic production losses (or gains) which mostly follows the pattern of export losses but 
in some cases (such as ‘other mining’) can be different. Compare Figure 3.10 with 3.13, or 3.15 with 3.16. 
41  This ‘worst case’ scenario is unrealistic because in reality developing countries will suffer from climate change 
and hence will impose some climate response measures of their own even if not obliged to and developed 
countries will also impose measures to combat ‘leakage effects’ such as import tariff adjustment or export 
subsidy to take account of different emissions intensities of traded goods sourced from different regions even if 
these measures are not easy to undertake. The ‘worst case scenario’ therefore serves to highlight only the 
potential impacts. Future studies need to undertake a more detailed analysis of the actual likely impacts when 
developing countries’ response measures and developed countries ‘border adjustment’ measures are also taken 
into account. 
42  There are two different ‘income effects’ impacting on South Africa: one (positive) which comes from the 
shifting of energy-intensive production activities from Annex I countries to (developing countries including) 
South Africa and the other income effect which comes from the reduced demand for these products within 
Annex I countries themselves due to climate response measures. If the former is stronger, then net income 
effect will be positive for South Africa, but if the second (negative) income effect is stronger, then net income 
effect for South African exports will also be negative and hence decreases export from South Africa rather than 
stimulates it. 
43  i.e. assuming the ‘net income’ effect is positive. 
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4. Further research 
This work has confirmed some results of previous studies, while extending it in relation to energy-
intensive and trade-intensive sectors and examination of scenarios related to emissions trading. This 
work was conducted with the analytical rigour possible within a tight time-frame for the modelling 
and delivery of a report, prior to the negotiations in Copenhagen in December 2009. The research 
process and its results suggest four areas in which the technical analysis could be further improved 
and one scenario which would be informed by the outcome of negotiations.  
1. Full alignment of sectors in terms of energy-intensive and trade-exposed sectors of the economy 
(SASID, SSA, Energy Balances and IEA). One of the main challenges posed when doing the 
energy-intensive analysis was that Statistics South Africa (SSA) classify non-ferrous metals in 
the same group as basic metals (i.e. iron and steel) in their GDP data. Thus assessing the energy-
intensity of iron and steel as separate from non-ferrous products was not possible. In addition, 
although shown to be of a lower energy-intensity, paper and wood products are similarly 
combined into one category in the SSA data. 
2. The impacts on agriculture and tourism deserve particular attention. More specifically, the issue 
of carbon footprinting which implies products produced from developing countries and bought 
by developed countries, involve many intermediate production processes which may impact 
upon (as well as be impacted upon by) climate measures and therefore should be taken into 
account. For example, carbon footprint labelling schemes and the impact this has on the 
competitiveness of the agricultural sector. In this report agriculture was not seen to be of high 
carbon intensity but its dependence on the use of transport supports acknowledgement of this 
sector in terms of the indirect impact of response measures to climate change by Annex I 
countries on exports from this sector. Also, there is the issue of international tourism
44
 which 
affects production and consumption activities of both developed and developing countries 
jointly. This study found that South Africa will benefit from emissions, in that the negative 
impacts of climate change (in the BaU scenario) are to some degree attenuated, thus the 
reduction in foreign tourism arrivals will be less than in the BaU scenario.  
3. Appropriate tourism data – a major challenge was acquiring the information on tourist 
expenditures in various sectors and how the total number of tourists may change as a result of 
climate response measures. This will then be used to define an ‘International tourism’ sector 
more accurately and model their changes over different periods. The Hamburg Tourism Model 
was one source of information on the total number of International tourists, but one also needs to 
know how International tourist expenditures may differ from domestic tourism expenditure to 
translate this into impact on total expenditure in the ‘tourism sectors’ (defined in Table 3.2).  
4. Depending on the outcome of negotiations in Copenhagen, an extension of the work on NAI no-
lose crediting could be to consider domestic emissions trading in NAI countries. This depends in 
the first instance on the politics of negotiations and the level of interest in exploring innovative 
carbon trading mechanisms. Such analysis would, however, not necessarily have to assume a 
‘hard’ cap on emissions, i.e. reductions or limits in absolute terms. Emissions trading could be 
conceived in relation to intensity goals, which would require a relative reduction or deviation 
below baseline. An indication would be needed from the South African government on whether 
such analysis would be of interest.  
5. Further research should address domestic policy measures to address the vulnerability of energy-
intensive and trade-exposed sectors to response measures by developed countries. Such 
measures should be designed in the overall context of climate policy, enabling these sectors to 
contribute to action on climate change. An assessment of the range of options to promote 
energy-efficiency in energy-intensive sectors to reduce their energy demand, for example, 
energy efficiency improvements through demand-side management or technological 
advancements. We note that impacts of climate response measures on energy-intensive 
industries in a NAI country such as South Africa can be ambiguous. On the one hand, these 
industries may benefit rather than suffer from climate response measures in terms of lower 
                                                        
44 One of the challenges faced when trying to model the impact of climate change responses specifically on 
tourism was the lack of model inputs. As a consequence, this is not dealt with at this stage. 
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energy prices due to reduced world demand (relative to BaU Scenario) and hence will not try to 
improve energy-efficiency on their own initiative. Furthermore, if there is any potential for 
‘leakage effect’, this will also benefit rather than harm these industries and therefore, the 
incentive for improvement on energy-efficiency is lacking in these circumstances. Therefore, 
there is a need for additional measures to promote energy-efficiency in these industries either 
through technological standard (in conjunction with some incentive such as investment subsidy) 
or some form of energy/emissions tax. To protect the energy-intensive but trade-exposed 
sectors, Simmonds (1995), Clark (2000) and Liang et al (2007: 311) show that one way is to 
‘combine the tax exemption for energy- and trade-intensive sectors with the reimbursement of 
tax revenue to the un-exempted sectors’. The one way in which this option could be explored is 
through a national level CGE modelling exercise whereby a carbon tax on certain industries 
could be tested to assess the economy-wide implications thereof. This could be taken further 
into the international context to determine the impact such a tax could have on the 
competitiveness of those industries. 
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5. Conclusions and recommendations 
This research confirms findings of previous studies (see Section 1.3), that the impacts of response 
measures may imply losses of exports in some sectors, but also possibly gains in other sectors. The 
present report has provided a more specific identification of energy-intensive and trade-intensive 
sectors – and those that are both energy and trade intensive. We have also examined variations 
related to scenarios with and without emission trading among Annex I countries, and extended this 
to the consideration of a no-lose crediting approach for NAI countries.  
This study revealed that the five top energy-intensive and trade-exposed sectors in South Africa are: 
1. basic iron and steel; 
2. non-ferrous metals; 
3. chemicals and petrochemical products; 
4. mining and quarrying (including coal); 
5. machineries and some other manufactures (such as food products, as well as transport 
vehicles and equipment. 
Unsurprisingly these are similar sectors to those identified in other countries facing the same policy 
dilemmas. Transport as a service sector is highly energy-intensive. However, often transport (and 
trade) is considered only as a ‘margin’, i.e. as a means to facilitate production and exchange, hence it 
may not feature directly as a single ‘sector’. Air transport is also a component of international 
tourism which is an important trade-related or export sector (see Section 3 below). Hence the list of 
energy-intensive trade-intensive sectors may also include transport: 
6. transport services including air transport.  
In general, with the climate negotiations on the future of the climate regime post-2012, the 
implication for energy-intensive and trade-exposed sectors of the economy needs to be clearly 
understood.  
The scenarios considered include two reduction scenarios for Annex I – 25% (Scenario 1) and 40% 
(Scenario 2) below 1990 levels by 2020. Each of these two Annex I mitigation scenarios considers 
three different variants, distinguished by their assumptions about emission trading: (a) no emissions 
trading, (b) trade only among Annex I countries, and (c) access to carbon markets for NAI countries 
on a no-lose crediting basis. The ‘No emissions trade’ scenario is not considered likely (given 
existing and planned trading schemes), but provides a benchmark against which marginal abatement 
costs of other variants can be assessed. ‘Annex I emissions trade’ keeps the situation as with the 
Kyoto Protocol, with trading limited to developed countries, but not extended to developing 
countries. The third variant considers a situation (as currently under negotiation for the period after 
2012) in which NAI countries could trade on a ‘no-lose crediting’ basis.  
The underlying concern for EITE sectors is the potential for leakage, that is for industries to be 
located in areas with no or lower constraints on emissions. The evidence on the impacts on 
competitiveness, as assessed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment 
Report, was limited (IPCC 2007). In this study, we find that leakage can be a significant concern, 
with rates rising from 12% in 2010 to 14% in 2020 for a 25% reduction below 1990 levels for Annex 
I countries which increases to 12% to 16% respectively for the 40% reduction scenario. However, 
we also note that the measurement of leakage rate depends crucially on the assumptions made about 
the reactions of both developed and developing countries to the changed economic conditions after 
response measures have been implemented (in developed countries only). The leakage rates above 
derive from the ‘worst case’ scenario with developing countries taking no action on climate change 
and developed countries not moving to protect industries adversely affected by climate response 
measures. The ‘worst case’ leakage rate is therefore used only to serve the purpose of highlighting 
the potential gains from countries co-operating to combat climate change and avoiding any 
counterproductive ‘free riding’ effects. This co-operative situation is represented by the Scenario 
‘C’: ‘Annex I ET with NAI no-lose crediting’ in our simulations. 
The overall results of modelling the impacts of response measures suggest that, nationally, losses 
due to exports (coal and other) are off-set by gains in exports of energy-intensive and trade-intensive 
sectors. However, this occurs only in a situation with emissions trading extended beyond Annex I, on 
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the basis of no-lose crediting for NAI. In the case of the ‘No ET’ scenario and the ‘Annex I ET’ 
scenario, South Africa can expect real production losses, essentially because global competition for 
export of energy-intensive goods to Annex I countries intensifies on the back of falling fossil fuel 
prices (due to falling world demand) which may end up allowing some NAI regions such as China to 
gain from the competition, but resulting in losses for others such as South Africa. The overall losses, 
however, can be turned into potential gains if NAI regions are allowed to participate in a global ETS 
on a ‘no-lose’ basis.  
In terms of potential gains from emissions crediting this study found that South Africa might earn 
$285 billion in 2010 (for the 25% no-lose NAI mitigation scenario which rises to $470 million for 
the 40% scenario), $121 million in 2015 ($187m) and $64 million in 2020 ($68m). These potential 
earnings should be understood in the context of massive gains from emissions trade by Annex I, for 
example, the US would save $4288 million in 2020 in the 40% scenario.  
A summary of the analysis can be described briefly in terms of winners and losers as follows:  
Losers: 
• ‘Coal mining’ irrespective of emissions trading regimes, due to reduced worldwide demand in 
all scenarios relative to BaU (around -1.5 to -2% per annum in ‘no ET’ and ‘Annex I ET’ 
Scenarios and around -2.5 to -3% in ‘Annex I ET with NAI no-lose crediting Scenario). More 
specifically the figures above show (as well as those in Table 3.10 later) that across all three 
scenarios assessed (No ET, Annex I ET and Annex I ET & no-lose crediting) the coal sector 
stands to lose in terms of exports. However, in the last scenario, with no-lose crediting, the 
magnitude of this negative impact on the coal sector is significantly smaller, dropping from 
5.4% in ‘no ET’ to 0.3% in ‘no-lose crediting’.  
• Other EITE sectors benefit from no-lose grading, but show some losses otherwise. There sectors 
are ferrous metals; agriculture, food and tobacco; chemical rubber plastic; motor vehicle and 
equipment; non ferrous metals; other manufacture; international tourism. This is due to a 
combination of reduced demand (income effect) in Annex I countries and strong competition 
from other NAI countries in the supply of these goods to Annex I countries. ‘Air transport’ 
escapes from losses because of the benefit of reduced fuel costs due to reduced world demand 
for fuels (relative to BaU Scenario). ‘Iron and steel’ and ‘Other mining’ avoid reduction due to 
leakage effects to South Africa despite competition from other NAI countries.  
Winners: 
• ‘Iron and steel’, ‘Other mining’ and ‘Air transport’ in ‘No ET’ and ‘Annex I ET’ Scenarios. The 
positive impact on ‘Air transport’ in South Africa is primarily due to reduced fuel costs due to 
reduced world demand for fuels (relative to BaU). The positive impacts on ‘Iron and steel’ and 
‘Other mining’ in South Africa is partly due to potential ‘leakage effects’. 
• Most EITE sectors can turn losses into gains with ‘no-lose trading’ or even just ‘Annex I 
trading’ – except ‘Coal mining’, ‘Iron and steel’, and ‘Other mining’. The potential losses 
outweighed by the positive income effect from improved efficiency in this ET regime, 
particularly if the sectors have access to the carbon markets directly. 
• ‘International tourism’ – as with most sectors – shows positive impacts when there is ‘Annex I 
ET with NAI no-lose crediting’, but reports losses when there is no NAI no-lose crediting. This 
is (at least in part) due to the way this sector is created in this analysis.
45
 Firstly, ‘International 
tourism’ shows negative impacts in ‘No ET’ and ‘Annex I ET’ scenarios because of the negative 
                                                        
45  In this study we assume the expenditure level of ‘International tourists’ takes up a fixed proportion of the total 
expenditure level in sectors such as ‘Other market services’, ‘Recreational and other services’, ‘Trade and 
transport’ (see Table 3.2). This means when the total expenditure in these sectors changes (as a result of the 
climate response measures) we implicitly assume that the expenditure level by international tourists in these 
sectors also change by the same proportion. This implies either that the expenditure level per tourist remain the 
same but the total number of tourists change or the number of tourists remain the same but their expenditure 
level per tourist has changed. Future studies may want to determine either or both of these two factors (in some 
exogenous simulations) to determine more accurately the changes in the proportion of international tourism 
expenditure level in these sectors over different periods rather than assuming them to remain unchanged, as 
assumed in this study. 
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impacts on the ‘Trade and other transport (except air transport)’ and ‘Other market services’ 
sectors despite positive impacts on Air transport sector. Only in the ‘Annex I with NAI no-lose 
crediting’ scenario that this is turned around. 
The findings suggest that policy-makers might wish to consider the following: 
• Negative impacts on the coal exports sector needs to be considered for further studies. 
• The mixed impacts on a range of sectors, including iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, 
chemicals, machinery and transport equipment, due to the differences inherent in different ET 
regimes, need to be considered for climate change considerations and negotiations, as well as for 
domestic industry policies. More specifically: 
o In terms of international climate policy negotiations. In particular, the potential gains (for 
South Africa as well as other developing countries) from an ET regime which allows for 
crediting for developing countries on a ‘no-lose’ basis. These potential gains are reflected 
in the results of this study and implies this is a promising policy approach.  This approach 
therefore can be supported at the international negotiation level; however, at the same 
time, further research needs to be conducted at the South African level to help identify 
more specifically the gains for South Africa and policies needed to facilitate these gains.  
 Research is needed to understand how this ET approach would work in practice in 
South Africa and to what extent it would help reinforce or is in conflict with domestic 
policies aimed at energy savings in South Africa to move towards a low carbon 
economy. 
 The impacts of industrial energy efficiency policies in South Africa and impacts of 
international ET regimes on South African sectors have domestic budgetary 
implications such as profitability and employment as well as environmental 
implications such as lower GHG emissions and future sustainable development of the 
country (Howells Laitner, 2005). The key question is how to reconcile or combine 
these two consequencess. 
o In terms of domestic climate policy on mitigation, the identified energy-intensive and 
trade-intensive sectors would either require a structured regulatory approach (e.g. 
benchmarks for emissions intensity in relation to their greater exposure), or incentives. 
Incentives could be domestically defined, e.g. through incentives to improve energy 
efficiency (and thus reduce intensity) or incentives in industrial policy for trade-exposed 
sectors. 
• The impacts on agriculture and tourism deserve particular attention. Specific areas of focus for 
further work are suggested in section 5. 
In general, previous studies have found the sectoral impacts of response measures to be negative. 
This report however shows that not all impacts will be negative, in fact some sectors will experience 
a positive gain from the implementation of response measures to climate change by Annex I 
countries. South African policy-makers must thus be aware of not only the sectoral gains and losses 
but more importantly the magnitude of these losses, and the degree to which they can be balanced by 
gains. Ultimately, trade and climate policy-makers need to be prepared to deal with the energy-
intensive and trade-exposed sectors identified in this report. 
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Appendix 1: Additional input  
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Figure A.1: Trends in the other main energy consuming industrial sectors between 2001 and 2006 
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Figure A.2: Trends in GDP across the other main industrial sectors between 2001 and 2006 
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Appendix 2: Detail on GTAP-E database and its 
aggregation in this study 
The Global Trade Analysis Project database and associated models 
In the modelling part of the project, we make use of a special purpose global economic and trade 
data set compiled by the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), a companion energy volume data 
set and CO2 emission data. Although there are many modelling frameworks that can be used to 
evaluate the likely impact of carbon reduction emission, we have selected the GTAP framework 
because it identifies the South African economy as a single region and also because the suite of 
GTAP models (including GTAP-E) are widely used and publicly available.
46
. 
The economic and trade part of the database (version 7) identifies 113 regions and 57 
commodities/sectors (see Narayanan & Walmsley 2008). In addition to intermediate demand and 
international trade, final demand and primary inputs, or factors of production are accounted for. 
Final demand is represented in its most aggregate form, i.e. by means of a single household, a single 
government and a single bundle of investment demand. Endowments (or factors of production) 
consist of four categories: labour, land, capital, and natural resources. GTAP distinguishes between 
skilled and unskilled labour which is of particular interest to South Africa, where unemployment 
amongst unskilled labour is considered to be very high compared to skilled labour. Anecdotal 
evidence even suggests that the latter is close to being fully employed. We note however, that as is 
standard in a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model approach such as GTAP, labour demand 
and supply (whether skilled or unskilled) are mostly assumed to be equalised (i.e. markets clear). 
Thus, to translate these variables into actual employment and unemployment rates requires 
additional information and assumptions on participation rates (in addition to population growth and 
distribution). Therefore, results from a ‘policy analysis’ using CGE model should be distinguished 
from the usual forecast analysis, unless the model is specifically adapted for this purpose (such as 
the case with MONASH model (http://www.monash.edu.au/policy/)). 
With this database GTAP has developed a standard neoclassical trade modelling framework that 
simulates impacts and interactions amongst these institutions based on the principle of global general 
equilibrium. General equilibrium modelling frameworks have a number of suitable characteristics 
that allow, according to Arndt & Lewis (2000)
47
 for the examination of a range of economic policy 
issues including the following: 
• The simulation of the functioning of a market economy, including markets for labour, capital 
and commodities to provide a useful perspective on how changes in economic conditions will 
likely be mediated through prices and markets. 
• Unlike many other partial equilibrium or aggregate macro approaches, they are based on a 
consistent and balanced set of economy-wide accounts (which in our case is a string of 
simplified regional Input-Output tables). This requires that behavioural and accounting 
constraints such as budget constraints and balance of payment equilibrium are maintained, 
which serve as an important check on the ‘reasonability’ of the outcomes. 
• Because they can be fairly disaggregated, general equilibrium models offer an economic 
‘simulation laboratory’ with which we can examine how different factors and channels of 
impacts will affect the performance and structure of the economies involved, how they will 
interact, and which are quantitatively the most important. 
An important feature of this class of models is that they allow for various degrees of substitution to 
take place at various points in the economic system. For example, these models usually allow for the 
substitution of labour for capital in reaction to changes in the wage rate. Another example is the 
demand for goods and services which is governed by imperfect substitution between domestically 
produced and imported supply. If the price of the domestically produced good rises, say, as a result 
of an increase in an import tax, demand is supposed to shift to some degree towards imported goods. 
                                                        
46  Alternative models like the MIT EPPA model (which also uses the GTAP database) – see Paltsev et al. (2005) -
is not publicly available. 
47  Arndt C, & Lewis J, The Macro Implications of HIV/AIDS in South Africa, a Preliminary Assessment, Paper 
presented at the TIPS Annual Forum, September 2000. 
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GTAP-E model and database 
In order to tackle some of the interactions between the environment and global trade, the economic 
database of GTAP has been extended with energy volume data and carbon (C02) emission data. With 
the extended database, it is then possible to allow for further possibilities of substitution, i.e., those 
amongst forms of energy (coal, gas and petroleum) and those between energy and capital. The 
former may be brought about by imposing a uniform tax on carbon emissions or an exogenous 
increase in the price of CO2 and since the various forms of energy produce different levels of carbon 
per unit producers, which are assumed to be cost minimisers, will shift their demand to forms of 
energy that produce less carbon. Similarly, producers are allowed, as is known to happen in 
economic reality, to switch to the use of more capital with the intention to save energy. The 
substitution between alternative forms of energy inputs in production and consumption activities in 
the GTAP model is specified in a special version called GTAP-E version and has been used to study 
the issues of energy-substitution, environmental and climate policy studies (Burniaux and Truong, 
2002; Truong et al. 2007).
48
 
The GTAP-E model, in its standard form, is still a comparative static general equilibrium model, i.e. 
each simulation assumes the economies traverse from one equilibrium position to another, and 
therefore, only the final equilibrium end points are considered but not the transitional path.
49
 
Furthermore, because each period is considered to be ‘self-contained’ (necessary for the solution of 
the general equilibrium outcome), this means there is no carry on of expectation from one period to 
the next and no inter-temporal optimisation between the periods. This means the model is simply 
solved for each simulation period of simulation and the results are then used to update the database 
for the next period simulation. This is called ‘recursive dynamic’ approach is to be distinguished 
from models which allow for intertemporal optimisation and ‘forward looking’ expectation which 
can be regarded as ‘truly’ dynamic. To date, due to computational as well as theoretical 
complexities, truly dynamic models exist only in highly aggregate form, typically with only a single 
or a few sectors of the economy, and therefore, are less suitable for policy analysis at the sectoral 
level. 
The GTAP-E model allows for capital stock to be read at the beginning of each period and updated 
at the end of the period. To make the model recursive dynamic, the growth of capital during each 
period needs to be linked to an investment decision (and depreciation of the capital stock) during 
each period. It is the theory behind the investment decision that distinguishes between different 
‘types’ of dynamism in a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model, and this can range from 
highly sophisticated setups of adaptive expectation and ‘error correction process’
50
 to simpler theory 
of investment decision based on some hypothesis about the long run or ‘normal’ rate of return.
51
 
With respect to labour (employment), the dynamics in the employment of this factor can also be 
determined by various theories about how labour demand and supply are linked to real wages and 
population growth. Finally, other factors such as land and natural resources can also be made 
‘dynamic’ by employing some theories about land and natural resource scarcity, etc.  
In the absence of these sophisticated theories, however, a simpler approach is to rely on ‘exogenous’ 
projection of the growth of these factors. In our case, because of the long time frame and the 
difficulty of maintaining some hypothesis or assumptions for such a long period of time, we have 
chosen to adopt a simpler approach. It is assumed that the rates of growth of GDP and population 
will be ‘consistent’ with some other studies (such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) Special Report on Emissions Scenarios). Once the rates of growth of GDP are ‘determined’, 
the growth of primary factors cannot be left entirely ‘exogenous’ but must be related to these 
assumed GDP growth rates. For example, we can imagine the whole economy as an ‘aggregate’ 
sector (as most aggregate models of economic growth would) and therefore, GDP is just an ‘output’ 
                                                        
48  There are two versions of the GTAP-E model, one maintained by Truong (Truong et al. 2007) and one 
maintained by the GTAP centre (Burniaux and Truong, 2002, McDougall and Golub, 2009), both are publicly 
available at the GTAP website: https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/. Latest research relating to the use of the 
GTAP-E model includes a study on the set of substitution parameters used in the GTAP-E model, and this is 
documented in Beckman et al. (2009). 
49  If the time period is sufficiently long (at least 5 years as in this study), this can be considered to be a reasonable 
assumption. 
50  See for example Ianchovichina and McDougall (2000).  
51  See, for example, investment decision in the ORANI-GD model, http://www.monash.edu.au/policy/ 
oranig.htm#oranigrd. 
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from an aggregate ‘production function’ which has the aggregate primary factors as inputs. The form 
of this aggregate production function determines the ‘elasticity’ of substitution between the factors 
of production, and therefore, their relative growth rates once the output growth has been 
determined.
52
 
Concordance between GTAP version 7 and Quantec standardised industry databases 
Table A.1 shows the concordance between GTAP v7 and Quantec standardised industry (SASID) 
databases. Based on this concordance, we have selected a particular sectoral aggregation which is 
suitable for the purpose of this study and this is shown in Table A.2. Table A.3 then shows the 
regional aggregation which is selected to highlight the most important trade partners with South 
Africa. 
Table A.1: Concordance of GTAP version 7 and Quantec standardised industry databases 
GTAP 
No. 
GTAP 
Code 
GTAP Description SASID 
No. 
SASID Description 
1 PDR Paddy rice 1 Agriculture, forestry & fishing 
2 WHT Wheat 
3 GRO Cereal grains nec 
4 V_F Vegetables, fruit, nuts 
5 OSD Oil seeds 
6 C_B Sugar cane, sugar beet 
7 PFB Plant-based fibres 
8 OCR Crops nec 
9 CTL Bovine cattle, sheep, goats, horses 
10 OAP Animal products nec 
11 RMK Raw milk 
12 WOL Wool, silk-worm cocoons 
13 FRS Forestry 
14 FSH Fishing 
15 COA Coal 2 Coal mining 
16 OIL Oil 4 Other mining 
17 GAS Gas 
18 OMN Minerals nec 
3 Gold & uranium ore mining 
19 CMT Bovine meat products 5 Food 
20 OMT Meat products nec 
21 VOL Vegetable oils and fats 
22 MIL Dairy products 
23 PCR Processed rice 
24 SGR Sugar 
25 OFD Food products nec 
26 B_T Beverages & tobacco products 6 Beverages 
7 Tobacco 
27 TEX Textiles 8 Textiles 
                                                        
52  Often, a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production can be assumed, but if there are more than two 
factors, this function is restrictive because it does not allow for different rates of substitution between different 
factors. Hence we have chosen a CRESH (constant ratio of elasticity of substitution homothetic) production 
function instead Once the CRESH elasticities of substitution between these primary factors (including capital) 
are determined, the rates of growth of the factors become endogenous, and hence this is the ‘special form’ of 
‘dynamism’ which has been chosen for the GTAP-E model. See Hanoch, G., (1971). 
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GTAP 
No. 
GTAP 
Code 
GTAP Description SASID 
No. 
SASID Description 
28 WAP Wearing apparel 9 Wearing apparel 
29 LEA Leather products 10 Leather & leather products 
11 Footwear 
30 LUM Wood products 12 Wood & wood products 
31 PPP Paper products, publishing 13 Paper & paper products 
14 Print, publish & recorded media 
32 P_C Petroleum, coal products 15 Coke & refined petroleum products 
33 CRP Chemical, rubber, plastic products 16 Basic chemicals 
17 Other chemicals & man-made fibres 
18 Rubber products 
19 Plastic products 
34 NMM Mineral products nec 20 Glass & glass products 
21 Non-metallic minerals 
35 I_S Ferrous metals 22 Basic iron & steel 
36 NFM Metals nec 23 Basic non-ferrous metals 
37 FMP Metal products 24 Metal products excl. machinery 
38 MVH Motor vehicles and parts 29 Motor vehicles, parts & accessories 
39 OTN Transport equipment nec 30 Other transport equipment 
40 ELE Electronic equipment 27 TV, radio & communication equip. 
41 OME Machinery and equipment nec 25 Machinery & equipment 
26 Electrical machinery 
42 OMF Manufactures nec 28 Professional & scientific equipment 
30 Other transport equipment 
31 Furniture 
32 Other industries 
43 ELY Electricity 33 Electricity, gas & steam 
44 GDT Gas manufacture, distribution 33 Electricity, gas & steam 
45 WTR Water 34 Water supply 
46 CNS Construction 35 Building construction 
36 Civil engineering & other 
construction 
47 TRD Trade 37 Wholesale & retail trade 
38 Catering & accommodation services 
48 OTP Transport nec 39 Transport & storage 
49 WTP Water transport 
50 ATP Air transport 
51 CMN Communication 40 Communication 
52 OFI Financial services nec 41 Finance & insurance 
53 ISR Insurance 
54 OBS Business services nec 42 Business services 
57 DWE Dwellings 
55 ROS Recreational and other services 44 Other community, social & personal 
services -profit seeking 
45 Other producers 
56 OSG Public Administration, Defence, 
Education, Health 
43 Medical, dental & other health & 
veterinary services 
46 Government 
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Table A.2: Sectoral aggregation for this study 
Aggregated Sector GTAP Sector SASID 
No Code Description No. Code Description No. Description 
1 COA Coal 15 COA Coal  2 Coal mining 
2 OIL Oil 16 OIL Oil 4* (part of) Other mining  
3 GAS Gas 17, 
44 
GAS, 
GDT 
Gas, gas manufacture 
and distribution 
33* (part of) Electricity, gas & 
steam 
4 P_C Refined 
Products 
32 P_C Petroleum, coal 
products 
15 Coke & refined petroleum 
products 
5 ELY Electricity 43 ELY Electricity 33* (part of) Electricity, gas & 
steam 
6 AFB
T  
Agriculture, 
forestry, fishing, 
food beverages 
and tobacco 
1-
14, 
19-
26, 
PDR-
FSH, 
CMT-
B_T, 
Paddy rice – fishing, 
bovine meat products 
– beverages and 
tobacco products 
1, 5-7 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, 
food beverages, tobacco  
7 OMN Minerals nec  18 OMN Minerals nec 3 Gold & uranium ore mining 
8 PPP Paper products, 
publishing 
31 PPP Paper products, 
publishing 
13, 14 Paper & paper products, 
publishing & recorded media 
9 CRP Chemical, 
rubber, plastic 
products 
33 CRP Chemical, rubber, 
plastic products 
16-19 Basic chemicals, Other 
chemicals, Rubber, Plastic 
products 
10 NMM Non metal 
minerals nec 
34 NMM Mineral products ne 20, 21 Glass, Non metallic minerals 
11 I_S Iron and steel 35 I_S Ferrous metals 22 Basic iron & steel 
12 NFM Non Ferrous 
Metals 
36 NFM Metals nec  Non Ferrous Metals 
13 FMP Ferrous Metal 
Products 
37 FMP Metal products 24 Metal Products excluding. 
machinery 
14 MVH Motor vehicle 
and parts, 
transport equip. 
38, 
39 
MVH, 
OTN –  
Motor vehicle and 
parts, transp equip 
nec 
29, 30 Motor vehicle, parts, 
transport equip. 
15 OMF Other 
manufacturing  
27-
30, 
40-
42 
TEX-
LUM, 
ELE-
OMF  
Textiles-wood 
products, electronic 
equip-manufactures 
nec 
8-12, 
25-28, 
31-32 
Textiles-Wood products, 
Machinery & equipment 
(elec., TV, radio, 
communication, 
professional, scientific), 
Furniture, Oth industries 
16 ATP Air transport  50 ATR Air transport 39* (part of) Transport & storage 
17 TTR Trade and 
transport (excl. 
air transport)  
47-
49 
TRD-
WTP 
Trade, transport nec, 
water transport 
37, 38*, 
39 
Trade, (part of) Catering & 
accom. services, (part of) 
transport & storage 
18 ROS Recreational, 
cultural 
sporting, 
domestic 
services  
55 ROS Recreational and 
other services 
38*  (part of) Catering & 
accommodation services 
19 OSM Other market 
Services 
45-
46
51-
54, 
57 
WTR, 
CNS, 
CMN-
OBS, 
DWE 
Water, Construction, 
Communication- 
business services 
nec, dwellings 
ownership 
38*, 40-
42, 44 
Other market Services 
20 OSG Government 
services 
56 OSG Public admin., 
defence, education, 
health 
43, 46 Government 
Note: * indicates ‘part of’ a sector 
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Table A.3: Regional aggregation for this study 
No  Code  Description  
1 SAF  South Africa  
2 USA  USA 
3 DEU  Germany 
4 GBR  The United Kingdom 
5 NLD  The Netherlands 
 FRA  France 
7 ITA  Italy 
8 BEL  Belgium 
9 WEU  Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden 
10 EFTA  Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, Liechtenstein 
11 RUS  Russian Federation 
12 JPN Japan 
13 ANC  Australia, New Zealand, Canada 
14 RoA1  Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Albania, Bulgaria, Belarus, Croatia, Romania, Ukraine, Rest of Eastern 
Europe (Republic of Moldova), Rest of Europe (Andorra,- Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Faroe Islands, Gibraltar, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Monaco, San 
Marino, Serbia and Montenegro), Rest of Former Soviet Union ( 
15 CHN  China & Hong Kong 
16 IND  India  
17 BAP  Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay 
18 AFR  Rest of South African Customs Union (Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland), Nigeria, 
Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana  
19 MDE  Islamic Republic of Iran, Egypt, Rest of Western Asia ( 
20 RoW  Rest of the World 
 
 
